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The primary purpose of this dissertation is to argue
that, through the first three parts of Book

I

of the

causal theory of the justification of

Treatise, Hume had

a

empirical belief.

In particular,

that are caused by other beliefs,

he held that, among beliefs
a

belief is justified if

and only if it is caused by the process Hume calls "causal

inference"
In the first chapter it is argued that Hume held that

all empirical beliefs

(that are caused by other beliefs)

which are not caused by causal inference are unjustified.
is by no means obvious,

but careful attention to some hereto-

fore neglected sections of Part (iii) of Book

attribution

This

quite plausible.

I

make this

In Chapter II an argument for

this substantive claim of Hume's is developed.

It is at

seven philoleast in part implicit in his discussion of the

sophical relations.

This argument is meant to demonstrate

V

how, on the basis of Hume's psychological theory he could

have argued for the assertion that all beliefs not caused
by causal inference are unjustified.
In Chapters III and IV an argument is offered for the

converse of the interpretive claim of Chapter

I,

viz.

that Hume held that all beliefs caused by causal inference
are justified.

In defense of this claim one is almost im-

mediately faced with an enormous interpretive problem.
Part (iii)

Section

6

In

Hume discusses the justification of

beliefs arrived at via inductive (causal) inference.

It

is the received opinion that Hume was highly sceptical of

such beliefs.

He is alleged to have held that beliefs about

the observed provide no ground or warrant for beliefs about
the unobserved.

It is the contention of this dissertation

that this interpretation is completely mistaken; Hume was
only concerned to establish that all such inferences have
less than the highest possible measure of epistemic warrant.

Since one of Hume's primary aims in the Treatise is
the construction of an elaborate psychological theory of the

operations of the human mind, it is not surprising to find
that,

throughout the first three parts of Book

I,

Hume

assumes that "arguments from experience" that constitute
causal

(inductive)

warrant.

inference have some measure of epistemic

The crucial question in Part (iii)

VI

Section

6

.

is only,

"How much?".

It is not until Part

(iv)

that he reaches the more

sceptical conclusion that has customarily been attributed
to him.

His arguments here are completely independent of

any arguments of Part

(iii)

,

notably Part (iii) Section

6

wherein he is alleged to pose the so-called "Problem of
Induction"

Scattered throughout Book

I

of the Treatise are a

number of suggestions concerning the grounds for our belief
in the legitimacy of inductive inference.

In the last

chapter an attempt is made to state clearly exactly what the

Problem of Induction is and to evaluate critically six proposals that have obvious roots in Hume’s philosophy.

Finally,

the outline of a correct solution of this problem is proposed.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith's The

Philosophy of David Hume

,

a landmark in

Hume scholarship,

it has been generally acknov;ledged that Hume's A Treatise

of H uman Nature has philosophical significance that extends

beyond his sceptical and essentially negative conclusions.
However, as yet there is no firm consensus about even the

general nature and purport of Hume's positive philosophical views.

Many commentators have noted that, while many of the

particular arguments that Hume offers for various claims
are relatively clear, the overall pattern of the argument
of the Treatise is puzzling and obscure.

The main problem

seems to be that Hume's aims are two-fold:

On the one

he is trying to construct a psychological theory

hand,
v;hich,

he believes,

for all the sciences

can serve as the only solid foundation
(see his Introduction to the Treatise

On the other hand, he has philosophical aims as well, i.e.
to evaluate our claims about the nature of the self, the

existence of bodies, the necessity of causal connection,
and so on.

In terms of the number of pages,

the psycho-

logical theory predominates.

Nonetheless, it is the evaluation of beliefs which
1

)

are in some sense fundamental and of
systematic impor-

tance that is a distinctively philosophical task.

One of

the most distressing tendencies in the secondary
litera-

ture on Hume (which is perhaps best exemplified by Kemp
Smith)

is to interpret Hume as maintaining that these

evaluations are, in some sense,
logical theory.

"absorbed" by the psycho-

Evidence for this view is not wanting.

Consider the following passage from the opening paragraph
of Book

I

Part (iv) Section

2:

We may well ask. Wha t causes induce us to
believe in the existence of~ a body ? but~tis
in vain to ask. Whether there be body or
not ? That is a point, which we must take
for granted in all our reasonings.^

This general line of interpretation holds that Hume confuses or deliberately conflates psychological questions
and philosophical ones.

Speaking very generally, this line of interpretation
is almost entirely pernicious.

In a work such as Kemp

Smith's, one is repeatedly faced with the following kind
of situation:

Hume is faced with a philosophical problem

A Treatise of Human Nautre, L.A. Selby-Bigg
^David Hume.
p.”169.
xMl references
editoF) TOxford, lF73)
to Hume's T reatise will be to the Selby-Bigge
edition, hereafter abbreviated, e.g. T. 222.
,

.

3

and by following the thread of the commentary, one finds

that the answer "disappears" in the psychological theory.

This is pernicious because the two kinds of questions can
be separated and usually were separated by Hume.

If and

when they are not properly separated, Hume should be
brought to task for it.

In short,

the philosophical sig-

nificance of Hume's psychological theory has been vastly

overrated
Obviously these are quite general remarks, and there
is not the space here to substantiate them.

Hov;ever,

if

one adopts the attitude implicitly recommended by these

remarks,

I

am confident that one will find Hume easier to

understand and his commentators easier to evaluate.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to discuss

Hume's evaluation of one kind of belief--empirical beliefs
Before discussing in

that are caused by other beliefs.

more detail how

I

have gone about this,

I

should like to

discuss briefly the motivations that have shaped this project and the grander scheme into which it fits.

original intention was to produce

a

My

definitive study of

Hume's epistemological theory of moral judgments.
particular,

I

In

was concerned to answer the following

questions that are relevant to an epistemology of morals:

a)

What are moral judgments?

4

b)

Are they truth-valued?

c)

If they are truth-valued,

under what conditions are

they true?
d)

If they are truth-valued,

e)

If they are corrigible,

are they corrigible?

how are they to be justified?

In the secondary literature on Hume's moral theory,

there has been a heated controversy concerning his views
on some of these questions.

Nonetheless, to the best of

my knowledge (see Bibliography) none of these commentators
has systematically addressed the counterparts of the above

questions

[especially

empirical claims.

(a)

,

(c)

,

and

(e)]

for ordinary

That is, there has been no attempt to

offer a systematic interpretation and reconstruction of
Hume's theory of the nature and justification of our opinIt would seem that this

ions concerning matters of fact.

would be a good idea for a variety of reasons:
(i)

Often it is maintained that Hume held that moral

judgments are significantly different in various

respects from ordinary empirical judgments (opinions

concerning matters of fact)

.

It is difficult to

evaluate such claims without an interpretation of
Hume's views on the latter.

This sort of deficiency

is particularly glaring with regard to so-called

.

5

"non-cognitivist" interpretations of Hume's ethics.

Interpreters of this stripe often fail to tell us

much about the class of "cognitive" judgments of

which moral judgments are not members.
(ii)

From the point of view of philosophical theory, it
is good business to reduce, as much as possible,

the

number of basic principles without sacrificing

explanatory power.

The systematic unity

— or

lack

thereof--of Hume's Treatise can be appraised in part
by examining the relationship between the basic

principles of the general theory of knowledge and
the moral epistemology.

In a paper

I

wrote two years ago,

I

answered the first

four of the questions asked on the preceding page.

Some

of these answers required some interpolation because

there were some obvious lacunae in Hume's epistemology
(i.e.

he never says what an ordinary predicative judgment

is)

The last question, however, raises considerable

difficulties when one turns to Hume's discussion of the

justification of ordinary empirical judgments.

question

— and

these difficulties

It is this

which have given rise

to this dissertation.

There can be little doubt that, at the end of Book

I,

Hume espoused a radical form of scepticism concerning all

6

of the mind's important claims to knowledge.

This scep-

ticism cuts the epistemological grounds out from under his

psychological theory, not only as it is developed in Book
but also as it is worked out in Books II and III.
look at Book

I

I,

A closer

reveals, however, that the arguments that

lead Hume into this scepticism are peculiar to Part (iv)

.

This suggests that perhaps prior to these arguments, Hume

endorsed some criterion of justification.
This view gets some indirect corroboration from

a

quite plausible hypothesis advanced by Norman Kemp Smith.
He argues, on a variety of grounds, that Hume wrote Book
of the Treatise after he wrote Books II and III.

This

would explain why Books II and III, which contain an
elaborate psychological theory, appear after the last
Part of Book
ticism.

I

It is

where he indulges in
m.y

a

most profound scep-

contention, to be argued in detail in

this thesis, that he did not argue for this profound
scepticism, until Part

(iv)

.

In fact, prior to that,

he

had the elements of a substantial positive theory of the

justification of empirical belief.

The bulk of this

thesis consists of an elucidation and defence of this as
a

correct interpretation of Hume.

^This will be argued in detail in Chapter

4
.

^

I
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However, my efforts have been restricted to just

those beliefs that are caused by other beliefs.

striction requires some defence,.

This re-

Conspicuous by their

absence are beliefs in the continued and distinct existence of bodies.

Hume has a long and complex discussion

of such beliefs in Part

(iv)

.

In addition,

I

have made

no attempt to discuss beliefs that arise from the opera-

tion of the memory.

There are three reasons for not

discussing the justification of these beliefs:
(i)

I

shall argue that, among those beliefs that

are caused by other beliefs, a belief is justified if and

only if it has a certain sort of cause.

Since the cause

of a belief is relevant to its justification,

it may

not be the case that beliefs that have radically different
kinds of causes can be easily assimilated to this theory.

That is, Hume might have had a bipartite theory of the

justification of empirical belief.

Thus, the division

between beliefs that are caused by other beliefs and those
that are not so caused is a natural one from an epistemo-

logical point of view.
(ii)

An adequate interpretation of Hume's views on

the justification of these other beliefs would require
an adjudication of a number of major interpretive and

philosophical problems that go beyond the scope of what

8

can be accomplished here.

It would require an interpre-

tation or rational reconstruction of Hume's views on the
nature of perceptions and the relation between per-

ceptions and their objects (or contents)

require

;

it would also

decision about where Hume stands on the debate

a

between realists and phenomenalists

.

Finally, since

some of the arguments that lead to Hume's deep scepti-

cism arise out of his discussion of the belief in the continued and distinct existence of bodies, it would probably
be necessary to discuss and evaluate Hume's scepticism.

The latter topic alone would,

I

suspect, be sufficient

for an entire dissertation.
(iii)

beliefs
motives)

(

Finally, since moral judgments are caused by

viz

.

,

beliefs about a persons

'

s

character or

the theory developed in this thesis will be suf-

ficient for the purposes of comparison with (and, if my

ultimate views are correct, assimilation of) the theory
of the justification of moral judgments.

Thus,

present work meets with sufficient approbation,

if the
I

should

like to carry out at some future time the "Grand Scheme"
of laying out Hume's epistemology of moral judgments.

The

theory of the justification of empirical belief worked
out in this thesis should provide an adequate foundation
for a discussion of correlative issues in the moral theory.

:

9

Consequently, in this thesis

I

shall restrict my

attention to Hume's theory of the justification of empirical beliefs that are caused by other beliefs.

*******
This thesis makes three modest contributions to Hume

scholarship and the philosophical problems about which
Hume wrote

1.

That Hume held

a

causal theory of the justification

of belief in at least the first three parts of Book

the Treatise is, as far as

I

I

of

am able to determine, en-

tirely original with this dissertation.

chapter

I

In the first

argue that Hume held that all empirical beliefs

(that are caused by other beliefs) which are not caused
by the process Hume calls "causal inference" are un-

This is by no means obvious, but careful

justified.

attention to some heretofore neglected sections of
Part (iii) make this attribution quite plausible.

Chapter

2

I

In

develop an argument for this substantive

claim of Hume's that is at least in part implicit in his

discussion of the seven philosophical relations.

It is

meant to demonstrate how, on the basis of Hume's psychological theory, he could have argued for the assertion

.
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that all beliefs not caused by causal inference
are

unjustified
2.

In Chapters

3

and

4

I

argue for the converse of the

interpretive claim of Chapter

1,

viz

.

that Hume held that

all beliefs caused by causal inference are justified.

In

defence of this claim one is almost immediately faced

with an enormous interpretive problem.
Section

6

In Part

(iii)

Hume discusses the justification of beliefs

arrived at via inductive (causal) inference.

It is the

received opinion that Hume was highly sceptical of such
beliefs.

He is alleged to have held that beliefs about

the observed provide no ground or warrant for beliefs

about the unobserved.

It is my contention that this in-

I

terpretation is completely mistaken; Hume was only concerned to establish that all such inferences have less

;

than the highest possible measure of epistemic warrant.

This interpretation is not original with me.

I

years, a few philosophers have maintained it.

In recent

However,

the alternative view has many adherents and at least one
I

able defender (D.C. Stove)

I

.

Which view is correct is by

I

I

no means obvious.

The problem with those philosophers

j

I

who adopt the same position as

I

do on this problem is

1

that they do not take seriously enough the position of
j

I

i

1

I

.
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our opponents, nor do they provide

very detailed posi-

a

tive argument for their own position.

What is unique about my discussion of this issue is
that

I

have argued for this interpretation on different

grounds and with more care and detail than has heretofore
been done.

This argument occupies almost one half of the

thesis (Chapters

3

and

4)

Though there may be arguments

.

for my interpretation that

I

have not recognized,

I

venture to affirm that no such argument will be more

conclusive than the one here offered.
argument does not constitute
trying to do, it is,

I

think,

a

And, though my

proof about what Hume was

sufficiently powerful to

daunt anyone tempted to argue for its contrary.

3.

From

a

substantive point of view, Hume's epistemological

position on inductive inference has two parts:

(i)

He

claims that such inferences have less than the highest

possible measure of epistemic warrant.

(ii)

He believes

that some inductive inferences are epistemically "better
off" than others.

laid out in Chapter

supplement it.

Hume's argument for
3.

I

(i)

is carefully

have made little effort to

The argument is virtually flawless

and constitutes one of the most brilliant pieces of reasoning in the history of philosophy.

On the other hand,

it

for
is not at all clear if Hume has much of an argument

(ii)

12

In Chapter

5

I

offer

a

critical evaluation of

proposals intended to substantiate
similar.

(ii)

a

number of

or something

All of these proposals are "Humean" in that they

are suggested by things that Hume said.

Finally,

I

shall

offer what

I

take to be the correct view on this matter.

In effect,

I

shall be outlining what

solution to the Problem of Induction.

I

believe to be the

CHAPTER

I

A major problem facing an interpreter of Hume's A
Tr eatise of Human Nature is the identification and clari-

fication of major epistemological doctrines.
avowed aim is to construct

much of what we find is

a

a

Since his

"science of human nature",

purely psychological theory,

the aim of which is to give a causal explanation of the

operations of the mind.

However, Hume's most profound

reasonings in Book I--those concerning causality, personal
identity,

induction, and the continued and distinct exis-

tence of bodies--clearly concern metaphysical and epis-

temological issues.

It is important,

though sometimes

difficult, to separate the two kinds of problems.

Throughout much of Book

I,

Hum.e is

an account of the causes of belief.

concerned to provide

In the course of

doing this, however, he also addresses himself to the question of the justification of beliefs.

My concern in this

dissertation will be primarily with the latter issue.

I

shall show that there is an intimate connection between

Hume's psychological theory and his views on the justifi-

cation of our empirical beliefs.

In particular,

I

shall

show that Hume held that such beliefs are justified if
and only if they have certain sorts of causes.

13

Throughout

.
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much of what follows
(e.g.

'justified',

I

shall use certain epistemic terms

'warranted', etc.)

meanings are relatively clear.
explanation.

as though their

This calls for special

There are primarily three reasons why this

is an acceptable procedure:

1.

For the most part, Hume's use of peculiary epistemo-

logical terms is informal, and he relies on

a

rough

and intuitive understanding of such terms in order to

make his point.

The contexts where he uses such

terms with more precision (e.g. his discussion of the

difference between judgments about matters of fact
and those concerning relations of ideas)

are often

peripheral to the present task.
2.

Part of the purpose of this dissertation is to show
that Hume was not a sceptic about empirical claims.

That is,

I

shall show that Hume held that some of

these claims are "epistemologically better off" than
others.

For that purpose, an intuitive understanding

of such terms is sufficient.
3.

Finally, and most importantly, it v;ill be possible
to attain a clearer understanding of these terms only

when we are able to see why and under what circumstances certain beliefs are "epistemically better" than

others

u

.
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Thus, as a noteworthy philosopher has said

connection)

(in another

;

.we have been obliged to advance
in this seemingly preposterous manner,
.

.

and make use of terms before we are
able to exactly define them or fix
their meaning.
(T. 169)

The bulk of Hume's discussion of the justification
of ordinary empirical claims is found in Part

(iii).^

In

this Part, his primary concern is to provide a psychological

explanation of the causes of the mind's beliefs in accordance with his basic methodological principles outlined in

Part

(i)

However,

it is primarily in Part

(iii)

that he

addresses the epistemological question of the justification
of our beliefs concerning matters of fact.

mainder of this chapter,
part of this discussion.

In the re-

should like to focus on one

I
I

shall show that Hum.e held that

certain sorts of beliefs concerning matters of fact are

unjustified and that they are unjustified because they are
not caused by the process Hume calls "causal inference".

I

.

Un j stified Belief and the Systems of Realities

In the early sections of Part

(iii)

Hume establishes

^All Part and Section references are to Book
wise indicated.

I

unless other-

16

the centrality and importance of the relation of causation
and the mind's reasoning concerning it.

done from the point of view of
the operations of the mind.

a

All of this is

psychological theory of

In Section

8

he discusses

how causal and reasoning engenders belief.

process is this:

Briefly, the

After the mind has observed

a

constant

conjunction of two objects, an impression of the one
object will determine the mind to form an idea of the cor-

relative object.

Some of the force and vivacity of the

impression will be "transferred" to the idea.
sequent forceful and lively idea

This sub-

the belief in the un-

observed occurrence of the cause or effect.
Ostensibly, the purpose of the next few sections is to

discuss the effects of other relations and habits which
are responsible for the association of ideas.
lar,

In particu-

he will be concerned with the effects of other rela-

tions and habits on belief.

The immediate problem at the beginning of Section

9

is that the relations of contiguity and resemblance

would seem to have the same effect as causation, viz

,

to

enliven the related idea and thereby engender belief.
I'he

reason for this apparent problem is that contiguity

and resemblance, as well as causation, are natural relations.

That is, the mind tends to associate ideas in the

imagination that bear (or are believed to boar) these

17

relations.

Since these relations do not in fact engender

belief (or at least not very often)

,

Huine

feels obliged to

explain why.
To accomplish this task, he first sketches two inter-

locking systems of beliefs that do not depend on resemblance
and contiguity;

these systems of belief are engendered by

the operation of memory and by the operation of causal

inference.

Hume says that we dignify these beliefs by

calling them realities.

He goes on to point out the cen-

trality and importance of these systems.
He then claims that resemblance and contiguity can

"assist" causal reasoning; the resultant beliefs will be

more firmly infixed in the mind.

The former relations

alone, however, are not enough to cause belief.

Thus,

Hume argues that resemblance and contiguity are unlike observed constant conjunction, which, together with

a

present

impression, cause belief in the occurrence of an event.
That is, the effect of the relation of causation is belief

,

whereas resemblance and/or contiguity alone do not have
this effect.

Throughout the remainder of Section
in tlie beginning of Section 10,

9

and at one place

he considers the effect of

other relations and habits; unlike resemblance and contiguity,

some of these other relations and habits do engender

18

belief.

These beliefs have causes other than the process

involved in causal inference.

Thus much of these sections

is devoted to providing a psychological account of the

causes of certain sorts of beliefs.

Interspersed with this

causal account, he argues that each of these kinds of

beliefs (which are engendered by other relations and habits)
is unjustified or unwarranted.

In each case he either

explicitly says or clearly implies that the reason that
such beliefs are unjustified is that the causes of these

beliefs are different from the causes of beliefs arrived at

through causal inference.

In what follows

I

shall show

this in detail.

Since much of what follows involves contrasting certain kinds of beliefs with beliefs that belong to the

"systems of realities", it will be helpful to get a clearer
idea of what kinds of beliefs Hume claims belong to these

systems.

As noted previously, there are two interlocking

systems--one based on memory (connected with some present
impressions)

and the other based on causal inference.

regard to the former, he says:
Of these impressions or ideas of the
memory we form a kind of system,
comprehending whatever we remember to
have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and
every particular of that system,
joined to the present impressions, we
are pleased to call a reality. (T. 108)

With

19

Since the survey of this system of memories is

activated by a present impression or impressions, some

measure of the force and vivacity of the latter is
transferred to the memory system, thereby engendering
belief.

However, our system of belief would be quite

impoverished, if it was limited to our memories.

We

find that there is another system connected to it by what

Hume calls 'custom or the relation of cause and effect'
(i.e.

causal inference)

.

He says,

and as it [the mind]

feel that tis

in a manner necessarily determined

to view these particular ideas, and
that the custom or relation, by
which it is determined, admits not
of the least change, it forms them
into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of
The first of these
realities
systems is the object of the memory
and senses; the second of the judgment.
(T. 108)
.

Thus there are two interlocking systems of belief
that might be called "systems of realities".

As subse-

quent quotations will clearly demonstrate, Hume held that
not all of our beliefs arise from memory or causal inference.

These other kinds of beliefs are not memories and

arise from kinds of causes that are different from the

causes of those beliefs that belong to the system of the
judgment.

Again,

though the primary concern is to give

psychological explanation of these beliefs, he also

a

20

maintains that those kinds of beliefs are unjustified.
The relevant discussions are those concerning Credulity,

Education, and Fools and Madmen.

Credulity

.

Hume defines credulity as a too easy

faith (or belief)

in the testimony of others.

Our belief

in the testimony of others arises from our experience of

those who testify.

Generally, we find (presumably by a

kind of corroborative checking) that men tell the truth
and report, with reasonable accuracy, what actually

occurs.

Our reasoning is causal in that we find that it

is generally the case that

(at least part of)

the cause

of someone's testimony is a lively idea or series of ideas

that the testifier has; these ideas constitute his belief
that the event actually occurred.
son a liar.

Lapses here make a per-

We in turn find that (at least part of)

the

cause of his or her forceful and lively ideas is the occurrence of the event in question.

Hume says that the ideas

"represent and resemble the facts or objects."
These facts are "known through"

(or perhaps are

identical to) certain impressions that the testifier has
had.

In the overwhelming majority of cases when someone

testifies, they do so on the basis of their memory of what
was present to their senses.

It is not clear what Hume

would say about cases of testimony where one is reporting
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what one is currently witnessing (e.g. sportscasting)

He

.

may want to say that there are two sets of perceptions

— the

impressions and the ideas which constitute beliefs about
those impressions.
feee

Treatise

,

p.

One of his definitions of belief

suggests that no impression is iden-

96)

tical to a belief.

Whatever is the correct description of

this kind of case on the basis of Hume's psychological
theory, let us restrict our attention (as Hume seems to

have done)

to those cases where the proximate cause of

the testifier's testimony

purported memory ideas.

(i.e. utterances)

is a series of

Of the connection between these

ideas and the past impressions, Hume says.

connection is generally much
This
overrated and commands our assent beyond
what experience will justify; which can
proceed from nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts.
.

(T.

.

.

113)

Lapses here are perhaps more frequent that in the case
of lying; in this case the cause of the testifier's
(mistaken)

belief is a faulty memory or

tion of what was observed.

a

misinterpreta-

Generally speaking, however, we

find that the grounding link in a causal chain which results
in our belief in the testimony of others is the occurrence

of the event that the testifier describes.

Experience (i.e. causal inference) will cause only

a
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limited faith in the testimony of others.

That is, we

find that there is often, but not always, a resemblance

between (what we believe to be) the testifier's memory
ideas and the facts.

What, then,

is the cause of our too

easy faith in the testimony of others?

Though it is hard

to pin Hume down exactly on this, he seems to suggest that

our discovery in the past of a resemblance between (what

we believe to be)

the testifier's ideas and the events

described in the veridical cases has, as an effect on our
minds, the enlivening of our ideas
of the testimony)

(which are the result

beyond what experience will justify.

That is, our degree of belief is greater than it would be
if we let past experience of genuine cases be our sole

guide.

Thus,

it is the relation of resemblance and not

past experience based solely on causal inference that
guides us when it comes to the testimony of others.
But though experience be the true
standard of this, as well as of all
other judgments, we seldon regulate
.No
ourselves entirely by it.
wonder, therefore, we are so rash
in drawing our inferences from it
[testimony] and are less guided by
experience in our judgments
concerning it, than in those upon
any other subject. (T. 113)
.

.

This passage makes clear that Hume holds that our
too easy faith in the testimony of others is unjustified
or unw’ar r an ted

.

Furthermore, he holds that this credulity
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is not caused by a causal inference or a series of causal

inferences.

Causal inferences only warrant a limited

faith in the testimony of others.
is a

(past)

What causes credulity

frequently discovered resemblance between

the ideas of the testifier and what actually occurs.
Thus, a too easy belief in the testimony of others is

unjustified; the reason that it is unjustified is that it
is caused by something other than causal inference,

viz.

an alleged resemblance.

B.

Education

.

Hume teaches that custom may operate in

two ways in "invigorating" an idea and thereby engendering
belief.

First, the mind may experience a constant con-

junction of the two objects.

Upon the occurrence of an

impression of the one, the mind will form

a

strong and

lively idea of the other; this is what occurs in causal
inference.

On the other hand, an idea may be frequently

introduced without any of this preparation.

Hume says

that this idea will eventually become firmly infixed in
the mind, thereby engendering belief.

Beliefs introduced

in this manner are what Hume calls the result of Education,
(We

might be inclined to call it, more accurately, in-

doctrination

.

)

Such beliefs may operate in much the same way as those
that belong to the Systems of Realities.

He says.

2/1

so the judgment, or rather the
imagination, by the like means,
may have ideas so strongly
imprinted on it, and conceive them
in so full a light, that they may
operate upon the mind in the same
manner with those, which the
senses, memory or reason present
to us.
(T. 117)

Note that Hume first says that these ideas are imprinted
on the judgment

the system of realities engendered

(i.e.

by causal inference)

but immediately corrects himself and

says that they are imprinted on the imagination (that is,

they become believed)

.

As the context of this passage and

the footnote that follows it make clear, Hume here means
by

ing

'reason' what he customarily means by 'causal reason'

.

Thus the cause of beliefs induced by Education is the

repeated introduction of the idea into the mind.

This is

obviously different from the cause of beliefs that are
induced by causal inference, which requires a constant

conjunction of impressions of objects and a present impression

(or memory idea)

of one of the objects.

What is Hume's evaluation of opinions induced by

education?

His answer is clear:

They are not, on that

account, warranted.
But as education is an artifical
and not a natural cause, and as
its maxims are frequently contrary
to reason and even to themselves
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in different places and different
it is never upon that account

times,

recognized by philosophers.
But though education be disclaimed
by philosophy, as a fallacious
ground of assent to any opinion, it
prevails nevertheless in the
.

world

.

.

(T.

.

117,

.

,

118)

The philosophers here, as elsewhere in Part (iii)
the Wise.

,

are

V/hile the Vulgar may accept views that are

induced by education, the Wise do not accept

a

proposition

solely because someone has tried to "educate" them with

respect to it.

Of course, Hume is not saying that all

opinions derived from education are false.

Rather, he

says that their being engendered by education does not,

upon that account (for that reason) recommend such beliefs
to the Wise.

Thus because such beliefs have the causes

that they do, they are unjustified.

In particular,

such

causes are not the causes that give rise to belief via

causal inference.

C.

Fools and Madmen

.

In Section 10 Hume discussed the

influence of belief on the passions and the influence of
poets on the imagination.

When

a

skillful poet describes

something in very vivid terms, the mind's resultant ideas
are so lively and intense that it becomes difficult to

withhold assent.
of the Vulgar,

Indeed,

no doubt'.)

some people

(weak-minded members

fail in this respect and actually
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believe some preposterous poetical system.

Hume notes that

the poets themselves are often victims of this.
A lively imagination may have other effects as well.

Sometimes such an imagination degenerates into madness or
folly.

On Hume's account of physiological psychology, an

extraordinary ferment of blood and animal spirits causes
a

vivacity of ideas (i.e. belief) which indicates that the

powers and faculties of the mind have become disordered.

When this happens,
there is no means of distinguishing betwixt truth and
falsehood; but every loose fiction
or idea, having the same influence
as the impressions of the memory or
the conclusions of the judgment is
received on the same footing
A present impression and a customary
transition are no longer necessary
Every
to enliven our ideas.
chimera of the brain is as vivid
and intense as any of those inferences v;hich we formerly
dignify 'd with the name of conclusions concerning matters of
.

.

.

.

fact.

(T.

.

.

123)

Here, more clearly than in any other passage, Hume

explicitly states the views that
him.

I

have been attributing to

The beliefs of fools and madmen are caused by some-

thing other than causal inference (the causes are aberrant

physiology)

.

Because such beliefs are so caused, these

individuals have no way of distinguishing the true ones
from the false ones.

That is, they have no means by which

.
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to judge which beliefs are justified and which are not.
It is the cause of these beliefs that cuts away their

credibility

**********
Hume's discussion of Credulity, Education, and
Fools and Madmen clearly shovs that beliefs can arise from

causes other than the operation of memory and causal inference.

Realities.

Thus, not all beliefs belong to the Systems of

Furthermore, he argues that these beliefs are

unjustified and that they are unjustified because they
have causes other than causal inference.
It would be a mistake to conclude from this discussion

that the only causes of unjustified belief are aberrant

physiology, education, and that which results in
faith in the testimony of others.
13 of Part

easy

a too

In Sections 11 through

(iii), Hume's doctrine of belief gets complicated

by the fact that, as a consequence of his definition of

belief, belief admits of degree.

Furthermore, he appears

to claim in Section 13 that the degree of belief can be

unwarranted or unjustified if it has certain causes.

To

get a complete picture of Hume's views on unjustified

belief and its causes, it will be necessary to examine his

position in Section 13,

"Of Unphilosophical Probability".
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II

.

Of Unphi losophical Probability
and Un just ified Belie f

Up through the end of Section 10 Huine has supposed,
for expository purposes,

that all of the mind's beliefs

concerning matters of fact which arise from causal inference require an observed constant conjunction together

with an impression or memory idea.

In Sections 11 through

13 he discusses variations and complications of this basic

pattern of reasoning.

His main concern, as in the past,

is to provide a psychological explanation of how such

reasoning causes belief.
At the beginning of Section 11 he remarks that he, as

well as other philosophers, have divided human reason into

knowledge and probability.

Knowledge arises from

a com-

parison of ideas and admits of no doubt or uncertainty.
As a consequence of this division, all arguments from

causation are merely probable.

The conclusion of any such

argument is not entirely free of doubt and uncertainty.
Hume recognizes that this is somewhat unfortunate because,
in common parlance,

it is ridiculous to say,

for example,

that it is only probable that all men must die.

The con-

clusions of well-established causal arguments achieve a
kind of practical certainty that needs to be taken into
account.

Accordingly, Hume designates such arguments as
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"proofs", and it seems reasonable to say that
their con-

clusions are practically certain.

Arguments that proceed from some variation on causal
reasoning and whose conclusions are attended with some

measure of uncertainty are rebaptized as "probabilities".
This class is in turn divided into two subclasses

subclass concerns arguments founded on chance.

;

one

An example

of this would be the argument whose conclusion is that it
is likely that the next poker hand to be dealt will not be
a

straight flush.

These arguments and the beliefs that

attend their conclusions are the subject of Section 11.

Section 12 concerns arguments that suppose the secret
(unknown)

operation of contrary causes to account for

contrariety of effects.

VJhat

Hume has in mind here can

best be made clear by an example.
on a number of occasions,

iron filings.

a

Suppose that we observe,

that a certain metal bar attracts

We then suppose that the cause of the motion

of the filings is the operation of a force exerted by the
bar.

On a few later occasions, however,

the filings fail

to move when the bar is appropriately placed.

Thereafter,

our expectations about what will happen on a given occasion
in the future will be attended with uncertainty.

Vulgar (falsely)

The

suppose that causes do not always bring

about their effects; Philosophers know better; they suppose
the secret operation of contrary causes

(such as someone's

.
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having coated the bar with some special substance before
the occasions when the filings did not move)
foir

the contrariety of effects.

to account

Usually the secret causes,

either by dint of their minuteness or remoteness, are not
readily discoverable.
However, past observations still have an effect; the

Philosophers, as well as the Vulgar, will still retain some

degree of conviction that the iron filings will move
towards the bar on the next occasion.
a

Since belief is only

more forceful and lively conception of an object or

event, and since the force and vivacity of a perception

admits of degree, Hume allows that there can be degrees
of belief.

The degree of belief that is caused by an

uncertainty about the cause

(s)

is the subject of Section 12.

or effect

(s)

of an event

His main task, in both

Sections 11 and 12, is to provide

a

(causal)

explanation

for the various degrees of belief that are engendered by

these variants of causal inference that are employed under

conditions of uncertainty.
Hume seems to approve of these kinds of inferences

especially his opening remarks in Section 13)

(see

None-

theless, all of these kinds of inference depend, in one

way or another, on causal inference.

Thus the question of

Hume's views on the justification of beliefs arrived at
through these kinds of inferences will depend on what Hume
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thinks about the justification of causal inference.
shall discuss this topic in detail in

Section 13, however, involves

a

a

I

later chapter.

discussion of beliefs

that Hume thinks are clearly unjustified.

He discusses

four kinds of situations that result in unjustified

belief.

Again, his primary concern is to provide a

causal account of the beliefs in question.
follows,

I

In what

shall show in detail that, in these situations

the beliefs are unjustified because they have certain

sorts of causes.
The first three kinds of situations concern beliefs

that arise directly from causal inference.

In these cases

the degree of belief is weaker than it would be ordinarily.

Hume is interested in explaining why this occurs.
Case

1

.

In causal reasoning from an idea of the memory,

the idea which is the conclusion of the causal inference

gets its force and vivacity (in part, at least)

from the

memory idea.

Thus the degree of belief that attends the

conclusion of

a

causal inference will be, in part,

a

of the degree of the force and vivacity of the memory
idea.

Hume puts the matter this way:
The argument, which we found on
any matter of fact we remember,
is more or less convincing,
according as the fact is recent
or remote; (T. 143)

function
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An example will make this clear.

one time in the past

plane for Paris.
I

I

Suppose that at

observed my Uncle Joe board

a

A few months later, someone asks me if

believe that my Uncle Joe has ever been to Paris.

I

recall my observation of him boarding the plane; by causal

reasoning

I

infer that an effect of this action was his

arrival at Orly Airport in Paris.

My memory idea is

quite lively and vivid because this happened

a

relatively

short time ago; consequently, the degree of my belief that

Uncle Joe has been to Paris is quite high.

A number of

years later, someone asks me the same question.

This time

my memory idea is not as lively and vivid as it was pre-

viously (but, let us suppose, not so faint that
that Uncle Joe boarded the plane)

reasoning
Paris.

I

.

I

doubt

Again, by causal

come to believe that Uncle Joe has been to

However, the degree of belief is much less because

the force and vivacity of the memory idea is less.

Hume thinks that the difference in the evidence afforded by the two memory ideas is unwarranted; he argues for

this by a kind of reductio ad absurdem

.

tho' the difference in these degrees
of evidence be not received by
philosophy as solid and legitimate;
because in that case an argument

shall have a different force today
from what it shall have a month
(T. 143)
hence.

:
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Hume seems to claim that the degree of belief in
the
case where the belief arises from the fainter
memory is

unjustified.

His argument for this is something like the

following
On two different occasions, the mind has before it

ideas that it believes to be memories

(e.g.

an image of

U^cle Joe smiling and waving as he boards an Air France
jet)

.

The ideas differ in their force and vivacity.

Hume

cannot hold that the mind doubt s whether the fainter image
is in fact a memory

wise,

(rather than a mere imagining)

Other-

.

it seems reasonable to say that the diminution of

the degree of the subsequent belief is warranted.

In

neither case is there any doubt that the ideas are memories.
In each case,

by causal reasoning, the mind arrives at a

belief that is not
are,

a

memory.

however, different.

The degrees of these beliefs

Hume seems to hold that the

degree of belief in the case where it is weaker is unjustified.

The cause of the degree of this belief is the rela-

tive faintness of the memory idea--a cause that is extrinsic to the process involved in the causal inference.

There are

a

number of difficulties with this claim

that it is the degree of belief that is unjustified.

are some relevcint questions that need to be answered.
do we determine w’hich degree

justified?

(or range of degrees)

There
How

is

Presumably, the force and vivacity of the rele-

.
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vant memory ideas can vary considerably.
belief is appropriate?

Which degree of

Furthermore, it is not clear what

the Wise (the Philosophers)

do in such cases.

of belief the same for them in both cases?

Is the degree

If,

as Hume

intends, his argument is a causal one, the Wise would be

affected with the same changes in degree of belief as the
Vulgar.

What does it mean, on this account, to say that

they do not receive these changes as solid and legitimate?

Hume does not even address these questions.

Furthermore,

given the machinery that he has to work with, it is hard
to see how he could reply to these questions.

Fortunately

there is another way to understand what is going on here

which avoids these problems.
Recall that Hume claims that well-established causal

arguments can rightly be called "proofs".

Their conclu-

sions can be regarded as practically certain.

My reasoning

concerning Uncle Joe's having been in Paris seems to be such
an argument,

as long as there is no doubt that what are

believed to be memory ideas in each case are in fact memory
ideas.

Nonetheless, in each case, the degree of belief is

different
What do the wise actually do in such a case?

Since

presumably they are human, and since Hume's arguments apply
to all human minds,

they must also suffer a diminution in

the degree of their belief in the second case.

However,
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they do not take account of this difference; it is not

regarded as "solid and legitimate".

reasoning are regarded as proofs.
viewed as practically certain.

Both chains of
The conclusions are

That is, the Wise, in

effect, make or are disposed to make an epistemic judgment

about the argument.

They regard the premises of the argu-

ment as bestowing a practical certainty on the conclusion.
It is on the basis of this epistemic judgment

disposition to make such

a

judgment)

(or their

and not the momentary

feeling of less than full conviction that they guide their
future inferences and actions.

What of the Vulgar in such cases?

It is tem.pting

to say that they too make an epistemic judgment.

their proclivity (often noted by Hume)
as they appear,

Given

for taking things

they might judge that the conclusion is

less than certain, thereby taking their degree of conviction
as the sole indication of the conclusiveness of the argu-

ment

.

But isn't this crediting the Vulgar with too much?

Don't the Vulgar merely entertain the conclusion with

degree of belief less than that of full conviction?
the Vulgar have,

beliefs?

a

Don't

for the most part, no epistemological

On Hume's account of belief, where belief is

occurrent rather than dispositional, the answer seems to
be "Yes."

However,

it does not seem unreasonable to say

.
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that the Vulgar are disposed to have the kind of epistemic

belief or to make the epistemic judgment suggested above.
Not only is the second argument, about Uncle Joe subjectively less convincing than the first,

the Vulgar, on Hume's

reading of the situation, are not disturbed by this.

Were

they to be asked about the concl usiveness of the causal

argument and its conclusion, they would reply that its con-

clusiveness is on a par with how convincing it is, viz.,
less than practically certain.

This would be unlike the

Wise, whose felt conviction may be less than entire, but

who nonetheless recognize that the argument constitutes

a

proof
The difference between the Vulgar's (dispositional)

epistemic belief and that of the Wise would, perhaps, be

manifest in long run dispositions to act and make inferences.
The momentary subjective degree of conviction, which, if

Hume's argument is correct, is identical for both the Vulgar
and the Wise, might be manifest in more short-term

dispositions, e.g. the willingness to take, on the "spur
of the moment" and unref lectively

,

certain bets.

Whether

this is all plausible from the standpoint of psychological

theory will be examined shortly.
here

.is

a line of

What is being developed

reasoning Hume might well have pursued.

Given all this, what belief is unjustified and why?

.
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Since,

in order for a belief to be unjustified,

actually occur in the mind as
of perceptions

(piven Hume'

rather than dispositional)

s

a

it

perception or series

account of belief as occurrent

let us suppose that a represen-

tative Vulgar, say Dr. Johnson, actually believes that the

conclusion is less than certain.
hold that such
p.
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a

Clearly Hume wants to

belief is unjustified

(cf,.

quotation on

Can it be shown that such a belief is not caused

by causal inference?

Hume could argue that Dr. Johnson falls prey to the
same sort of process that makes him so gullible.

Experience

shows that there is often a resemblance betv;een the degree
of conviction and the degree of conclusiveness of the con-

clusion of an argument (see the discussion of the proba-

bility of chances and the probability of causes in
Part (iii)

Sections 11 and 12).

As the current discussion

of unphilosophical probability shows, this resemblance is

not always present.

However, since resemblance is a natural

relation, responsible (in part)
ideas.

Dr.

for the association of

Johnson extends this resemblance "beyond what

experience will justify".

Thus he supposes that the degree

of conclusiveness resembles the degree of conviction and

makes his judgment accordingly.
garded as less than certain.
caused by causal inference.

The conclusion is re-

Thus,

his judgment is not
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Craftier types, such as, say, Adam Smith, make
are disposed to make the following causal judgment:

or.

"Were

the force and vivacity of the memory ideas equal, there

would be no difference in the degree of conviction in the
two cases."

This is what Hume might mean when he says

that the actual difference in degree of conviction is not

regarded as "solid and legitimate".

This also captures

the intent of my claim that the degree of conclusiveness
is the same in both cases,

though the degree of conviction

differs.
This psychological explanation is obviously not in

Hume's discussion of unphilosophical probability.
remarks are much more cursory.

His

This explanation does show,

however, how Hume could have proceeded on the basis of his

psychological principles.

Furthermore, it shows just exact-

ly what belief is unjustified and that such a belief is not

caused by causal inference.
Actually, there is something about Hume's psychological

explanation and subsequent evaluation that does not ring
true.

One might ask,

'Do the Vulgar really behave in the

way Hume seems to suggest?'

In addition,

over time of the liveliness of

a

the diminution

memory idea might be

indicative of (in the absence of any corroborative evidence)

legitimate doubt about the veracity of the purported memory
idea.

That is,

(all else equal)

I

am less certain, both

.
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psychologically and epistemically

memories than

I

,

about my childhood

am about my recent ones.

In the cases

that Hume describes, the arguments really are not "the
same

as Hume suggests.

In one case,

one begins with

purported memory idea about which there is doubt.
other argument this doubt is not present.

a

In the

It seems that

the conclusiveness of the two arguments differs.

Hume

seems to be committed to holding that there is a range of

degrees of force and vivacity v/ithin which legitimate doubt,

minor though it may be, has no place.

This seems very odd.

In the absence of corroborative evidence,

the liveliness

of a purported memory idea is a prima facie measure of its
legi ti macy

Nevertheless, whatever may be the problems with Hume's
actual discussion, the account that

I

have offered seems

to characterize accurately his intentions.

Moreover, in the

remaining cases to be discussed, Hume's psychological

description and his epistemological diagnosis seem to be
much more plausible.
Case

2

.

This case is similar in many respects to Case

1.

Here again it is the mind's limited memory capabilities
that have undesirable effects.

The observation of a cause

and effect in the past is in part responsible for the belief
that,

in similar circumstances,

the effect

(cause)

will occur
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(has occurred)

when the cause (effect) has been observed.

When the observation of the past cause and effect is remote,
the mind

recollection of it will be weaker and fainter

s

than when the observation is more recent.

The degree of

the subsequent belief arrived at through causal inference

will vary correspondingly.

With regard to this Hume says,

There is a second difference,
which we may frequently observe
in our degrees of belief and
assurance, and which never fails
to take place, tho disclaimed by
philosophers. An experiment, that
is recent and fresh in the memory,
affects us more than one that is
in some measure obliterated; and
has a superior influence on the
judgment, as well as on the
passions.
(T. 143-144)
'

As an example, Hume cites the case of a drunkard

who observes his friend die of a debauch.

For a short

time thereafter, he more firmly believes that the same

After

fate will befall him.

a time,

the cause of his friend's demise

effect (his friend's death)
belief that

a

however, the memory of

(the debauch)

fades;

and its

the degree of his

similar end awaits him lessens and, as a

consequence, so does his fear.

This explains why his

friend's death may bring about a partial reform in his

drinking (or at least
only

a

a

concern if he does not reform)

relatively short time.

his old ways.

for

Thereafter, he reverts to

A recent observation of a cause and effect
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has the same result as the more recent memory
idea in

Case

1.

He says,

A more recent observation has a
like effect; because the custom
and transition is there more
entire, and preserves better the
original force in the communication.
(T. 144)

The degree of belief differs, then, according to how

recent the observation is.

As Hume indicates by his remark

that such differences are disclaimed by philosophers (see
the second previous quotation)
of no account.

,

these differences should be

What this means is that such beliefs should

be viewed as conclusions of proofs

ference is

a

(if,

genuine causal inference)

,

indeed, the inand, as such, the

conclusion should be regarded as practically certain.
someone comes to believe that

a

If

conclusion of this sort is

only probable because his degree of belief has been

weakened by, in effect, the passage of time, his belief is
unjustified.

It is unjustified because he has supposed,

without the benefit of causal reasoning, that the degree
of conclusiveness resembles the degree of (actual)

Case

3

.

conviction.

In this case the degree of belief of the conclu-

sion of a proof gets weakened because the proof requires

many steps.

That is,

a

great number of causal inferences

are required to roach the conclusion from an impression of
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sensation or an idea of the memory.

The force and vivacity

of the ideas entertained in the chain of
reasoning gets

weaker as the chain of causal inferences grows longer.
Hume describes the mechanics of this process as follows:
Tis from the original impression,
that the vivacity of all the ideas
is deriv'd, by means of the customary
transition of the imagination; and
tis evident this vivacity must
gradually decay in proportion to the
distance, and must lose somewhat in
each transition.
(T. 144)

The result of this process is that the degree of

belief that attends the conclusion of this extended chain
of causal inferences is considerably weakened.

The Vulgar

unjustifiably regard the conclusion as less than practically
certain,

i.e.

as merely probable, even though each step is

(in Hume's words)

"just and conclusive".

warrantedly supposes that the argument is
bability "

The mind una

.

I add, as a third instance of this
kind [i.e. unphilosophical probability] that tho our reasonings
from proofs and probabi] i ties be
considerably different from each
other, yet the former species of
reasoning often degenerates insensibly into the latter, by nothing
but the multitude of connected
arguments. (T. 144)
'

"mere pro-
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The unjustified belief is the belief that the
conclusion is merely probable rather than practically
certain.

The cause of this belief is the supposed resemblance
between the degree of conviction and the degree of conclu-

siveness of the conclusion.

This supposition is not caused

by causal inference.
In all three of these cases the degree of belief is

irrelevant to the certainty of the conclusion.

The con-

clusion is practically certain because the argument upon

which it is based is

causal argument.

a

case in other sorts of arguments

This is not the

In arguments concerning

.

the probability of causes, the degree of belief that at-

tends the conclusion determines how probable the conclusion is

[see Sections 11 and 12 of Part

Cas e 4. Unlike cases

1,

2

and

3,

(iii)]

.

this case does not result

in the Vulgar supposing that a conclusion is merely proba-

ble when it ought to be judged as certain.

Rather, in this

case the Vulgar unjustifiably believe that the conclusion
is practically certain when it is,

at best, only probable.

The undesirable effects on the judgment here are the result of the following

(the wrong sort of)

Hume says,
A fourth unphilosophical species
of probability is that derived
from general ru les which we
rashl^^form to ourselves, and
,

general rules.
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which are the source of what we
properly call PREJUDICE. An
Irishman cannot have wit, and
a Frenctima n cannot have
solidity; ... we have entertained such a prejudice against
them, that they must be dunces or
fops in spite of sense and
reason.
(T. 146, 147)
(emphases
are Hume's)

Hume claims that the formation of such general rules is
the effect of custom or habit.

Though the operation of

causal inference is also explained as the effect of custom,
there are considerable differences between the psycho-

genesis of the two.
Hume explains the formation of these unreasonable

general rules as follows:

In the mind's observations of

causes and effects, there is usually
cumstances,

a

complication of cir-

some of which are essential to

(i.e.

are

constantly conjoined with) the production of the effect and
some of which are superfluous

present)

.

(i.e.

are only occasionally

If these superfluous features are remarkable

and oft present, their presence, even in the absence of

what is essential, will cause the mind to form an idea of
the alleged effect with a force and vivacity that is

indicative of full conviction.

The propensity of the mind

to pass from a perception of the superfluous circumstance

to a forceful and lively idea of the effect

rule.

^

the general

The effect of this general rule is that the mind

.

45

will believe, with respect to anything that
satisfies the

superfluous circumstance that it also satisfies the
other

condition
Hume never explicitly says how this accounts for
prejudice, but the implicit account is relatively clear.
If someone observes numerous instances of

(what he or she

believes to be) witless Irishmen, then even if he or she
does not observe a constant conjunction of the qualities
of being Irish and being witless, the occurrence of the

superfluous circumstances (being Irish) will still have an
effect on the mind--it will pass to an idea of witlessness.

The force and vivacity of the idea in question

will be such that the person believes, with full conviction, that this particular Irishman is witless.

belief is the effect of

a

This

propensity of the mind to pass

from a perception of the superfluous circumstance to an

idea of the alleged effect.

general rule; its effect is

particular Irishman.

This propensity is the
a

prejudicial judgment of

a

The cause of this propensity is

the observation of the occasional

(but not constant)

con-

junction of qualities that are remarkable or prominent.
This is the effect on the mind; how do the Vulgar

respond here?

The Vulgar believe with full conviction that

this Irishman is witless.

In addition,

they are disposed

to believe, on the basis of past experience,

that this
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conclusion is (practically) certain, and they
guide their
future actions and inferences accordingly.
The Vulgar's
epistemic belief (supposing it to be actualized)
is

caused by the bigot's supposing, without the benefit
of
causal inference, that the degree of conclusiveness
of the

conclusion (about a particular Irishman) resembles his
degree of conviction.

As the above quotation makes clear,

Hume thinks that such
words,

a

belief is unjustified.

In Hume's

it is believed "in spite of sense and reason".

The Wise, on the other hand, are more diffident in their

epistemic dispositions.

Even though they may believe with

full conviction that this Irishman is witless, they do not

trust that sentiment to guide their future actions.

Hume's account here makes

a

good deal of sense.

Any

person, whether he be a member of the Wise or of the Vul-

gar cannot help but feel prejudice with regard to an ethnic
or racial group with which he or she has had long and nega-

tive experience.

Nonetheless, the judicious person will

not let those sentiments guide his actions
of other evidence)

in,

(in the absence

e.g. hiring and housing.

On the other hand, what if a person believed, on the

basis of past experience, that it is only probable that
the next Irishman is witless

degree of conviction)

?

from that of the bigot.

(regardless of his actual

This is a judgment quite different

Hume discusses probabilistic

—

?

:
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judgments on the basis of

f requent--but

conjunction in Sections 11 and 12.

not constant

Though such judgments

are the result of a variant form of causal
inference, the

bigot

s

belief or disposition to believe that it is certain

that the next Irishman to be observed is witless is
not the

result of such

process.

a

This completes my discussion of Hume's catalogue of the

venal sins of epistemology.

In each case,

I

have given

evidence that Hume held that certain beliefs are unjustified and that they are unjustified because they are not

caused by causal inference.
at this point is,

"WHY?".

The obvious question to ask

That is, from an interpretive

point of view, one might wonder why every time Hume discovers a kind of belief not caused by causal inference he

pronounces it unjustified.

Leaving to one side two impor-

tant classes of beliefs that

I

have not discussed, viz.

those that attend memory and sensation,

a

partial explana-

tion might be that Hume is committed to the following

principle
(*)

All beliefs (concerning matters of fact) not
caused by causal inference are unjustified.

This raises two important questions:
(a)

Is Hume really committed to

(b)

If so, what arguments did he or might he offer

for

(

*

(*)?

)

Let us consider question

(a)

first.

This is solely a

.

.
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problem of interpretation.

It might be argued on inductive

grounds that Hume did indeed hold

(*)

The argument

would be something like the following:
Hume believes that each kind of belief that he
examines in Part (iii) that is not caused by
causal inference is unjustified.

(1)

Therefore, probably

Hume believes that every kind of belief not caused
by causal inference is unjustified.

(2)

The evidence for

(1)

has been accumulated in this chapter.

If inductive arguments are warranted,
a

then this seems to be

good argument
However,

in order not to beg any questions and for the

benefit of those what are sceptical of inductive procedures
(and Hum.e might be among them.'),

it would be better if a

different sort of interpretive argument could be given.

And,

indeed such an argument can be given.
If we take seriously the claim that Hume is trying to

provide

psychological theory of the operations of the

a

human mind, then we would expect him to provide an exhaustive account of the causes of our beliefs concerning matters

This is exactly what he appears to be doing in

of fact.

Sections

4

through 13 of Part (iii)

.

A desideratum of

any scientific theory is to subsume a variety of apparently

diverse phenomena under

a

small number of principles.

I

shall show that Hume hold that all of our beliefs con-

cerning matters of fact are engendered by

a

small number

.
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of processes.

shall also show that he holds that
each of

I

these processes, except for causal
inference (and perhaps
the processes that result in beliefs
about sensation and
memory) cause unjustified belief.
That is, I shall show
that the catalogue of unjustified belief
considered
in

this chapter is exhaustive.

sider Question
In Section

Then

I

shall proceed to con-

(b)
7

of Part

(iii)

,

Hume argues that belief is

to be defined as a lively idea related to or
associated with
a

present impression.

As the mind makes

a

transition

from the original impression to the subsequent idea, some
of the force and vivacity of the former gets transferred
to the latter.

Without the present impression, the subse-

quent idea is weak and feeble; belief is not present.

On

the basis of this definition, the causes of belief will be

accounted for by the impression and the principles governing the transition, which may consist of a number of

ideas.

The causes of impressions of sensation are, in part,

unknowable (cf. Treatise

,

p.

7).

But, Hume clearly allows

that the cooperation of sense organs and

a

mind in which

they "reside" are necessary for their occurrence.

The

occurrence of the constituents of the transition (i.e. the
ideas)

is determined by the association of ideas.

arc associated by the three natural relations, viz.

semblance, contiguity, and causation.

Ideas
re-

However, as we have
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already seen (cf. pps. 4-5 above), Hume holds
that resemblance and contiguity cannot sufficiently enliven
ideas

to produce belief; they can, nonetheless,
tion, which can so enliven ideas.

"assist" causa-

When the transition is

governed by causation, causal inference occurs.
a

There are

number of distinct processes that Hume calls causal

inference (these will be discussed in Chapter III)

and

,

there are some variants on the basic process or processes.
For the purposes at hand,

it is not necessary to

consider the exact mechanisms involved.

The important

point is that Hume seems to hold that all of the mind's

beliefs concerning matters of fact are caused by some

version of causal inference, perhaps occasionally assisted
by resemblance or contiguity.

Or does he?

Actually,

there is another process that causes belief, but it is

explained by the same principle that explains causal inference.

Causal inference is so ubiquitous because the

transition based on the relation of causation is customary
or habitual.

It is because of custom or habit that the

mind believes that the future resembles the past.

But,

this is not the only effect of custom..

custom, to which I attribute
all belief and reasoning, may
operate on the mind after two
several ways. (T. 115)
.

.

.

He proceeds to describe what occurs when the mind is engaged
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in cnusnl inference.

The other effect of custom is described

as follows:

But let us next suppose, that a
mere idea alone, without any of
this curious and almost artificial preparation [observed constant conjunction, etc.] should
frequently make its appearance
in the mind, this idea must, by
degrees acquire a facility and
force; and both by its firm hold
and easy introduction distinguish
itself from any new and unusual
idea.

(T.

116)

What Hume is talking about is, of course, education

which

I

have discussed before.

is that this is the only way,

The important point here

aside from causal inference,

that custom can "invigorate" an idea and engender belief.

Given Hume's definition of belief and these basic
tenets of his psychological theory, it is possible to see
that Hume has in fact discussed all the various kinds of

belief concerning matters of fact.

Beliefs that arise from

education are the result of custom; those of fools and
madmen result from physiological or psychological disturbances; credulity and all the kinds of unphilosophical

probability are all founded, to some extent, on causal
inference, but they get an unfortunate "assist" from re-

semblance.

Finally, of course, there is causal inference,

memory, and sensation.

The point of all this is that

a

pattern emerges from

CHAPTER

I

I

As noted previously, much of Hume's discussion
in

Part

(iii)

is devoted to providing a psychological explana-

tion of the causes of the mind's beliefs concerning
matters
of fact.

belief.

However, he does not begin with a discussion of
Rather, the opening two sections are concerned

with what occurs when the mind is engaged in reasoning.
The reason for this move will become apparent as
I

proceed.

What does Hume think reasoning is?
the beginning of Section

2

It is not until

that he gets around to propos-

ing something like a definition of reasoning.

He says.

All kinds of reasoning consist in
nothing but a comparison and a
discovery of those relations, constant
or inconstant, which two or more
objects bear to each other. (T.73)

Implicit in Hume's definition here and in the surrounding

discussion is the notion that all reasoning issues in
some judgment or other.

This judgment may not be believed,

as is the case when the reasoning is hypothetical, but the

end result of a bit of reasoning will always be some sort
of judgment.
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Since, as the above quotation indicates,
the discovery
of relations is essential to all reasoning,
Hume opens

Part (iii) with a discussion of all the relations;
they
have been exhaustively enumerated in Part

(i)

Section

5.

The importance of the judgment that terminates a bit
of

reasoning is recognized at the beginning of Section

1;

Hume

opens this section with an epistemological distinction

based on such judgments.
on the ideas,

Some relations depend entirely

and the relation is present as long as the

ideas remain the same.

The discovery of these relations

result in judgments that constitute knowledge in the strict
sense because their denials are inconceivable and absurd.

The relations in question are resemblance, contrariety,

degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and
number
In Section
(

viz

.

2

he discusses the other three relations

identity, relations of time and place, and causation),

which may be present or absent even though the ideas remain
the same.

Some instances of reasoning terminate in judg-

ments about such relations; these may be false without
being absurd or self-contradictory.
The discussion thusfar presupposes that the ideas
that constitute a bit of reasoning are given.

well ask,

'Can the reasoning process generate

these ideas?'

If so,

We might
(i.e.

cause)

then the mind will suppose or believe

.
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that the objects of these ideas exist.

The reason for

this is that Hume holds that existential judgments are

identical to the occurrence of the idea whose object is
the subject of such judgments (see Trea t ise

This has significant consequences.

question becomes,

,

p.

97n)

For, now the

'Can reasoning carry the mind beyond

what is present to the senses and inform it of existences,
and objects with which it is not sensuously acquainted?'

Hume's answer is an emphatic 'Yes', but only if the

objects of the constituents of

a

bit of reasoning are

believed to be causally connected.
he held this below.

I

shall investigate why

A more immediate problem is this:

While it is clear that, to judge that an object exists is
just to have an idea of that object, what about judgments

that something occurs?

Things that are causally related

will often be something other than mere physical objects.
Hume recognizes this in his discussion of relations in
Part

(i)

Section

There he speaks of actions or motions

5.

of objects as causally connected.

'occurrences'.

As

I

Let us call them

shall show below, they are not what

we might call events because unlike events, occurrences

can recur at different times.

What are we to make of judgments that an occurrence
occurs?

According to Hume's way of individuating percep-
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tions, any change in the object of a
perception means a

change in perception.

Thus such a judgment cannot be the

mere occurrence of a perception.

Nonetheless, there seems

to be an important similarity between such
judgments and

judgments that an object exists.

Accordingly, it seems

reasonable to suggest that a judgment that an occurrence
occurs is a series of perceptions, the objects of which

constitute the occurrence.

Judgments that an object

exists or that an occurrence occurs can both be approp-

^i^tely termed

existential judgments' to distinguish

them from relational and predicative judgments.
The picture of the termini of instances of reasoning
is more complicated than it was a few pages back.

Reason-

ing can issue in a relational judgment or an existential

judgment.

In the case where reasoning issues in a rela-

tional judgment, the penultimate step will be an existential

judgment of one kind or the other.

In cases where reason-

ing issues in an existential judgment, the mind will be

disposed to judge that some relation
objects of the constituents of

a

(s)

obtain among the

bit of reasoning.

However, not all existential judgments are termini
of instances of reasoning.

Hume's claim is that such

judgments have this status only if they are the result of
the process of causal inference.

judgments?

What about relational

Hume's definition of reasoni.ng seems to
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indicate that all relational judgments are the
product of
reasoning.
Suppose, however, that I arbitrarily
judge

that the horse is next to the barn by comparing my
ideas
of the horse and of the barn.

If these ideas are not

brought about by causal inference, then the existential

Presuppositions upon which my relational judgment rests
are not the result of reasoning.

Hume could hold that, in such

It is not obvious that

a case,

ment is the result of reasoning.

the relational judg-

He might be able to cover

himself by saying that, in such cases, as long as the

mind supposes that the existential presuppositions are

merely hypothetical, the relational judgment is the result of reasoning.

That is, if the mind does not believe

that the process by which the ideas arise (say, the

operation of mere caprice) actually informs it of

existences and objects, the subsequent relational judgment could count as an instance of reasoning because

relation has been discovered.

On the other hand,

a

if the

relational judgment has existential presuppositions that
do not arise from causal inference and if these existential

presuppositions are believed, it seems unreasonable to
say that such a judgment is the result of reasoning be-

cause it logically depends on
result of reasoning.

a

belief that is not the

Hume's definition of reasoning would
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have to be amended to take this into account.

The process that most interests Hume is reasoning
that results in belief both in the existence
of the ob-

jects of ideas and the relations they bear.

Let us call

all such reasoning 'empirical reasoning' to distinguish
it from the discovery of relations among objects,

the

ideas of which result from other causes such as the

reveries of the fancy.
Before considering Hume's arguments for the claim
that only the relation of causation can be made use of in

reasoning to carry the mind beyond what is present to the
senses, it would be helpful to ponder the epistemological

significance of saying that a particular belief is caused
by empirical reasoning.

Though Hume devotes a great deal

of attention to the psychological description of what

happens when the mind is engaged in empirical reasoning,
he does not explicitly consider the epistemological sig-

nificance of saying that a belief is the result of empirical reasoning.

Clearly, Hume does not mean to say that all beliefs

concerning matters of fact are caused by empirical reasoning.

As

I

have shown in the previous chapter, there are

other sources of belief besides empirical reasoning (e.g.
education, disturbances of the animal spirits, etc.).
is also clear that empirical reasoning docs not

It

(invariably)
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cause true belief.
ing reason:

This should be obvious for the follow-

all empirical reasoning is causal reasoning.

In causal reasoning,

the mind observes a constant con-

junction of objects or occurrences; upon the appearance
of
one of these to the senses or the memory, the mind
infers

the existence or occurrence of the other; it also
believes
or is disposed to believe that there is a causal connection between the two.

can be mistaken.

However, one or both of these beliefs

The observed constant conjunction might

only have been coincidental; alternatively, the object

might exist (or the occurrence occur) in that particular
case, but there may not be any causal connection.

Thus,

empirical reasoning does not produce all true beliefs concerning matters of fact.

What sorts of beliefs does it

produce?
Since Hume thinks that the only kind of empirical

reasoning is causal reasoning, let us consider what he
thinks causal reasoning produces.

He says,

Tis only caus a tion which produces
such a connection, as to give us
assurance from the existence or
action of one object, that t'was
follow'd or preceded by any other
existence or action. (T. 73-74)

The key word here is 'assurance'.

Upon reflection,

it should be clear that it is an epistemic rather than a

,
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psychological term.
mind passes from

a

Hume is not hero arguing that the

perception to an idea only when their

objects are believed to be causally connected.

Such a

claim would clearly contradict his view that there
are
other natural relations

(

resemblance and contiguity)

which are responsible for the association of ideas in the
mind.

Nor is he making the sweeping psychological claim

about the causes of belief, for the reasons cited above.
Ihe assurance that Hume is talking about here is the

assurance of warranted or

j

ust i f ied belief.

claim in the above quotation is that
(concerning matters of fact)

a

Thus, his

justified belief

is produced by a transition

from a perception to an idea only when causal connec-

tions are supposed among the objects of the perceptions.
Let us call all such empirical judgments that arise from a

transition from

a

perception to an idea 'mediate judgments'

to distinguish them from the immediate judgments that attend

the operation of the memory and the senses.

Hume can then

be interpreted as making the following claim:
(1)

A mediate empirical judgment is justified only
if it is caused by causal reasoning.

This is logically equivalent to:
(la)

This,

All mediate empirical judgments that are justified are caused by causal reasoning.

in turn,
(lb)

is logically equivalent to:

All mediate empirical judgments that are not
caused by causal reasoning are unjustified.

'
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(lb),
(cf.

p.

of course,

47).

is very similar to

of Chapter

I

The difference is that Hume has an
argument

for the contrapositive of

(lb)

in Section 2, whereas in

the sections discussed in Chapter

ment for (*).

I

he offers no argu-

Obviously, if his argument in Section

works, this is an acceptable procedure.

argument that

(*)

I

2

It is to this

shall now turn.

The way that Hume sets up his argument for

somewhat peculiar.

(lb)

is

He supposes that there are only three

kinds of relations that are candidates for the foundation
of empirical reasoning

space, and causation.

identity, relations of time and
He argues that the first two will

not do and claims that causation will.

This procedure

seems unwarranted; why could not the mind be informed of

existences and objects with which it is not sensuously
acquainted by say, the relation of resemblance?
not even consider this question.

Fortunately,

Hume does
I

shall be

able to show that the same arguments that rule out identity and spatial and temporal relations as foundations for

empirical reasoning rule out all other relations as well.
It is now possible to consider the question,

'Why is

causal reasoning the only kind of empirical reasoning?
One might expect Hume to appeal to some requirement that a

relation must satisfy in order that it be suitable for

empirical reasoning.

After

a

fashion, this is what he docs.

61

However, the requirement, as

shall show,

I

is extraor-

dinarily complex, and Hume only hints at what it is.
Hume

s

strategy is to argue that neither relations of

time or space nor the relation of identity can be made
use of in empirical reasoning unless some causal connections
are presupposed.

He then states, without argument, that

causation can be so used.

Thus,

the key to the question

asked in the preceding paragraph will lie in his essentially negative arguments about these other kinds of relations.

The first of these arguments goes as follows:
nor can the other two relations ever
be made use of in reasoning, except so
far as they either affect or are affected
by it [causation]
There is nothing in
any objects to persuade us that they are
either always remote or always contiguous;
and when from experience and observation
we discover, that their relation is in
this particular invariable, we always
conclude that there is some secret cause,
which separates or unites them. The
same reasoning extends to identity
.

.

(T.

.

.

74)

The case of this argument is thoroughly psychological.
He is concerned to describe what in fact occurs in the

mind.

However, the process that he is describing is the

process of empirical rea s oning

.

That is, it may happen

that an idea whose object is believed to bo spatially

contiguous to the object of some other perception gets introduced into the mind, even though there is no "secret
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cause

presupposed.

Nonetheless, in such cases what has

occurred is not an instance of empirical reasoning;
rather,
it is a mere association of ideas.

As the above quotation indicates,

in all genuine

cases of empirical reasoning, a relation that the mind

believes to obtain among the objects of perceptions must be,
in some sense,

invariable.

Although some spatial or

temporal relations are invariable with respect to some
objects^, this is not the case with all spatial and tem-

poral relations among objects.

And, as Hume makes clear,

when a spatial or temporal relation between some particular

objects is believed to be invariable, some causal connection

(s)

is always presupposed.

Of the four kinds of relations under consideration,

tis only causation that always has the requisite invaria-

bility.

The obvious question to ask at this point is,

'Under what conditions

always invariable?'

is a relation or kind of relation

This concept of an always invariable

relation is of crucial importance to Hume's view of the
nature of empirical reasoning because, as the above quotation makes clear,

it is only when at least one relation

believed to obtain among the objects of the perceptions is
always invariable that empirical reasoning occurs.

^Unless otherv/ise indicated, I shall use the term 'object'
in the sense of 'object of perception.'
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Hume never explains this notion, except
by way of
examples.
We do know that spatial and temporal
relations
and the relation of identity are not always
invariable and
that causation is.

A careful examination of Hume's argu-

ments concerning these relations should provide the
answer
to the question asked in the preceding paragraph.

The reason that spatial relations are not always

invariable is, quite simply, that there are some objects
that are say

,

next to each other at a given time which are

not next to each other at all times.

Thus, when one of

these objects makes its appearance to the senses, the mind

cannot conclude that the other object exists and is next to
the first.

What about temporal relations?

There is every indi-

cation that Hume intends the argument quoted on pace 61
to apply to both spatial and temporal relations.

There is

no separate argument concerning temporal relations in this

section;

in addition, Hume elsewhere uses the terms

'remote'

and 'contiguous' to denote temporal as well as spatial re].ations.

If the things that are temporarily related are

(non-recurrent) events, this argument would not show that

temporal relations are not always invariable.

If event a

is precedent to event b during a given time interval t,

then during any time interval in which a and b occur, the

former wii.l be precedent to the latter, since the only time
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period in which they occur is

Accordingly,

I

t.

have suggested that what are temporally

related are occurrences, which can recur at different
times.

For example, the occurrence of Jones' driving to

work along a certain route may recur five days a week.

On

this view of what it is that is temporally related, Hume's

argument guoted on page 61 makes sense.

If Jones'

driving

to work on Monday precedes Smith's driving to work on

Monday, then there is no assurance that Jones' driving to

work will always occur prior to Smith's driving to work
unless certain causal connections are presupposed.
In general,

then, Hume's argument seems to be that

there are some objects that bear

a

spatial or temporal

relation to each other at a given time, and yet they are
not so related at all other times that they exist or occur.

Obviously, by implication, Hume does not think that this is
true of the relation of causation.

causally connected at

a

If two occurrences are

given time, then at any time that

the one occurs, the other will occur, and they will be

causally connected.

It is for this reason that causation

gives
us assurance from the existence or
action of one object, that 'twas follow'd or
preceded by any other existence or action.
(T. 73-74)
.

.

,

It is not altogether clear how Hume might individuate

]
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occurrences, i.e. those things that bear temporal and
causal

relations to each other.

On the one hand,

they cannot be

individuated too finely or his argument will not show that
temporal relations are not always invariable.
hand,

On the other

if occurrences are individuated too coarsely,

causation will not be always invariable.

then

At this time

I

am not sure just how Hume could individuate occurrences.

Nonetheless, it is clear from his arguments in this section
that these requirements must be met.

Returning now to the notion of an always invariable
relation, the above considerations suggest the following

definition

:

Relation R is always invariable if and only if

:

(m) (n) (t)

[Rmn,t -> (t^) (3C) (Cm, t^) ->
(3D) (Dn,t^ & Rmn,tM] & (t^)
(3F) (Fm,t^ & Rmn,t2)
(

[

]

[

{9G) {Gn,t^)

->

)

Where m and n range over objects of perceptions
(physical objects, occurrences). C, D ^F and G
range over properties and t, t'^ and t"^ range over
time intervals.
,

,

All that

says is that if two objects of perceptions

bear an always invariable relation to each other at
time,

a

given

then if at any other time one of the objects exists

or recurs, then the other will exist or recur and bear the

same relation to its counterpart.

It is easy to see that

spatial and temporal relations are not always invariable.
The relation of causation, on the other hand, satisfied
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Ihe problem with

is that the relation of identity

also satisfies the definition.

identical at

a

If two objects are in fact

given time, then they are always identical.

Identity, however,

according to Hume.

is not an always invariable relation,

While

may express a necessary con-

dition for an always invariable relation, it does not express

a

sufficient condition as well.

Hume's argument for the claim that identity lacks the

requisite invariability should provide
can be improved.

a

clue as to how

Immediately following the above

quoted passage he says.
We readily suppose that an object may continue individually the same tho several
times absent from and present to the senses;
and ascribe to it an identity notwithstanding
the interruption of the perception,
But
this conclusion beyond the impression of our
senses can be founded only on the connexion
of cause and effect nor can we otherwise
have any security, that the object is not
changed upon us, however much the new object
may resemble that which was formerly present
(T. 74)
to the senses.
'

.

.

.

His argument here seems to be that the mind cannot

suppose that two objects that resemble each other are in
fact identical unless some causal argument can be given.

Hume says (in the passage omitted by the ellipses) that
this argument is to the effect that, were
or hand upon the object,

I

to keep my eye

it would have conveyed an invari-
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able and interrupted impression.

This is not to say that

the imagination cannot make such a transition
without

this kind of argument; nothing is more free than that
faculty.

Rather, Hume implies that, under such conditions,

''^hat

occurs is not an instance of empirical reasoning.

Thus his claim is that the mind cannot infer simpliciter

that two resembling objects of perceptions bear the relation of identity to each other.

There is,

I

think, another way that the mind could

"operate" by means of the relation of identity.

quent to its having

a

memory idea of an object, it could

suppose that that object presently exists at

place and in

a

Subse-

certain manner.

a

certain

In this way the relation of

identity could lead to an existential belief.

However,

just as in the other case, this transition could not be

said to be an instance of reasoning unless certain causal

connections were presupposed.
The failure of the relation of identity to be suitable
for empirical reasoning

suggests that, for

a

(i.e.

to be always invariable)

relation to be always invariable, it

must be the case that if any two objects bear the relation
in question to each other at a given time,

then, not only

do they always bear that relation to each other, but, in

addition, any other objects that resemble the first two

^
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bear the relation in question to each other.

How is resemblance to be understood here?

The obvious

move is to say that objects can resemble each other in

various respects.

This,

in turn, can be understood in

terms of shared properties.

Thus, to say that two objects

resemble each other with respect to beinq red is to say
that each object has the property of being red

.

The failure of the relation of identity to be always

invariable in spite of some resemblance between the objects suggests the following amended version of
D2

:

Relation R is a lways invariable if and only if

:

(i)

(m) (n) (t)

(Dn,t^

&

(Fm

&

,

t"^

jRmn,t^

Rmn,tl)]
Rmn t^
,

)

]

&
)

(

(

t^

(t^) [ (5C) (Cm, t^) -> (5D)
(3G) (Gn t^ -> C3F)

)

[

,

]

AND
(ii)

(A) (B) (x) (y) (t^)

(z)(w)(t^)[(Az,t^

&

[(Ax,t^ & By,t^
Rzw, t^

Bw, t

]

&

Rxy,t^)^

]

where A,B,C,D,F, and G range over properties,
m,n,x,y,z, and w range over objects of perceptions
(physical objects, occurrences), and t,t^,t^,t^,
and t^ range over time intervals.

Although the relation of identity satisfies the first
condition, it fails to satisfy the second condition.
Hence,

it is not an always invariable relation.

And, of

^For a detailed argument to show that this is a reasonable
interpretation of Hume, see my paper, "The Epistemological
status of Moral Judgments in Hume's Treatise " unpublished,
14-16.
pps
,

.

'
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course, this is what Hume says.

The problem with D2 is that causation
also fails to
satisfy the definition.
If 'a' and 'B' are instantiated by
two arbitrarily chosen properties that two
causally con-

nected things happen to have, it is easy to find
two other
things that also have those properties but are
not causally
connected.

Many counterexamples of this sort can be found.

Obviously
dition;
it,

,

the problem lies with the resemblance con-

it is too weak.

To see how to suitably strengthen

it will be helpful to take a closer intuitive look at

the notion of an always invariable relation.

This notion is purely metaphysical in that whether or
not a relation is always invariable will be independent of

what the mind believes about it.

However, Hume has intro-

duced this concept for essentially epistemological purposes.
If the mind

(correctly)

believes that two things bear an

always invariable relation to each other, then the mind can

correctly infer, upon the appearance of an object or occurrence that resembles,

iui

the appropriate respect, one of

the previously observed pair, that another object exists or
an occurrence occurs--an object or occurrence that approp-

riately resembles the other member of the pair.
vious question is,

The ob-

'What constitutes the appropriate sort of

resemblance?
For the properties that determine the resemblance to

(

]

70

be of any significance for the epistemological
purpose of

warranting inferences, each property must empirically
determine that there is another thing which has the
other

appropriate property and bears the relation in question
to
the first thing.

Since these inferences are empirical, a

thing's having the appropriate property need not logically

guarantee that something else exists which has the appropriate property and bears the relation in question to the

former object or occurrence.

Rather, the guarantee need

only be "as a matter of fact" or empirical.
These considerations suggest
to be made in condition

(ii)

tv;o

of

:

changes that need
First, another

condition (or conditions) needs to be added to the antecedent to insure that the properties which determine the

resemblance are "appropriate".

Secondly, the consequent

must be altered to reflect the epistemological purposes
that an always invariable relations serves.

D3 accomplishes

both of these tasks:
D3

:

Relation R is always invariable if and only if
(i)
( 3 D)

(m) (n) (t) [Rmn, t

(Dn,tl & Rmn,tl)]
t^
(Fm
& Rmn t^
,

,

)

]

(

&

(t^)
(

t^

[

)

(3C) (Cm, t^l-^
(^G) Gn t^
[

(

,

3 F)

)

AND
(Ax,t^ & By,t^ & Rxy,t^) &
[(x's being A empirically guarantee s that y is B
and that x bears R to y) & (y's being B empirically guarantees that x is A £md that x bears

(ii) (A) (B) (x) (y) (t^)

[

[

]

:
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R to y)]
Rzw,
M
Rpq, t-^^)
wliGiTG
in,

n,

A,
X,

-V

]

&
)

]

Of coursG, D

(z) (t^l)

(-7.

(q) (tl2)

(Bq,tt2_^

,t|

(3w) (Bw,t^J- &
(3p) (Ap,t^2 ^

]

B,
y,

pGrcGption^
t,t ,t

[

F, 3nd G irsnqG ovgjt propGrtiGS,
q, and p rangG ovGr objGcts of
(jl^iysical ^^jocts, occurroncGs)
and
,t
and
rangG ovGr tiruG intGrvals.
,

C,
z,

D,
w,

,

,

t

O

is not VGry holpful unlGSs tho undorlinod

GxprGssions can bo mado cloar.
shall now turn.

It is to that task that

For thG sakG of simplicity,

I

lot us consider

only the first clause in which this expression occurs.

The

explication of this clause will apply, mutatis mutandis,
to the second clause.

The property A must be the kind of property that, if
some X were to have it at any time, then it would determine

that some y has the property B and bears the relation in

question to it at that time.

This can be more perspicu-

ously expressed as follows:
D3q

x's being A empirically guarantees that y is B and
that X bears R to y=df
(t^) [Ax,t^-^ (By,t'^

where the symbol

ditional

'

Rxy,t^)]

&

'

stands for the subjunctive con-

.

The use of the subjunctive conditional here is unavoidable; Hume clearly has it in mind when he describes the

special cases of the relation of identity that are suitable
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for inference

Treaty,

(cf.

p.

74).

it is irrelevant whe-

ther or not X happens to bo A at a given
time.
tant point is that, were x to be A at

wo^d

a

The impor-

given time, it

be the case that Y is B and that x bears
R to y

.

Of

course, there are a number of well-known problems
with sub-

junctive conditionals.

In particular,

there is no general

account of under what conditions they are true.

Nonetheless,

there are many such conditional statements that are clearly
true and many others that are clearly false.

poses at hand, this is sufficient.

Of course,

For the pura

similar

definition can be given for the other clause of D that con3
tains the expression 'empirically guarantees'.

Definition D 3

,

suitably clarified, does indeed rule

out the relation of identity as an always invariable relation.

^

For causation, the two kinds of cases that ruled it

^For a counterexample for the relation of identity, let 'A'
and 'B' be instantiated by properties that a given object
would have at any time that it exists. The following substitutions seem to do the trick:
A=
B=
x=
y=

is bald or not bald
is identical to David Hume

David Hume
David Hume

If we suppose that God always loves all sentient creatures
and that all and only men always have souls, we can generate another, less trivial counterexample:
is loved by God
has a soul
David Hume
David }Iuine
Hume would, no doubt, disapprove of this easel

AB=
x=
y=
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out for

will not create problems for D3.

Nonetheless, D3~D3^ is not quite good enough.
the following schema for a counterexample:'^

there are two individuals, call them
such that,

Consider

Suppose that

a and b,

which are

for any time whatever, if a were to be A then
b

would be B and

a

and b are causally connected.

However,

suppose that this is merely "accidental" in the following
sense:

There is some other (logically independent) property

P such that,

were

a to

be A at any time, it would be P at

that time and it is in virtue of a's being P (and not in

virtue of a's being

causally connected.
be called a "rider".

A)

that b is B and that a and b are

In such a case,

the property A may aptly

However, other things that have the

property A are not causally connected to things that have
the property B.

mutandis

,

Similar considerations apply, mutatis

to the property B.

Thus, under such circumstances,

the antecedent is true and the consequence is false.

Thus,

^3~^3a fails.
The problem here is not a minor one; it concerns the

circumstances under which

a

always invariable relation.

general

way,

property will determine an
How are we to specify, in a

the kind of thing that objects must be in order

^Suggested by Prof. Ed Gettier
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that they be invariably related?

This specification must

be done in such a way that is neutral with respect to

causation.
viz.

Otherwise, it would beg the question at issue,

What is distinctive about causation that makes it,

and it alone, suitable for empirical reasoning?'

The solution to this problem would seem to lie in

strengthening the definition of 'empirically guarantees'

meet the challenge of the schema for
given above.

v/ay

counterexample

It is necessary to insure that the property

A (as well as the property

best

a

to

is not a mere "rider".

B)

The

to accomplish this is to require that there be

no logically independent property P upon which A can

"ride".
that,

That is, there must be no other property

if anything were to have it at any time,

P

such

then there

would be something else that has the property B and is

causally connected to the first thing.

This can be more

perspicuously stated as follows:

03

)

3

:

x's being A emp ir ically gu arantees that y is B and
that X bears R to y=,^f
(1)

(t^) [Ax,t^-v^ (By, t^

&

Rxy,t^)]

AND
(2)

~

(3P) (t^)

[

~Pi,t 6

&

(r) (t'7) [Pr,t'^-v^

)

<Mi) (Ai,t^
Pj,t^)
(3s')(Bs,t ^ & Rrs,t')])]

(Ax, t^-^Px, t^)

&

&

0(i)

(

~Aj,t^

&

&

(where the ranges of the variables follow the
pattern of D 3
)
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Similarly, the same treatment can be rendered for B:
^3b'

y's being B empirically guarantees that x is A and
that X bears R to y=^£

=

(t^)

(1)

[By,t^^(Ax,t^

Rxy,t^)]

&

AND
~

(2)

(3Q) (t^)

~Qk,ty)

[

(By t^-^Qy t^)
,

,

& <>( 1

(tlO) [Qv, tlO

)

(

(

&0(k)(Bk,t5

&

-Bl,t^ & Ql,t9) & (v)
3 u) (Au,t^0 ^ Ruv,t^0)]]

(where the ranges of the variables follow the pattern
of d3)

This completes the definition of an always invariable

relation.

The relation of identity is not always invariable

(the same counterexamples that apply to 0 ^- 03
^ also apply

to D 3 ~D

3 ]3

D

3 t)

'

)

•

Causation, on the other hand, satisfies

both conditions.
Admittedly, this definition is extraordinarily complex.

And,

it would be unreasonable to suppose that Hume

had all of these conditions in mind when he wrote the passage

under discussion.

However, as I've tried to show, he is

nonetheless committed to something very much like D 3 -D 3 t,D 3 ]^

,

This definition also provides the following insights about
the notion of an always invariable relation and Hume's

reasoning concerning it.

1.

Contrary to what Hume says (cf. the last two lines

of the quotation on p.61)

,

it is not the "same reasoning

which shows that identity, as well as relations of space and

.
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time,

is not always invariable.

The key difference between

causation and spatial and temporal relations
(embodied in
condition (i) of D3) is that those things
that are causally
connected at a given time are, whenever they occur,
causally
connected.
Such is not always the case with things
that

bear spatial and temporal relations.

On the other hand, the

key difference between causation and identity lies in
the

fact that occurrences that are distinct from, but appropria-

tely resemble, two causally connected occurrences are causally

connected.

Such is not always the case with identity.

rather long antecedent of condition
plicit just

v;hat

(ii)

The

of D3 makes ex-

sort of resemblance this must be.

This

antecedent also tells us something about the nature of the
kind of thing that objects must be in order that they be

always invariably related.
2

.

This definition also tells us something about the

process of empirical reasoning in the following sense:

If

the mind knows that two things bear an always invariable

relation to one another, then if one of the occurrences

presents itself to the senses or memory, then the mind can
infer that the other occurrence occurs and boars the relation in question to its correlate.

In addition,

if the mind

knows that two occurrences boar an always invariable relation to one another, and that it is in virtue of their
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having certain properties that this is so, then it can conclude, upon the appearance of something that has one of these

properties, that there is some other occurrence which has
the other property and bears the relation in question to

the former.

That is, this definition explains how empiri-

cal reasoning is possible.

Of course, there still remain

the problems of how the mind reidentifies occurrences or

recognizes that something is of the appropriate kind and on
what grounds this is done.

All that has been solved here

is the metaphysical problem of the nature of a relation

that is suitable for empirical reasoning.
3.

Finally, this definition allows us to do something

that Hume did not do but should have done.

Throughout the

passage under discussion, Hume speaks of only four relations or kinds of relations that are candidates for being

always invariable:

spatial relations, temporal relations,

identity, and causation.

The force of his reasoning in

these passages is exclusionary in that he tries to show how

only one of these relations is suitable for reasoning, viz.
causation.
tions:
ty,

Notable for their absence are the other rela-

proportion in quantity or number, degrees of quali-

contrariety, and resemblance.

Hume nowhere says why

such relations are unsuitable for empirical reasoning.

He

might have thought that, since judgments about these relations constitute knowledge and are, therefore, incorrigible.

.

78

and since no empirical judgment is incorrigible, none of

these relations are even candidates for being the basis of

empirical reasoning.

However, the end products of a bit

of empirical reasoning are not alv/ays judgments that some

relation obtains.

Indeed, the kind of empirical reasoning

that has been discussed here issues in a judgment that

something exists or occurs.
put to Hume is,

Thus, a question that we can

'Why cannot the mind infer,

upon the appear-

ance of something to the senses, that something else exists
or occurs which

resembles the first thing?'

(say)

Indeed,

Hume thinks that this cannot be done (witness his discussion of credulity--cf

.

pps

.

20-23 above)

.

However, nowhere

does he provide an argument to show that resemblance is
not an always invariable relation.

On the basis of the

above definition, it is easy to see that resemblance is not
an always invariable relation;

it fails to meet condition

(i)

If two objects resemble each other in some respect at a

given time, there is no guarantee that they will always

resemble each other in that respect.

What about the other

relations?
a.

Proportion

in

quantity or number

this relation is not always invariable.

:

Clearly

If the number of

Indians is greater than the number of cavalrymen at the Battle
of the Little Big Horn, one cannot conclude that the number

.
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of Indians will always be greater than the number of
cavalry-

men in a given battle.

This

(kind of)

relation fails to

meet condition (i).
Degr e es of quality
not always invariable.

Clearly this relation is

:

If the Sun is brighter than Alpha

Centauri at a given time, there is no guarantee (without
some causal reasoning anyway) that it will always be

that way (the latter may become

a nova)

lation also fails to meet condition
c.

Contrariety

:

I

(i)

This kind of re-

.

.

must confess that

I

find

Hume's few remarks on this so-called relation quite puzzling.
He emphasizes that the only things that can bear this rela-

tion are existence and non-existence.

If there is such a

relation (and it is not obvious that there

difficult to see how it could even be
basis for empirical reasoning.

a

is)

it is

candidate for the

Thus Hume is vindicated;

only the relation of causation is always invariable.

**********
It is now possible to draw together the threads of the

major argument of this chapter.

Hume has claimed that only

transitions based on the relation of causation can produce
assurance (justified belief)

His argument for this claim

.
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is that only the relation of causation always
has the

requisite invariability.
Hume

s

I

have tried to make explicit

notion of this invariability and to show how the

fact of that invariability makes empirical reasoning
possible.

This is independent of what the mind happens to believe
about any of the relations themselves.

(It is interesting

to note that Hume claims in the section on the probability
of causes that the Vulgar sometimes falsely suppose that

causes do not always produce the same effects.)

Within the context of Hume's psychological theory and
his exhaustive enumeration of the seven philosophical relations, only the relation of causation has the requisite in-

variability to render empirical reasoning possible.
fore,

(la)

on p.

59

(and its logical equivalent

(lb))

Therehave

been established.

Nonetheless, we might well ask,

'Can the mind ever

know, or at least have justified belief, that any causal

connection obtain?'

To answer this question, it will be

helpful to consider

a

converse of (lb)?'

That is, what are we to make of the

closely related question,

'What of the

following claim in the context of Hume's philosophy:
(2)

All instances of causal reasoning cause justified
belief

Though the discussion thusfar strongly suggests that
Hume does indeed subscribe to (2),

it is consistent
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with the argument of these two chapters that Hume correctly holds that

is false.

(2)

It would,

ficult to explain why Hume would deny
the proposition that all

(mediate)

however, be very dif(2)

and yet affirm

empirical judgments not

caused by causal inference are unjustified.

denied

(2)

is,

next chapter

a.

I

I

That Hume

think, a rather widespread view.

In the

shall show two things:

Nothing that Hume says in his discussion of the

epistemological status of causal beliefs shows that

(2)

is false.

b.

Nothing that Hume says in the relevant passages

shows that Hume bel ieved that
In Chapter IV
is true.

I

(2)

is false.

shall show that Hume believed that

(2)

.

CHAPTER

III

In this chapter and the next

I

shall argue that Hume

that all beliefs caused by causal inference are

justified.

give

a

Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to

preliminary characterization of the notion of justi-

fication that

I

have in mind.

It is the rather standard

notion of epistemic appraisal common in philosophical

writings of at least the present era.

Though, of course,

there is considerable variation in the meaning that

philosophers have ascribed to the term 'justification' and
its cognates,

connection.

there are a number of common features in this
The concept is not merely the psychological

one of "having conviction".

This concept is logically in-

dependent of the concept of truth in the following sense:
It is possible that someone is justified in believing some-

thing that is in fact false.

It is also possible that some-

one believes something that is true but is not justified in
so believing.

Furthermore, it is possible that someone is

mistaken in his belief that he is justified in believing
something
These features are quite obvious in light of common
phi losophica]

usage.

following reason:
on Hume

However, they are worth noting for the

A significant majority of commentators

(and other philosophers who are acquainted with his
82
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work)

believe that Hume held that no opinion concerning

matters of fact is justified, in the aforementioned
sense
of the term.

sound,

If the argument of these two chapters is

then these philosophers are seriously mistaken about

some fundamental aspects of Hume's philosophy.

Ihe most prevalent view is that Hume was a radical

sceptic about most of our claims to knowledge.
it would be foolish to deny this.

Book

I

Part (iv)

No serious reading of

(especially Sections

any other interpretation.

I

In one sense

1,

2,

and

can survive

7)

have no quarrel with a radical-

ly sceptical interpretation of Hume at that juncture.

On the other hand,

shall argue that there is no such

I

radical scepticism in Part (iii) of Book

I

.

At one point

in the process that Hume calls causal inference,

the mind

comes to believe that the future resembles the past in some

significant respect or respects.

The place where

I

differ

with the majority of Hume's commentators is on Hume's view
of the epistemic warrant of that belief (or process by

which that belief arises)

.

Quite simply, their view is

that Hume held that there is rm epistemic warrant, whereas

my view is that Hume holds that there is an epistemic

warrant for that procedure.
The focus of this debate is on Hume's argument of

Section

6

Part (iii).

In this argument Hume is supposed to
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have posed the so-called Problem of Induction.

As the pre-

ceding paragraph suggests the received opinion has it that
Hume was highly sceptical about the mind's claims to knowledge about the future (or, more generally, about the

unobserved).

If the received opinion is correct,

then on

Hume's view, scientific method is epistemically no better
off than enthusiasm and superstition.
be among those for whom this claim,

bad news

,

because one of Hume

Treatise is to construct

a

'

s

And,

David Hume would

if true, would be very

primary purposes in the

Science of Man.

Thus, this

argument is of considerable internal significance because,
if my opponents are correct,

Hume appears to have cut the

ground out from under what he took to be one of his most
important pro j ects-- the construction of

a

Science of Man.

The other feature of this argument that makes it worthy
of serious consideration is that it is philosophically

interesting in its own right.

Though there is considerable

disagreement about what this argument is intended to establish and what it does establish, there is no disagreement

about the fact that it is of considerable epistemological

significance.
poses,

Thus,

for historical and philosophical pur-

it is important to consider this argument in great

detail and with considerable care and precision.

Instead of passing on immediately to a consideration of

Hume's

(epistemic)

appraisal or evaluation of inductive

.
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procedures,

shall first show that his account of the causes

I

of beliefs arrived at through causal inference
requires that

the mind infers that the future resembles the
past in certain

respects (or, more generally, that what is unobserved
apP^^^P^istely resembles what is observed)

inference is
steps,

I

complex process involving

a

will,

Though causal

.

a

number of

for analytical purposes, not discuss Hume's

epistemic appraisal of other elements of the process (e.g.
the operation of the miemory)

.

Thus, my first task will be

to show, quite simply, that beliefs arrived at through

causal inference require that the mind makes inductions.
This can be done quite quickly and easily by pointing to
the appropriate psychological descriptions of the process of

causal inference that Hume offers.
So as not to beg any questions against a small minority

of commentators,

I

shall next consider and reject the view

that Hume offers no epistemiic appraisal of inductive pro-

cedures, and, as a consequence, of beliefs caused by causal

inference
Finally,

I

shall be in a position to consider the

question of Hume's appraisal of inductive procedures.

I

shall proceed by way of a critical evaluation of my oppo-

nent's arguments on this question.

Unfortunately, many of

these philosophers think that the assertion that Hume was
a

sceptic

(in some strong and interesting sense)

about

.
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induction is too obvious to require argument.
that one can find is a quotation from Section

Often all
6

of Part

(iii)

or from the corresponding passages from the
Enquiries or

the A bstract

.

Fortunately, one of my opponents has thought that
this interpretive claim and Hume's argument for scepticism
are not altogether obvious.

D.C.

Stove,

in his monograph.

Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism

,

goes to great

lengths to establish the following:
(i)

(ii)

The exact nature of the Inductive Sceptic's claim
A rational reconstruction of Hume's argument for
Inductive Scepticism.

In a rather oblique way,

he also argues for the interpretive

claim that Hume was such a sceptic.
I

(i)

.

shall agree in large measure with his assessment of
My representation of Hume's argument will agree, in

many respects, with Stove's version.^

However,

I

shall

show that Hume's argument establishes and is only intended
to establish a weaker and less controversial position than

Stove and others have attributed to Hume--what Stove calls

Inductive Fallibilism.

To do this,

I

shall show that

^My debt to Stove's monograph is too obvious and pervasive
Though, as I shall argue,
to require detailed citation.
he is seriously mistaken about Hume's views on induction,
his work has pushed the debate far beyond where it had been

previously
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Stove's argument for the interpretive claim
is unsound and
the passages quoted by those who think that
Hume's scepticism is obvious admit of another, non-sceptical
interpretation

.

fear,

I

however, that no interpretation of a handful

of passages can be completely conclusive.
in this one in particular)
a

In many cases

(and

it is very difficult to discover

philosopher's intentions when his words can be read in

two incompatible ways.

Though

think that my reading of

I

the relevant passages is correct,
is not completely conclusive.

sively

,

I

I

admit that the evidence

To establish my case conclu-

shall resort to more powerful interpretive and

philosophical arguments.

In Chapter IV

I

will show that

a

sceptical interpretation of Hume at this point cannot account
for much of what he later says;

I

will also show that my

interpretation best explains what is going on in the relevant parts of Book

I

of the Treatise.

**********
When we last left Hume, he had discovered that, of all
the philosophical relations, only causation is suitable
for empirical reasoning.

Immediately thereafter he proceeds

to analyze the idea of causation with a view to discovering
its "components".

He quickly establishes that temporal

priority and spatial contiguity are necessary conditions

:

,
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for a causal connection

objects and events)

However, these conditions are not

.

joiiitly sufficient;

(at least as regards physical

there is necessary connection to be

taken into account.

He quickly concludes that there is no

impression (of sensation) of necessary connection.

Instead

of giving up his principle "No Idea Without a Precedent

Impression" he declines to "beat about the neighboring
fields", presumably to force his quarry into the open.

This eventually leads him to a careful consideration of the
exact psychological processes involved in causal inference.
In particular,

he sets out to answer the following question

in Sections 4,

5

and

6

of Part

(iii)

Why [do] we conclude that such particular causes have such particular effects
and why [do] v/e form an inference from one
to another? (T. 82)
It might appear to be a

The 'why' here is ambiguous.

psychological 'why', in which case the question would read,
'What process causes us to conclude

.

.

.

question might be an epistemological one, viz
grounds can we conclude
for concluding

.

.

.

?'

.

.

.

?

'

However, the

?'

.

'On what

or 'What is our warrant

Perhaps he has in mind or will

provide answers to both questions.
Nonetheless, whether or not he answers the epistemological question, it is clear that he answers the psycholo-
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gical question of how we are caused to believe
that a cause
or effect has occurred when only one event is
present to

the senses.
ing

in Section

he argues that all causal reason-

4

(if it is to result in belief and not be

thetical)

merely hypo-

is grounded in an impression, or at least a

memory idea.

In Section

5

he discusses the difference

between memory ideas and those of the imagination.
in Section

6

Finally,

he describes what occurs in the mind when it is

engaged in causal inference.

He says.

The nature of the experience is this. We
remember to have had frequent instances of
the existence of one species of objects;
and also remember that the individuals of
another species of objects have existed in
a regular order of contiguity and succession
with regard to them ... We likewise call
to mind their constant conjunction in all past
instances.
Without any further ceremony, we
call the one the cause and the other the effect,
and infer the existence of the one from that
of the other. ... in all cases, wherein
we reason concerning them, there is only one
perceiv'd or remembered, and the other is supply 'd in conformity with our past experience.
(T.

87)

Thus it is clear that Hume answers the psychological

question.

It is also clear that causal inference requires

that the mind believe that the unobserved resembles the ob-

served in some significant respect.

It seems in accord with

ordinary usage, then, to say that all causal inferences
involve inductive inference.

What is Hume's epistemic

.

.

.
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appraisal of such inferences?
There have been three kinds of responses to this
question:
(1)

Hume offers no appraisal of the epistemic
warrant of beliefs arrived at via
inductive inferences.

(2)

Hume held that there is no epistemic warrant
for such beliefs.

(3)

Hume held that such beliefs do not have the
highest possible measure of epistemic
warrant.
However, among these beliefs,
some are epis temically better off than
others

In the remainder of this chapter

and

(2)

I

shall argue that

are false and that the first part of

In Chapter IV

shall defend the second part of

I

In terpretation

(3)

I

:

(1)

is true.
(3)

The first interpretation supposes that

Hume had no views about the epistemic warrant of inductive

inferences.

His only concern was to describe the operations

of the human mind.

Since he was merely doing psychology, he

had no interest in the epistemic evaluation of such inferences.

To serious students of Hume, this view might appear

to be too preposterous to consider seriously.

Yet,

it has

been proposed by two philosophers of note (though one holds
the view with diffidence)
In an article entitled "Some Misunderstandings of

Hume", T.E. Jessop says.

^

,

.

.
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That he uses the law of causal association [i.e. causal inference] to explain
the ideas of causality [i.e., necessary
connection] v/ould be a glaring petitio
principii if his enquiry were an epistemological one.
His inquiry is psychological; and there is plainly no impropriety
whatever in the search for the idea of
causality, and also
for the cause
our belief in specific causal connections.^
.

.

.

Professor Passmore, in his book Hume's

I ntentions,

some-

times expresses a similar view.

There are
1.

a

number of problems with this view.

It makes Hume out to be a mere psychologist who

no evaluation
of men's beliefs.

ignores Hume

'

s

(from an epistemic point of view)

As John Lenz has pointed out^

,

this

famous conclusion of the Enquiries in which

he condemns all but mathematical and experiential reasoning to the flames.

Psychologists qua psychologists do not

make such harsh critical judgments of men's beliefs (ex-

cepting perhaps for the beliefs of other psychologists)

2

T.E. Jessop, "Some Misunderstandings of Hume" reprinted
in Hume:
A Collection of Crit ical Essays, ed. by
V.C. Chappell (Notre Dame, Indiana 1966)
pps
48-49.
In light of Jessop's view on this matter
and others, one might conclude, to paraphrase
Nelson Goodman, that this article is an instance
of the topic rather than a treatment of it.
,

3

,

John A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1952),
pps.

^John W. Lenz,

12,

41.

"Hume's Defence of Causal Inference", reprinted
pps. 173-174.
Chappell, op. cit

in V.C.

.
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Such a view is at wide variance with certain
key

2.

passages of the Tr eatise
discussion.

,

especially in the section under

There Hume says.

Thus, not only our reason fails us in the
discovery of the ultimate connection of
causes and effects, but even after experience has inform'd us of their constant
con j unction tis impossible for us to
satisfy ourselves by our reason why we
should extend ourselves beyond those particular instances which have fallen under
,

our observation.
If Jessop is correct,

(T.

then this is merely a psychological

claim with no epistemic import.
content,

91)

Whatever its psychological

it is surely some sort of evaluation of our beliefs

or of the process by which we arrived at them.
3.

Most importantly, if Jessop were to admit that

Hume had philosophical

— and

in particular epistemic--aims

with respect to some of our beliefs (e.g. the belief in
the existence of the soul)

there would remain the question

of the justification of our beliefs concerning matters of
fact.

If Hume had no explicit or implicit views on this,

could be convicted of a gross philosophical oversight.

he

Under

any reasonable construal of the Principle of Charity in the

interpretation of a major philosophical figure, such an in-

terpretation can be rejected out of hand.

Interpretation II:
The second interpretation supposes that Hume did offer

.
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an cpistemic evaluation of inductive inference.

Those who

argue for this position hold in common the view that
Hume’s

appraisal was highly sceptical--a shocking assessment of
the pretensions to knowledge of both the Vulgar and the
Wise.

Where various commentators who adopt this general line

diverge is on the consequences (if any) of this view for
Hume.

What exactly is this assessment on their view?

Their answer is that Hume held that there is no epistemic

warrant (in any standard sense^) for inductive inferences.
They are all unreasonable or unjustified.
We might well ask what argument Hume offers for this

rather startling claim.

The answer is, of course, the

famous argument of Section

Ostensibly, he offers

claim in the Enquiries

a
.

6

Part

(iii)

of the Treatise

.

similar argument for the same
In some respects,

the Enquiries

version of this argument appears to be more strongly
sceptical than the Treatise version.

However, in light of

the obvious similarities between the two, it would be

prima facie unreasonable to suppose that Hume was arguing
for a completely different conclusion in the Enquiries

.

^One of these commentators, F.C. Baylie, holds that Hume
eventually does find an epistemic warrant for inductive
inferences, but because it involves "extending" the
customary notion of justification beyond what is usually
taken to be its bounds, it is helpful for the purposes
of discussion to classify Baylie 's interpretation as
sceptical
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Consequently, it is encumbent upon me to show that my

interpretation of Hume's argument best accounts for what
he says in the E^nquir ies as well.

this chapter

I-

In the Appendix to

do just that.

I

Identification and Pr eliminary Interpretation of
Hume s Argument
'

Hume is concerned to discover the foundations (in
some sense) of the mind's transition from an impression
or memory idea to an idea of its usual concomitant (i.e.
an idea of the cause or effect of the object of the im-

pression or memory idea).

He says,

the next question is, 'Whether
experience produces the idea by means
of the understanding or of the imagination; whether we are determined by
reason to make the transition or by
a certain association or relation of
perceptions.
If reason determin'd us,
it would proceed upon that principle,
that instances of which we have had no
expe r ience must resemble those of V7hich
we~~have had experience and that the
course of nature continues always
(emphasis Hume's)
uniformly the same.
.

.

.

(T.

In this passage Hume clearly indicates that he is

trying to discover whether or not reason will determine
the transition under discussion.

A transition from beliefs

about what is or has been observed to

a

belief about what

is not observed is the hallmark of inductive inference.
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Hume does not use the expression
’inductive inference’ or
Its cognates (his most common
term is ’probable argument’),
but there can be no doubt that
the transition of which he
speaks is some variety of inductive
inference.
In particular,

Hume’s discussion is about one specific

kind of inductive inf erence-- the kind
Stove calls ’predictiveinductive inferences.’
These are inferences which have as
their conclusion a claim about a particular
event or object.
To use an example of Hume’s, such an
inference would have
among the premises the claim that all flames
that have been
observed in the past are hot and the claim that
this is a
flame.

The conclusion of such an inference is the
assertion

that this flame is hot.

There are o ther kinds of inductive

inferences (e.g. the one whose conclusion is that all flames
are hot), and there can be no doubt that Hume’s argument

should and does apply to all of these.

Nonetheless, the

focus of the present argument is on those inferences whose

conclusions are singular.
It is a consequence of Hume’s psychological theory that

all predictive-inductive inferences are causal inferences.

Hume later discovers, the constant conjunction of two kinds
of objects in past experience brings about an idea of the

one when the other is present to the senses or the memory;
in addition,

the past constant conjunction is responsible

for an impression of necessi tation that is the origin of the

idea of necessary connection.

Thus the mind believes that

As

.

:
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the object of the idea, which is
the conclusion of the
inference, is causally connected to
the object of the ori-

ginal impression or memory idea, which
initiates the

predictive-inductive inference.

Nowhere does Hume say that

the mind believes that the connection
is always one of

proximate causation.

As he makes clear in his discussion of

the "probability of causes" (Part (iii)
Section 12), one
may believe that there are intermediate
causes and effects
of which one is unaware.

What does the passage quoted on page

predictive-inductive inferences?

94

say about

This question is of capital

importance for reasons that will become apparent as
ceed.

I

pro-

It is worth dealing with this question with consider-

able care.

Hume seems to say that if the mind makes the

transition on the basis of some argument (is determined by
reason)

,

then it presupposes that the future will appropriately

resemble the past.

Let us call the underlined passage in

the preceding quotation the Resemblance Thesis

course, as Hume states it, RT is very vague.

(RT)

.

Of

For the present,

anyway, it can be left that way because our concern is not

with its content, but, rather, with its function in Hume's
argument.

Thus,

it is safe to say that Hume believes the

following

(1)

All predictive-inductive inferences presuppose
the Resemblance Thesis (RT)
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What sense can be assigned to 'presuppose' here?

Stove

has offered the following interpretation of Hume's
sense of
'

presuppose

Co

'

:

Sometimes when we say of an argument from
p
to q, that it presupposes r, our meaning is
as follows:
that, as it stands, the argument from p to q is not valid, and that, in
order to turn it into a valid argument it
would be necessary to add to its premises
the proposition r.

The core idea of this proposal is that the addition of the

presuppositum to an invalid argument turns it into
argument.

As

I

a

valid

shall argue later, this is basically what

Hume had in mind.

However, as Stove states it, this pro-

posal cannot be correct.

For any invalid argument from p

to q there is no proposition r that is n eces sary to turn it

into a valid argument.

Rather, there are a number of prop-

ositions any one of which would be sufficient to make the
argument valid.

However, among those propositions, there

is at least one which could not reasonably be construed to

be a presuppositum of such an argument, viz

.

a

contradiction.

It must be at least possible that the presuppositum is true;

otherwise, it is not even possible that the valid "counterpart" argument is sound.

^Stove, D.C.

These considerations suggest the

Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism
(Oxford,

1973), p. 43.

,
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following amended version of Stove's
construal:
argument 'p^
r

^

(iii)

.

.

,

therefore

'p^
r

•

•

•

presupposes

.

.

.

therefore q' is invalid.

Pn?

p^

&

r,

therefore

q'

is valid,

is not self-contradictory

Note that this construal does not require that
unique.

q'

and only if
'Pl

(ii)

.

However, this is not problematic.

r

will be

Hume's statement

of what is presupposed by predictive-inductive inferences
(cf.

p.

biguous.

94

above)

— the

There may be

"Uniformity of Nature" is quite ama

related sense of presupposition

that does guarantee uniqueness, but there does not appear to
be any suggestion of it in Hume.

If this is a correct in-

terpretation of Hume, the three conditions of CQ'--the
invalidity of the original argument, the validity of the
subsequent argument, and the possibility that the presup-

positum is true--are the most that one can legitimately
extract from Hume's discussion here.
This construal of Hume's sense of presuppose is intui-

tively plausible, and there are good interpretive arguments
for it.

Before considering these arguments,

I

should like

to consider three other interpretations of the notion of

presupposition that Hume relies on in this passage. The first
two have never been explicitly considered before; the third
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was offered by D. Goldstick in his
article entitled "Hume’s
Circularity' Charge Against Inductive
Reasoning".
1.

^n^£ual_J.; Hume's concern in this passage

psychological.

is strictly

He is trying to show that the mind must

have a certain belief

(v^.

,

RT)

in order that it be dis-

posed or determined to make the transition in
question.

Thus,

presuppose' in Hume's sense, can be defined as follows:
Cj^

S's argument: 'p therefore q' presupposes r iff
would not make the transition from his bell^
p to his belief q unless S believed (or were
disposed to believe’^) r.
S

Thus,

the presupposition in question is a psychological one

that all of us as a matter of fact have, since we all make

such transitions.

Objection
s -a- vis

:

Whatever the truth of this psychological claim
the Resemblance Thesis and predictive-inductive

inference, the main problem with this construal of Hume's
sense of

'presuppose' is that the question of the epistemic

warrant remains untouched, if Hume's aims are strictly psychological as this construal requires.

And,

in particular,

we could ask Hume for the justification of the empirical

claim that he is making in the passage under discussion.

7

Since, for Hume, belief is occurrent rather than dispositional, it is appropriate to speak of a disposition
to believe here.
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Recall

(see quotation p.

94)

that Hume is intent on discover-

ing whether or not reason determines
the mind to make the

transition involved in

certain kind of inference.

a

This

may appear to be a psychological question-Is Reason the
faculty that makes this transition or is it
some other
'

faculty?'

Whatever psychological content this has, there
is

surely an epistemological element here.

Analogously, if

someone asked whether the mind's "deductive faculty"
makes
the transition involved in an instance of modus
ponens and
if he answered affirmatively, we would be entitled
to draw
a

non-psychological conclusion--the theorist believes that

modus ponens is valid.

Hume is notorious for framing non-

psychological questions in psychological terms.

This seems

to be as clear a case of this tendency as one can find.

There can be little doubt that Hume's claims here have some

non-psychological import that is not expressed in

.

Therefore, Cj can be rejected.
2.

Co nstrual

2

:

On this interpretation, Hume is concerned

with the epistemic warrant of the conclusion.

What Hume is

saying is that the belief arrived at is unjustified unless
the presuppostium is true

0-2

,

i.e.

S's argument;
'p, therefore q' presupposes
Unless r is true, S's belief q on the basis
of his belief p is unjustified.

r

iff
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Here the question of the epistemic warrant
of the belief that
q is dealt with.
Thus the problem of Construal 1 does not
arise in connection with this construal.
Applying this

definition to the passage in question, Hume is
interpreted
as saying that, unless RT is true, a given
predictiveinductive inference results in an unjustified belief.

Objections

:

There are two major problems with this construal,

one interpretive and one philosophical.
a)

If this interpretation were correct, we should

expect to find in this section
RT is true.
RT.

a

discussion of whether or not

However, Hume does not discuss the truth of

That matter is an open question for him in the Treatise.

Though he does discuss what sorts of arguments may be

offered for it, he does not affirm or deny RT

.

It is true

that he does appear to affirm RT in the second to last para-

graph of Essay V of the E nquiries
the sense of

.

Nonetheless, if this were

'presuppose' that he had in mind in the passages

from the Treatise under discussion

(as well as the

passages in the Enquirie s and the Abstra ct)

correlative

he would have

,

discussed the truth of RT at that juncture.
b)

A more telling objection is that D

2

,

instantiated

in a manner appropriate to the passage in question,

an obviously false claim to Hume.

attributes

If we say that inductive

inference presuppose RT in this sense, then the truth value

^

,
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of RT will determine whether or not
the mind's belief in a

particular inductively arrived at conclusion
is justified.
If RT IS true,

RT

then regardless of

a

person's beliefs about

(even if that person has no beliefs about
RT)

,

the con-

clusion of an inductive argument will be justified.

How-

ever, any adequate account of justification
makes it relative
to other beliefs

(or justified beliefs)

that a person holds,

unless, perhaps, the belief in question is self-certifying,

which is obviously not an issue here.

Thus, this interpre-

tation fails.
3.

Construal

3

:

This interpretation avoids the pitfalls

of the second construal in that there is some textual support
for it and it does not commit Hume to any obviously intenable

positions.

Goldstick, in response to Stove's interpre-

D.

tation, has offered the following interpretation of Hume's

sense of

C3

'presuppose':

S's argument:
'p, therefore q' presupposes r iff
it would be impossible to bo justified in believing
q on the basis of an inference from p unless it were
to be possible independently to be justified in

believing

r

.

On this construal,

O

the passage in question would be inter-

Donald Goldstick, "Hume's 'Circularity' Charge Against
Inductive Reasoning" Dialogue 1972, p. 259.
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preted as follows:

All predictive-inductive inferences

presuppose RT in that it would be impossible to be justified
in believing the conclusion of a predictive-inductive

inference (on the basis of that inference) unless it were

possible independently to be justified in believing the
Resemblance Thesis.

Objection s

:

Problems with this interpretation arise when we

try to get clear about Goldstick's sense of 'justified'.

He

clearly does not mean that the presuppositum and the premises of an argument must logically imply the conclusion.

Otherwise,

collapses into Stove's view (i.e. C^)

.

addition, he explicitly denies that this is his view.

In

He

tries to make clear this sense of 'presuppose' by way of

examples.
I

infer,

Let us consider one of his examples.

Suppose that

from the observation that the street is wet, that

it rained recently.

(Never mind that this example of

Goldstick's is not a predictive -inductive one.

It is in-

ductive, and the point remains the same if the example is
changed.)

Such an inference is said to presuppose that a

sprinkler truck had not just passed through the area in that
one is or can be justified independently in believing that
a

sprinkler truck has not passed through the area recently.
The significance of the modal operators in Goldstick

construal is unclear.

His construal makes perfectly good

s

.
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sense without them; if
wet,

I

i

were to observe that my street is

would conclude that it had rained recently.

That

argument might be said to presuppose that no sprinkler
truck
had passed through the area recently in that

I

actually have

good reason to believe that no one operates such a truck
in
I

lorence, Massachusetts

(even though

consider this presuppositum)
justified belief for me

may not explicitly

the presuppositum is a

So,

.

I

it is a well-grounded suppressed

{-iremise

To say, on the other hand, that it is possible for me
to be justified in believing this presuppositum might mean

the following.

(Assume that

I

do not in fact have any reason

to believe the aforementioned presuppositum)

facts are such that if

I

were to check

and generally reliable source,

I

are no sprinkler trucks in town.

a

:

The empirical

certain independent

would be told that there
Of course, another generally

reliable source could in fact lead me astray.
the course of nature is such that there is

^

However, if

sanctioned and

independent way for me to acquire this belief, then it would
be impossible

(in this

sense)

for me to be justified in be-

lieving the presuppositum, and as
strual,
i]

a

consequence of this con-

it would be impossible to be justified in believing

on the basis of p.

'presuppose'.

Admittedly, this is an odd sense of

Either interpretation of Goldstick's construal.

.

10 5

however, is unhelpful.
To see this, consider how things stand
with respect to
the Resemblance Thesis.

Suppose, contrary to fact, that RT

were somehow "available"

— perhaps

by the benevolence of the

Divine Artif icer--f or predict ive- induct ive inference
(i.e.
the mind is or could be independently justified
in believing
RT)

How would RT, coupled with the premises of a pre-

dictive-inductive inference, justify one's belief in the conclusion?

As noted previously,

it could not be on the basis

of a deductively valid argument.

The above example of

Goldstick's suggests that RT and the premises of the argument would inductively warrant the conclusion.

But,

so

Goldstick would argue, RT is not available; thus the belief
in the conclusion is not justified.

However, if inductive

procedures can produce justified belief, why consider RT
at all?

Hume's concern is with the warrant of particular

inductive inferences.

There seems to be no point in dis-

cussing RT unless he thinks it necessary to logically guarantee
the conclusion of an argument.
the sense in which RT,

Goldstick might reply that

if available, would justify a pre-

dictive-inductive conclusion involves neither deduction nor
induction (broadly construed)

.

Of course,

in that case,

the

example of his cited above is particularly inappropriate.
The problem now is to specify the sense of 'justification'
in such a way that,

RT,

if available, would

(together with
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the premises of a predictive-inductive inference)

the conclusion.

justify

Perhaps there is an appropriate sense here,

but Goldstick does not say what it is.

The upshot is that

C3 fails because the intention of any construal is to make

more clear what is unclear

seems to be a case of ex-

.

plaining the obscure by the more obscure.
Are there any other construals of Hume's sense of

presuppose' in this passage?

Stove considers and rejects

one other, somewhat bizarre construal.

construals of Hume's sense, but

I

There may be other

am unaware of them.

More

importantly, there are positive, and indeed conclusive argu-

ments for something very much like Stove's interpretation
(i.e.

C^,).

Stove himself advances two arguments for this

interpretive claim, but they are embedded in his particular

representation of the rest of Hume's argument.

Both are

designed to show that the rest of Hume's argument makes

a

great deal of sense if his interpretation of this key passage
is correct.
is

Though my representation of Hume's argument

somewhat different.

Stove's arguments have the same

benefits for my representation.

Nonetheless,

I

think that

there is another argument for Stove's construal that he
does not explicitly offer.

It is to this argument that

I

shall now turn.

The centerpiece of Hume's argument in this section is

.

.

.
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the Resemblance Thesis.

He is at great pains to establish

that RT is somehow "unavailable" for
predictive-inductive
inference.

We might speculate for a moment about what
would

happen if, p^r impossible

,

RT somehow became available.

What would we then have?
Upon reflection, there can be no doubt that what we

would have is

deductively valid argument

a

has been left unspecified.

.

Thus far RT

How might it be specified so as

to be of some value in an argument?

Consider the following

inductive argument:

.

•

.

(1)

Flame^^ is

(observed to be) hot

(2)

Flame2 is

(observed to be) hot

(3)

Flame 2 is (observed to be) hot

(k)

Flamej^ is

(

observed to be) hot

(k+1)

This is

(k+2)

This is hot.

a

flame
(where

(k+1)

but not

(k+2)

is an

observation statement)
We can specify
as

a

Minimal Resemblance Thesis for this argument

:

(MRT)

If

(1)

&

(2)

&

...

&

(k+1)

,

then (k+2)

This just says that if all observed flames have been observed to be hot and this is

a

flame, then this is hot--

Nature is Uniform with respect to Flamo]^ through this flame
being hot.

It is minimal in that it is the weakest version

:

.

108

of RT that requires the use
of all the other premises
in
the predictive-inductive
inference to make it valid. The
important feature of this argument
is that Promises (1)

en^

through (MRT)

(k+2).

Thus,

if this inductive argu-

ment "proceeds upon the principle"
of MRT, then it can be
transformed into a deductively valid
argument.
Of course,
a stronger version of RT might
also suffice to generate a
valid argument.
Suppose, however, that RT did not entail,
together with
the other premises of a predictiveinductive argument, the

conclusion.

What might RT look like?

Well, Goldstick,

in

the previously cited article, proposes a
very, very weak

version of RT that does not provide the premise
of an entail'
ment
In any particular respect, it is more
probable than not, other things being
equal, that, the course of nature will
continue at least approximately the
same as in the past.^
It may be doubted whether this is precise enough to be any-

thing but trivially true, or perhaps "lacking in cognitive
content", but supposing that this is not the case, what could
this version of RT do for an inductive argument?

^Ibid

.

,

p.

260

The only

:
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thing that it might do would be to render the
argument in-

duct ively stronger (though perhaps not

a

great deal)

A more precise version of RT makes this clearer.
us consider,

as Goldstick suggests,

a

Let

very general probabil-

istic statement of the Resemblance Thesis:
PRT:

For any empirical properties A and B,
P (An instance of B will occur/An instance of A

has been observed to occur and instances of
A and instances of B have been observed to be
conjoined k times) > .75

Of course,

PRT may well be false but for logical purposes

that is irrelevant.

Instantiating in

a

manner appropriate

to the predictive-inductive inference about the flame, the

following more specific version of PRT can be deduced:
PRT'

P(This is hot/ This is a flame and k flames
have been observed to be hot) > .75

It is clear that the argument on page 107 is inductively stronger with PRT'

perhaps not

a

than it is without that premise (though

great deal stronger)

.

ment is still not deductively valid.

Nonetheless, the arguYet if, at this point,

inductively strong arguments are acceptable, there is no
point in considering any version of RT; many arguments are

inductively strong without it.
Of course, one may, by means of the probability calcu-

lus and a suitable rule of detachment, be £\ble to get a

'
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singular probability statement such
as P(This flame is hot)
.75.
That, however, is not the conclusion
of a predictiveinductive inference. For Hume, the
conclusion of a predictive
inductive inference from an obser_yed u
niformity
is a

statement such as 'This flame is hot'.

in summary,

then,

given that Hume is in some way concerned
with the warrant of
predictive-inductiv e inferences, the only decisive
role that
RT can play here is to transform such
inferences into deductively valid arguments.

Perhaps there are other modes of justification; C.S.
Pierce has called our attention to another fonn of
inference-what he calls abductive inference; there may well be others.
Nonetheless, since the "Epistemological Turn" was inaugurated
by Descartes, philosophers of the modern era have searched
for a certainty that can only be provided by deductive in-

ference or intuition.

Though as scientists

perhaps, as philosophers)

(and even,

they might be willing to counte-

nance inductive inferences as producing justified belief, it
is reasonably clear that there were no other options.

Thus,

it is reasonable to believe that Hume intended that, were RT

to be available as a premise,

render

a

(contrary to fact)

,

it would

predict ive- inductive inference deductively valid.

Thus, not just any version of RT will do; together with
the other premises,

conclusion.

it must be strong enough to entail the

Let the expression

'RT(V)

stand for any such

?

Ill

version of the Resemblance Thesis.
RT(V)

Therefore, by adding

to the premises of a predictive-inductive
inference,

it will be transformed into what, may
be aptly termed a

deductively valid counterpart inference.
Premise

(1)

Consequently,

of Hume's argument (see p. 97) can be inter-

preted as follows:
All pr edi c t ive — indue t ive inferences are
invalid and all deductively valid counterpart inferences have RT(V) as a premise.

(la)

Is Premise
it,

(la)

true?

Hume offers no argument for

but it would be helpful to consider what kind of argu-

ment he might have offered.

The first part of (la)

obviously true because, as it occurs in the mind,

predictive-inductive inference is invalid.
is not so obvious.

is

a

The second part

Why is it that the premises that trans-

forms a predictive-inductive inference into a deductively

valid counterpart inference
of Nature

(i.e.

a

a

statement about the Uniformity

version of RT)

The non-ampliative nature of valid arguments guarantees

that RT(V) will be some statement about the Uniformity of
Nature, though perhaps in a very limited sense.
of a non-ampliative

(valid)

inference are often said to

"contain" implicitly the conclusion.

premises of

comprise

a

a

The premises

Since some of the

deductively valid counterpart argument

statement of an observed regularity and since the

112

conclusion of such an argument extends that regularity
to
something that is unobserved, it seems fair to say that
the
key premise, which "validates" that transition, is

ment about

a

a

state-

resemblance between the observed and the un-

observed and hence is

a

version of RT.

It has been necessary to go to what might appear to be

inordinate lengths to establish

(la)

as a clear and correct

interpretation of Hume's claim in the passage under discussion.

However,

it has very significant consequences for the

interpretation of the conclusion of Hume's argument.

The

interpretation of the rest of his argument is fairly straightforward.

This way of interpreting the first premise will

determine that there are only two possible ways to read the
conclusion; one reading is highly sceptical, and the other
is not.

I

shall show that the former is untenable and that

the latter is correct.

Now,

for the rest of Hume's argument.

Immediately following the passage quoted on page 94
Hume says.
In order therefore to clear up this
matter, let us consider all the argu-

ments, upon which such a proposition
can be founded; and as these must be
derived from either knowledge or
probability let us cast our eye on
each of these degrees of evidence
and see whether they afford any just
conclusion of this nature. (T. 89)
It is clear that the question with which Hume is here con
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cerned is whether or not RT
IS,

can be established

(V)

.

That

he wants to know whether or not RT(V)
can appear as

the conclusion of a rationally acceptable
argument having

rationally acceptable premises.
a

good argument for RT(V)?

an argument,

Put more simply,

is there

Hume says that if there is such

it is a demonstration or what he calls
"a

probable argument".

Thus, Premise

(2)

of Hume's argument

can be expressed as follows:

(2)

If RT(V)

can be established, then it can be
established by a demonstration or by a
"probable argument".

It is not obvious what Hume means by a "probable argu-

ment

in this context.

However, since this notion reappears

shortly in Hume's argument,

a

discussion of what he means

by this expression can be profitably postponed.

Hume's third premise and his argument for it are quite

straightforward.

He says.

there can be no demon strative arguments
prove that those instances of
which we have had no experience, resemble
those of which we have had experience.
We can at least conceive a change in the
course of nature; which sufficiently proves,
that such a change is not absolutely impossible.
(T. 89)
.

.

.

,

,

,

It is clear from this passage that Hume asserts and argues

for the following proposition:

(3)

RT(V)

cannot be established by demonstration.
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This prenuse is obviously true and
uncontroversial
once it is understood what Hume means
by

a

demonstration.

demonstration is not just any valid argument.

A

Otherwise,

Hume's claim that there is no demonstrative
argument for
RT(V)

is obviously false

(to take a trivial counterexample,

consider the valid argument 'RT(V) therefore
RT(V)').
Rather, a demonstrative argument is

a

whose premises are necessary truths.

valid argument all of
Since no set of propo-

sitions, all of whose members are necessary truths,
implies
a

contingent truth, and since the denial of RT(V)

ceivable (i.e. RT(V) is

a

is con-

contingent truth), there can be

no demonstrative argument for RT(V).

Hume next wants to argue that any argument from experience for RT(V) will be circular.

He says,

probability is founded on the
presumption of a resemblance between
those objects of which we have had
experience, and those, of which we have
had none; and therefore tis impossible
this presumption can arise from probability.
(T. 89)
.

.

.

What does Hume mean by a "probability"
here?

As a first step,

(probable argument)

it is fairly clear that the cate-

gories of demonstrative arguments and probable arguments are

mutually exclusive.

Thus,

a

some contingent premises, viz
ience.

probable argument will have
.

some statements about exper-

Are all probable arguments invalid?

The answer

,

.

,
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here must be 'No' if, as Premise

2

implies, Hume's classi-

fication of arguments as demonstrative or probable is coll-

ectively exhaustive.
premise is

a

If having at least one contingent

sufficient condition for an argument to be

probable in Hume's sense, then obviously there are valid
probable arguments (consider, for example, deductively
valid counterpart inferences).

Because the word 'probable'

has connotations that make it seem incongruous to speak of

valid probable arguments, let us henceforth refer to such

arguments by means of a more neutral term-- arguments from
'

experience
Nov;,

'

in the above-quoted passage, Hume argues that

there are no non-circular arguments from experience for RT(V).
However, he must mean by this that there are no non-circular
(deductively) valid arguments from experience.

This is clear

in light of the fact that if an invalid argument from ex-

perience could be used to establish (RT(V)

the entire argu-

ment under consideration would be rendered superfluous.

The

reason for this is that the predictive-inductive inference
is,

as it occurs in the mind,

invalid.

The whole point of

considering whether or not RT(V) can be used as

a

premise is

to see whether a predictive- inductive inference can be con-

verted into

a

deductively valid inference.

If there is a deductively valid argument from experience

for RT(V)

what would it look like?

Hume leaves little doubt

.
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about this mattor.

Hg says.

The only connexion or relation of objects,
which can lead us beyond the immediate
impressions of our memory and senses, is
that of cause and effect; and that because
tis the only one on which we can found a
just inference from one object to another.
The idea of cause and effect is derived
from e xper ience which informs us, that
such particular objects, in all past
instances have been constantly conjoined
with each other; And as an object similar
to one is immediately present in its
impression, we thence presume on the
existence of one similar to its usual
attendant (T 89-90)
,

.

.

As the last two sentences make clear, an argument from

experience for RT(V) will be just like
inductive inference except for

things:

It must be valid for reasons cited previously.

2)

Its conclusion

RT(V)
)

predictive-

1)

(prediction)
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tv;o

a

(RT(V))

will not be statement

about a particular object or event.

will have some predictive import (see pps

However,
.

111-

.

In light of these considerations it is possible to

interpret more clearly Premise
Premise

(

(2')

4

)

(2)

(and,

subsequently.

)

If RT(V) can be established, then it can be
established by a demonstration or by a
deductively valid argument from experience.

But, as Hume argues in the passage quoted on page 114,

.

;

.

'
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(4)

Any deductively valid argument from
experience for RT(V) is circular.

nis reason for this is that any valid argument
from

experience has RT(V) as a premise.
'RT(V)

(as well as the

[there is]

a

However, the expression

expressions that Hume uses, e.g.

resemblance betwixt those objects of which we

have had experience and those of which we have none")
ambiguous.

is

There are many non-equivalent Resemblance Theses

that could turn invalid arguments from experience into valid
ones.

In particular,

MRT makes it valid.

consider the argument on page 108.
There could be an argument from ex-

perience whose conclusion is MRT but which fails to have
MRT as a premise.
flames are hot.

One of its premises might be that all
Thus,

strictly speaking. Premise

(4)

is

false

Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear that Hume is onto

something here.
MRT.

Consider arguments from past experience for

No statements about past experience will entail MRT

otherwise, such statements would entail the predictive

conclusion (k+2)

However, a valid but non-circular argu-

ment from experience for MRT would have to have implicit
in its premises a supposition of an even greater uniformity

than is implied by MRT.
out,

And,

as Nelson Goodman has pointed

that is an odd and expensive way to justify

a

conclu-

,
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Sion about a particular
object.

All this suggests the
following:

A non-circular valid

argument for MRT (or, for that
matter, for any rt(V))
either begs the question or
gets involved in an infinite
regress (by supposing an even
greater regularity than is
stated in MRT)
This way of viewing matters
receives confirmation from Hume’s subsequent
discussion of a counter
argument that an opponent might
offer.
.

It may, perhaps, be sai(d, that
after
experience of the constant conjunction
of certain objects, we reason in
the
following manner:
Such an object is
always found to produce another. Tis
impossible that it could have this
effect if it were not endowed with a
power of production. The power
necessarily implies the effect; and
therefore there is a just foundation
for drawing a conclusion from the
existence of one object to that of its
usual attendant.
(T. 90)

However, Hume replies that since the power itself
is not

present to the senses (otherwise one could directly (and
validly)

infer the existence of one object from the other)

the existence of the power in one of the members of the
past

observed conjunction does not imply its existence in the
present case.

Shou'd it be said, that we have experience, that the same pov/er continues united with the same object,
and that like objects are endowed
with like powers, I wou'd renew my
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question, why from this experience we
conc l usion beyond those past
ins t a nces
of which
have"'had e^e7i^enc e?
if you answer this question in
the same manner as the preceding your
answer gives still occasion to a new
question of the same kind even in
inf ini turn which clearly proves, that
the foregoing reasoning has no just
foundation.
(T. 91)
,

,

;

Hume

s

argument here is

that the kind of argument for

a

good one; he says, in effect,
(som.e

version of) RT

either

(V)

begs the question or involves an infinite regress.

It is

difficult to prove that any non-circular valid argument for
any version of RT

will be question begging or involve an

(V)

regress, partly because it is difficult to state

precisely just what

a

question-begging argument is.

One can

adopt a favorite tactic of Hume's in this connection:

with the task of "proving a negative", one can issue

Faced
a

challenge to a prospective critic to produce a non-circular

valid argument from experience for RT(V) that does not beg
the question or involve an infinite regress.

Having

silenced potential critics in this manner, we can, with

reasonable assurance, restate the fourth premise as follows:
(4')

10

Any deductively valid argument from
experience for RT(V) is circular, questionbegging, or involves an infinite regress.

The use of this tactic here was suggested to me by
Prof. Robert Paul Wolff.
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The next two steps of Hume's argument
are so obvious
that Hume did not and need not have
stated
them:

(5)

••.(6)

Premises
•••(7)

If (4) is true, then RT(V) cannot
be established
by a deductively valid argument from
experience.

RT(V) cannot be established by a deductively
valid argument from experience.

(3)

and

RT(V)

(6)

obviously entail:

cannot be established.

The whole point of the discussion of whether or not
RT(V)

can be established is to see if invalid predictive-

inductive inferences can be "cured" of their invalidity by
t>sing

transformed into acceptable deductively valid counter-

part inferences.

The epistemological motivation for this

inquiry is not far to seek

:

VJhatever Hume

'

s

ultimate views

are on the epistemic warrantabil ity of certain kinds of

invalid inferences, because of the obvious and intimate relation between validity and certainty, valid arguments

are,

all else equal, epistemically better than their invalid

counterparts.

But,

if the premise that effects the transfor-

mation from an invalid argument to its deductively valid
counterpart (e.g. RT(V)) cannot be suitably supported, then
for epistemological purposes, the invalid argument cannot be

"cured" of its invalidity.

If,

in something like this fashion,

as seems likely, Hume reasoned

then the following obvious

.

:
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and uncontroversial premise can be
attributed to him:
(8)

Premises

.

.

(9)

If RT(V) cannot bo established, then
all pred ic t ive — indue t ive inferences
are incurably invalid.

(7)

and

(8)

obviously imply:

All predictive-inductive inferences are incurably

invalid
A final word about Premises

(2)

and

(8)

Hume's

unwillingness to use invalid arguments to establish RT(V)
cannot be taken as evidence that he believed that invalid

arguments are epistemically worthless.
is that if the

this context

The reason for this

use of invalid arguments were to be allowed
,

the entire argument under discussion

would be rendered superfluous.

What epistemological conclusion does Hume draw from
this argument?

This is a difficult and epistemologically

significant question.

One way to interpret Hume's conclu-

sion is to see him as taking a profoundly sceptical attitude

towards predictive-inductive inf erences--they are epistemically worthless.

The other way to interpret Hume's con-

clusion is to see him as holding that the conclusion of no

predictive-inductive inference is or can be rendered
certain relative to the premises of that inference.

remainder of this chapter

I

In the

shall lay out and evaluate

:
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these two options.
II.

The Interpretation of Hume's Conclusion

What, then is Hume's final conclusion?

As noted

previously, shortly after the above-quoted passage, he

considers and rejects

a

counter argument.

This argument

is designed to show that inductive inferences can
be made

deductively valid by introducing the notion of
powers are responsible for
it does.

a

a power;

cause having the effect that

He shows that this argument either begs the

question or involves an infinite regress.

After disposing

of his opponent in this manner, he states his final conclu-

sion

:

Thus not only our reason fails in the
discovery of the ultimate connexion
of causes and effects, but even after
experience has informed us of their
constant conjunctio n tis impossible
for us to satisfy ourselves by our
reason, why we should extend that
experience beyond those particular
instances which have fallen under
our observation.
We suppose, but are
never able to prove, that there must
be a resemblance betwixt those
objects, of which we have had experience
and those which lie beyond the reach of
(emphasis Hume's)
our discovery.
,

(T.

91-92)

Hume's conclusion can be expressed more succinctly as
follows
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(11)
(9)

Reason cannot determine the mind to
make
predictive-inductive inferences.

It is clear that
.

However,

(11)

(9)

stated by Hume,

does not follow from

together with

(call it

(10)),

a

(1)

through

premise not explicitly

entails (11).

The missing

premise is:
(10)

Reason cannot determine the mind to make incurably
valid inferences.
How is Hume's conclusion (and step (10)) to be inter-

preted?

It would be a mistake to think that this matter

could be settled by

a

textual examination of Hume's use of

the term 'reason' as a substantive.

makes Hume appear to be

a

This way of talking

faculty psychologist.

His use of

faculty psychology terminology is obscure and often incon-

sistent.^^

More importantly, as the development of his

psychological theory makes clear, Hume was not
psychologist.

a

faculty

His principal explanatory device, the

association of ideas, supersedes the appeal to various
"faculties",

before Hume.

a

device frequently used by psychologists
Thus, the interpretation of Hume's conclusion

will depend not on his use of the word 'reason' as

a

sub-

For example, compare his use of 'the understanding and
the imagination' on pages 88 and 267.
Reason is sometimes the "faculty" that discovers relations among ideas
(p. 157); sometimes it is that from which causal inference springs (p. 321); sometimes, indifferently, both
(p. 124).

,

:

124

stantive elsewhere in the Treatise

;

rather,

it will depend

on internal features of the present argument, direct clues

about what he took his conclusion to be, and the systematic

impact of various alternative interpretations on the rest
of Hume's philosophy.

What,

then,

are the alternatives?

that there is really only one.

D.C. Stove thinks

In speaking of this passage,

he says.

After all, [this] is that famous
sceptical conclusion which Hume came
to about inductive inferences, or
rather, about the only 'species' of
inductive inference which he discussed
both clearly and at length.
(If [this]
is no t Hume's inductive scepticism,
there is no inductive scepticism anywhere in Hume.)
I therefore suggest, as the interim
translation of [Hume's conclusion]
'All predictive-inductive inferences
are unreasonable.'
This captures
the non-psychological evaluative,
and the unfavorable meaning of Hume's
conclusion.
,

As Stove readily admits, this interpretation is

terribly unclear as it stands.

I

shall discuss below how

Nonetheless, there is one thing

he makes it more precise.

that is clear about this interpretation.

It is an epistemi c

appraisal of predict ive- induct ive inferences that is highly

^

^Donald C. Stove, op. cit

.

pps

.

33-34.

.

.
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unfavorable.

if Hume was a radical sceptic
about inductive

procedures, then he surely would assent to
Stove's interpretive claim. The vagueness of Stove's
interpretation
here has the salutary consequence that most
commentators
who adopt a sceptical interpretation of Hume
would assent
to it

For my purposes three minor changes in Stove's
inter-

pretation are warranted.
formity,

I

To preserve terminological uni-

shall replace 'unreasonable' by 'unjustified'.

Secondly, as Chapter

I

shows, Hume thought that the cause

of a belief can determine its epistemological status.

should be reflected in his conclusion here.

This

Thirdly,

Hume's conclusion is not an assessment simpliciter of
beliefs arrived at via predictive-inductive inferences.
His epistemic appraisal of such beliefs is of significance
in light of the fact that there are no acceptable deductively

valid counterpart inferences with the same conclusion.
This too should be reflected in the conclusion of Hume's
argument.

The following interpretation of Stove's conclu-

sion reflects these changes:

(11a)

All beliefs that are caused by predictiveinductive inferences are (and must remain)

unjustified
Statement

(11a)

is clearly a sceptical assessment of predic-

tive-inductive inference.

This interpretation of

(11)

,

.

.
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requires that (10) be interpreted
as follows:
(10a)

All beliefs that are caused
by
invalid arguments are (and must incurably
remain)
unjustified

One might wonder why someone
would believe (10a)
Well, most philosophers believe
that logical relations
between premises and conclusions
determine, in some sense,
epistemic relations between premises
and conclusions.
What would best explain (from a
logico-epistemic point of
view) someone's adherence to
(10) is the following

epistemological principle:
Principle P:

^

(11a)

All beliefs caused by invalid arguments are unjustified.

accurately represents Hume's conclusion and if,

as seems reasonable,

from

(9)

(10a)

best explains how he got to (11a)

then it is reasonable to believe that Hume sub-

scribed to Principle P.

This claim receives confirmation

from the fact that Stove, who is the most sophisticated

defender of (something like)

(11a)

tation of Hume, attributes

version of Principle P to

Hume.

1

a

as the correct interpre-

O

D.S. Miller also attributes something like

Principle P to Hume.^^

^^ Ib id.

,

p.

54

l^Dickinson S. Miller, "Hume's Deathblow to Deductivism"
Jou rnal of Philosoph y 1949, p. 745.
,

,
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Curiously, Miller argues that the entire
argument of
Hume's that is under consideration here is an
elaborate,
but wholly unintended reduc t io ad absurdem of
Principle

P.

That is, since Hume's final conclusion is something
like
(11a), which, according to Miller is obviously(?)

the guestionable principle on which it rests

Principle

is mistaken.

P)

absurd,

(viz.

What did not occur to Miller

was the possibility that Hume never subscribed to either
the sceptical conclusion or the

Principle

P!

However,
Hume

,

(equally implausible)

if

(11a)

is the correct interpretation of

then the above is undoubtedly a correct represen-

tation of his reasoning.

But,

is

(11a)

the correct inter-

pretation of Hume's conclusion?
There is,
reasoning.

I

think, another way to understand Hume's

Hume could be asserting that, since all

predictive-inductive inferences are incurably invalid, the
conclusion of no predictive-inductive inference is or can
be rendered certain relative to its premises.

This, too,

is an epistemic appraisal of beliefs arrived at via

predictive-inductive inferences.

Thus,

(10)

and

(11)

could

be interpreted as follows:

(10b)

No conclusion of an incurably invalid inference is (or can be rendered) certain relative
to its premises.
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No conclusion of a predictive-inductive
inference is (or can bo rendered) certain
relative to its premises.

(11b)

As was the case with Stove's interpretation, it
would
be helpful to consider why someone would believe
the

suppressed premise (i.e. step 10b)).

what would best ex-

plain someone's adherence to (10b) is the following epistemic principle:

Principle Q:

If

The conclusion of no valid inference is
certain relative to its premises.

accurately represents Hume's conclusions and if,

(11b)

as seems reasonable,
(9)

to

(11b)

,

(10b)

best explains how he got from

then it is reasonable to believe that Hume

subscribed to Principle Q.
Both

(11a)

and (11b) are epistemic appraisals of

beliefs arrived at via predictive-inductive inferences.
Though both are somev/hat unclear

remedied shortly)

,

(a

problem that will be

there is no other obviously distinct

way to understand Hume's reasoning here.

In order to see

which of the above is the correct way to interpret Hume,
it is important to clarify the epistemic notions employed
in these competing interpretations.
(8)

and

(9)

Since, as Premises

imply, no deductively valid counterpart in-

ference is rationally acceptable, we can confine our
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attention to Hume’s appraisal of
beliefs arrived at via
predictive-inductive inferences: such
inferences are, by
definition, invalid.
One way to get a handle on Hume's
epistemic evaluation
of beliefs arrived at by predictive-inductive
inference
is to see how he would answer the
following question:

What degree of belief in the conclusion
of
inductive inference would

a

a

predictive-

full and entire belief in the

premises cause in a completely rational inferrer,
whose
belief in the conclusion was influenced only by his
belief in the premises of that inference?' Admittedly,
from
a

philosophical point of view, this might not be

a

terribly

helpful way to proceed because it might not be possible to

specify the completely rational inferrer in

a

way that does

presuppose what he would do in the circumstances under

consideration.^^

The present problem, however, is an in-

terpretative one, and this question seems to be

a

felicitous

way to ask Hume for his epistemic appraisal of inductive

inference for two reasons:
(i)

It appears to be an empirical, psychological
question but is not in fact such a question.
Hume asks and answers many such questions in
the course of the Treatise.

15 This difficulty
was pointed out to me by G.
in conversation.

Lynn Stephens
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(ii)

A key concept hore-that of degree
of belief
is
a familiar one for Hume.
Mis account of belief
requires that there be degrees of it,
and he develops in Sections 11, 12, and 13
of Part (iii)
the psychology of this in great
detail.

—

Thus It seems reasonable to say that
Hume's epistemic
appraisal of inductive inference can be
understood in terms
of an answer to the above question.
What do such answers
look like? Stove suggests that what is
called for here
is an assessment of the conclusiveness
of arguments.

The

conclusiveness of an argument is the measure of the degree
of belief that the completely rational infeirer has in
the

conclusion of that argument, given that he has

a

full and

entire belief in the premises and given that his degree of
belief in the conclusion is influenced only by the premises
Stove claims that this notion of the conclusiveness of an

argument is a magnitude.

He makes this clear when he says.

Some arguments, it is evident, have
this property in the highest possible
degree.
A completely rational inferrer,
that is to say, if he knew the premises
and were influenced by nothing else,
would have in the conclusion the same
degree of belief as he has in the premiss.
All valid arguments, for example, have the
highest possible degree of conclusiveness.
It is equally evident that some
other arguments do not have the highest
possible degree of conclusiveness. A
completely rational inferrer who knew the
premiss of such an argument would have
not the same but at most a lower degree
of belief in its conclusion.
No invalid

.

.
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arguments, for example, are of the
highest degree of conclusiveness
these assertions
suffice to
establish that conclusiveness is a
property of arguments which is a
magnitude at least in the minimal
sense that some arguments have it in
the highest possible degree and others
do not.-^o
'

.

.

*

.

It is clear that Stove wants to
understand the degree

of conclusiveness of an argument as a measure
of the

epistemic warrant of the conclusion of an
argument relative
to Its premises.

That is, the premises of an argument pro-

vide a measure of rational justification for the
conclusion
(exactly what that measure is for various arguments can
be
left open at this point).

The concept of conclusiveness is an objective one;
the measure is independent of what the mind happens to

believe it to be.

Consequently, the mind can be mistaken

about this measure, and it can correctly believe that the

conclusion of a given argument has

a

certain measure of

epistemic warrant (relative to the premises) for the wrong
reasons (e.g. by making

a

number of errors in reasoning that

cancel each other out)

^^Donald
1

7

C.

Stove, op. c it

.

,

p.

9

One might wonder what Stove would say about the degree of
conclusiveness of a circular (and hence valid) "counterpart inference".
According to the above quotation, ho
would say it has the highest possible degree of conclusiveness.
Though this might appear odd. Stove could say
that, since the establishment of RT(V) is so problematic,
this argument could be rejected on other grounds.
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It IS not clear to me at
this time what the conditions

are for the degree of
conclusivenoss to be a measure of
a
given individual's epistemic
warrant.
It can at least bo
said that if someone knows what
the degree of conclusiveness
IS, then it (the degree of
conclusiveness) measures his
or her epistemic warrant.
To further explain or clarify
this notion of the

conclusiveness of an argument, Stove claims
that assessments
of conclusiveness are or can be
expressed by statements of
Logical Probability, in Carnap’s sense.
Any philosopher
who IS concerned with arguments makes
assessments of their
conclusiveness.
Since, on this view, such assessments
can

be expressed by statements of Logical
Probability,

such

statements can be attributed to any such philosopher,
in-

cluding Hume.
Thus, Stove identified statements assessing the con-

clusiveness of arguments with statements of Logical
Probability.

One should be sceptical of this claim for

the following reasons:

It is clear that the degree of

conclusiveness of an argument is an epistemic concept
measure of epistemic warrant)

.

however, are logical relations.

(a

Validity and invalidity,
Thus, Stove's assertion

that all valid arguments have the highest possible degree
of conclusiveness and his assertion that all invalid argu-

ments have less than the highest possible degree of conclu-

,
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siveness are substantive epistemic principles.

Even if

they are necessary truths, they are not trivial identity
claims.

For Carnap, Logical Probability is a logical con-

cept which is to be understood (roughly) as degree of

entailment.

Stove

s

identification of a logical concept.

Logical Probability, and an epistemic concept, degree of

conclusiveness, needs some sort of an argument, which he
does not provide.

Furthermore, Carnap, towards the end of

his life, came to distinguish the relevant epistemic and

logical concepts.

In a very recent article he said.

The former [i.e. epistemic] concepts
are quasi-psychological they are
assigned to an imaginary subject X
supposed to be equipped with perfect
rationality and an unfailing memory;
the logical concepts, in contrast, have
nothing to do with observers and
agents, whether natural or constructed, real or imaginary.
;

The exact relation between the logical and epistemic

concepts is in some dispute; fortunately, for the purposes
at hand,

this dispute need not be resolved.

Stove and

I

can rightly agree on the following points about the inter-

pretation of Hume's conclusion:

^^Rudolph Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions" in
Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability ed by
M*chard~C. JeTfrey”^d Rudolph Carnap (Berkeley
,

1971), p.

25.

.

.

.

,
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(a)

His conclusion contains an epistemic
assessment
or predictive-inductive inferences.

(b)

His conclusion does not follow from
step (9) of
his argument (i.e. his claim that
all such inferences are incurably invalid)

(c)

The suppressed premise, which, together
with
entails (11) rests on an epistemic principle (9)
which states that the invalidity of an inference
IS a sufficient condition for its conclusion
having the epistemic property (relative to the
premises) that Hume assigns it.

(d)

In the passage under discussion (the last
paragraph on page 88 to the top of page 92 in
Selby-Bigge)
Hume offers no argument for the
,

unstated epistemic principle.

To resolve the dispute about Hume's epistemic assessment of

predictive-inductive inferences, it is unnecessary to bring
in the technical apparatus associated with modern inductive

logic

Stove has two major purposes in his monograph; he

wants to give
ment for

a

a

clear statement of Hume's (alleged) argu-

form of scepticism, and he wants to show that

this version of scepticism is false.

His heavy reliance on

Logical Probability is really only essential for the second
task, which is of no concern for the present debate.
I

Thus,

think that Stove's interpretation can be fairly stated and

evaluated in terms of the concept of conclusiveness.

Though

this concept is not as clear as it might be, it is not

hopelessly obscure.

As

I

shall presently show, a number of

.

.
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distinct forms of scepticism can be
represented in terms
of it

What exactly is the version of
scepticism that Stove
attributes to Hume? The sceptic does not
deny that the

mind's degree of actual belief in the
conclusion of a
predictive-inductive inference can be increased as
a

of the appropriate sort of experience.

result

Nor does he deny

that the mind does in fact make predictions.

His substan-

tive claim about predictive-inductive inference
is threefold

:

(i)

All predictive-inductive inferences have less
than the highest possible degree of conclusive—
ness

(ii)

All predict ive— inductive inferences with the same
conclusion have the same degree of conclusiveness.

(iii)

The degree of conclusiveness of all predictiveinductive inferences with the same conclusion
(call it 'c') is the same as the degree of conclu—
siveness of that argument (whose conclusion is
c) which has only a tautological premise.

19 Though

conclusiveness is an epistemic property of arguments
and the two interpretations of Hume's conclusion (as
well as the suppressed epistemic principle) are statements about b eliefs the relation between the two is
fairly obvious; (i) means the same as:
,

(i')

The measure of epistemic warrant of any belief, which
is the conclusion of a predictive-inductive
inference, relative to the premises of that inference
is less than the highest possible.

:

,

,

,

,

136

A word of explanation is needed
about the relation
between (ii) and (iii). Consider
the following three
inferences
A.

(1)

Flame^ is hot.

(2)

Flame2 is hot.

B

(1*)

Therefore
(2')

•

(n)

Flame^ is hot.

(n +

1)

This is

a

This is a flame

This is hot.

flame.

Therefore
(n+2)

(1")

p or not p

Therefore
(3")

This is hot.

This is hot.

Suppose that someone assents to Statement

(ii)

above.

That is, he asserts that Inference A has the same degree
of conclusiveness as Inference B.

Statement
(ii)

(ii)

If he were to deny

(iii)

means the same things as:

The measure of epistemic warrant of any belief, which
is the conclusion of a predictive-inductive inference, relative to the premises of that inference
is the same as the measure of epistemic warrant of
that belief relative to the premises of any other
predictive-inductive inference which has that belief
as a conclusion.

Statement (iii) can be similarly transformed.
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he would have to say that the degree
of conclusiveness of

Inference B is greater than or less than that
of Inference
C.

It would be arbitrary to say that the
degree of con-

clusiveness of Inference B is greater than that
of C for
the following reason:
The observational data that transforms
Inference B into Inference A has no effect on the
degree
of conclusiveness of Inference A.

The observational data

that transforms Inference C into Inference B does have such

offset.

Bearing in mind that Inference B really does

exclude all other data, this is clearly arbitrary.

Similar

considerations apply if the sceptic says that the degree of
conclusiveness of Inference
Thus,

greater than that of B.

C is

if someone assents to Statement

to Statement

(iii)

Statements

(ii)

,

he should assent

as well.

(ii)

and (iii) proclaim the irrelevance of

experience from an epistemological point of view, for the
purposes of prediction.

In particular.

Statement (iii)

asserts that all predictive-inductive inferences have the same

measure of epistemic warrantability as what is, in effect,
a

groundless belief.

Clearly, then, this is a form of scep-

ticism about predictive-inductive inferences.
is the way that Stove understands
a

(11);

thus,

Statement (iii)
it serves as

clarification of (Ha).
Though Statements

(ii)

and

(iii)

are clearJ.y sufficient

conditions for scepticism about predictive-inductive infer-

.
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ences, are they necessary
conditions as well?20
Suppose a sceptic were to
assert that (ii) is false
but that his scepticism can
still be maintained.
lie might
argue for this as follows:
it is true that predictive-

inductive arguments have different
degrees of conclusiveness.
As a consequence, it is true
that a completely
rational inferrer would have varying
degrees of belief in
the conclusion of a
predictive-inductive argument, depending on what the premises were.
However, no predictiveinductive argument is conclusive enough
to provide knowledge
Only arguments with the highest
possible degree of conclusiveness can do that.

.

Thus the sceptic might say that the degree
of conclusiveness of all predictive-inductive inferences
is just

insufficient.

One might well ask,

"Insufficient for what?"

If he says that the degree of conclusiveness
is insufficient

for knowledge,

in Hume's sense, Hume might well be such a

sceptic because his conception of knowledge is highly
re-

strictive and idiosyncratic, at least by present standards.
Knowledge, for Hume, is characterized by certainty.

This

certainty is absolute, if the belief is intuited or demonstrated (i.e. validly inferred from intuitive truths).

pn
^^This
question was suggested to me by
conversation

G.

If

Lynn Stephens in
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Hume is here arguing that
predictive-inductive inferences
never yield knowledge, then he
is denying that there is any
Illative certainty that can be achieved
by this kind of
inference.
To say that predict ive- inductive
inferences
never yield relative certainty is
consistent with the view
that some predictive-inductive
inferences are sufficiently
conclusive to produce justified belief
in the sense outlined
on page 82.
Of course, it is also consistent
with the
deeper and more radical scepticism that
Stove attributes to
him.

However, if stove were to admit that this
is what Hume

was up to here, it would be disastrous for
his interpretation.
For,

as he rightly admits,

if Hume is not here arguing for

the radical scepticism of Statements

(ii)

and (iii)

,

then

nowhere (in Part (iii)) does he argue for it.
There is another form of scepticism about predictive-

inductive inferences that is consistent with the denial
of
(ii)

and (iii)

.

A sceptic could claim that, though different

predictive— inductive inferences have different degrees of
conclusiveness, none of them has

a

degree of conclusiveness

sufficiently high for it to produce justified belief.

The

reason for this is not that justified belief requires certainty.

Rather,

in order that a belief be justified

merits rational acceptance)
must have

a

,

(i.e.

the argument that caused it

degree of conclusiveness which is, while not

the highest possible, higher than that of any predictive-

1
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inductive inference.
ference has

a

Thus, no predictive-inductive in-

degree of conclusiveness sufficiently high

to produce justified

belief— a level necessary

for empirical

science to be rationally acceptable.

Another way of looking at this form of scepticism is
this 2
'

:

Someone could grant that different predictive-induc-

tive inferences have differing measures of epistemic
warrant,
but these measures are more appropriately called degrees of

worthlessness rather than degrees of conclusiveness.

Thus,

though some such arguments are less worthless than others,
none has a sufficiently high measure of warrant to merit

rational acceptance.

Rational acceptance requires

measure of warrant than any such argument can have.

a

higher
It

cannot be the case, however, that the requisite measure of

warrant is the highest possible.

Otherwise this form of

scepticism would collapse into the form outlined on pages
137 and 138.

This is a really strange form of scepticism, but it is

not worth considering in more detail here for two reasons:
First, there is no suggestion anywhere in Hume's writings

that he made the rather subtle distinctions that this view

requires.

If Hume was a sceptic about inductive inference,

it was because he held that no such inference has the highest

^^This way of looking at this form of scepticism was suggested
to mo by Prof. Bruce Aune.

.

,

,
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possible measure of epistemic warrant
or because he held
that such inferences have, in effect,
no measure of epistemic
warrant at all.
In addition, no commentator
that

I

of ever attributed this form of
scepticism to Hume

Bibliography)

.

am aware

(see

Secondly, this is not a very interesting

form of scepticism in the present context
for the following
reason:

Since this kind of sceptic admits that some induc-

tive inferences are "epistemically better off"
than others,
he can,

in principle,

and enthusiasm.

distinguish between scientific method

From the point of view of an interpretation

of Hume

s

stake.

On Stove's interpretation, Hume has cut the epistemic

scepticism, it is this distinction which is at

ground out from under natural science in the argument under
consideration.

If

(as seems unlikely)

Hume held the form

of scepticism outlined in the last page and one half, he

would be able to find epistemic grounds for preferring
scientific method.

This is the crux of the interpretive

issue

The results of this discussion may be summarized as
follows:

Adherence to

(i)

,

(ii)

and

(iii)

is a sufficient

condition for scepticism about predictive- inductive inferences.
Thus,

if Hume would assent to these propositions

claims that he does)

inductive inferences.

(and Stove

then he was a sceptic about predictiveTliis

is a very strong form of scepticism

on this view, experience can provide no epistemic warrant for

142

conclusion arrived at by predictive-inductive
inference.
The most important consequence of this
view is that empirical
science cannot have any epistemic ground
in experience.
a

Certainly this is

a

shocking assessment of the mind's pre-

tensions to empirical knowledge.
There is, however, another form of scepticism
about

predictive-inductive inference that does not entail this
shocking assessment of science. Of the three
statements
listed on pages 135 and 136, a sceptic may assert only
(i).
He would then say that the degree of epistemic
warrant

necessary for knowledge (in his sense of the term) is the
highest possible; since no predictive— inductive inference
hss this degree of conclusiveness, no predictive— inductive

inference can produce knowledge.

He may hold that some

predictive-inductive inferences do have

a

sufficiently high

degree of conclusiveness for well-grounded opinion.

Such a

sceptic could also consistently deny this and subscribe
to Stove's more extreme

(interpretive)

claim, or he may sub-

scribe to the more mitigated scepticism outlined on pages
140 and 141.

The important point is that this form of

scepticism is consistent with there being

a

rational ground

for empirical science.

The importance of this for the interpretation of Hume's

conclusion is this:

If Stove is correct,

Hume's conclusion

can be understood in terms of Statement (iii)

(or perhaps

.

:

.
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(ii)

and

(iii).

This is a truly shocking assessment of
the

foundations of empirical science because

a

fundamental form

of inference (predictive-inductive inference)
provides no

epistemic warrant for its conclusions.
if

I

On the other hand,

am correct, Hume is really only arguing for
(i), which,

given his requirements for knowledge, entails
that predictive-

inductive inferences can never yield knowledge.

On this

interpretation, the question of the more radical form of

scepticism expressed by Statements

(ii)

raised in Part (iii) Section
show that Hume denied (ii) and (iii)

and (iii)

This does not

6.

(that

is

I

will show in the

next chapter)
The significance of this latter view for Humean scholar-

ship is that most commentators believe that Stove's viev;

either is what Hume explicitly intended to establish or what
his position,

if true,

does establish.

The following quo-

tations provide evidence for this (probability or likelihood
is here understood as an epistemic concept)

A.H. Basson:

N.

Kemp Smith:

Some have tried to save the situation by
admitting that all scientific inference
is probable inference.
But Hume's sceptical attack applies with equal force to
probable inference.
Can we not, however, argue that while
experience yields no certainty as to the
future, it may yet instruct us as to what
is
kely to happen in the future? But
this, too, as Hume points out, is 'no
3. i

thoroughfare

'
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K.

Popper:

In other words Hume points out
that we
get involved in an infinite regress
if
we appeal to experience in order to
justify any conclusion concerning unobserved instances even more probable
conclusions

—

.

G.

von Wright:

.

.

It deserves mention that David Hume,
who
was the first to see that general synthetical propositions cannot be proved a priori
also clearly apprehended that this result
of the impossibility of foretelling the
future cannot be 'evaded' or 'minimised'
by reference to probability 22
.

—

^ ou the

Term 'Justific ation'

Hum.e

:

doesn't use

this term or its cognates very often or with much precision.
It does not have an entry in Selby-Bigge
I

have given

a

'

s

Analytical Index.

rough characterization of the sense that

assign to the term (cf.

p.

82)

I

and some options on how it

instates to the technical concept of degree of conclusiveness.

It might be objected that these concepts are quite

modern and thus foreign to Hume.

His conception of epistemic

warrant is an all or nothing affair.

That is, Hume believes

that an argument's having less than the highest possible

degree of conclusiveness is tantam.ount to saying that it is
unjustified.

Thus,

it is mistaken and inappropriate to

represent Hume as either affirming or denying (even implicitly)

Statements

(ii)

and (iii).

22 Quoted in Donald C.

There are four things that strongly

Stove, op. cit

.

p.

129.
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suggest that this is false.
First,

in the Enquiries version of Hume's
argument

there is some direct and indirect evidence that
Hume did not
have this conception of epistemic warrant.
The evidence will
be discussed in the Appendix.

Secondly, there is some clear

evidence in the Treatise (though not in the argument under
discussion)

that Hume did not have this rather narrow view

of justification.
IV.

This evidence will be discussed in Chapter

Thirdly, in the Appendix to Chapter IV,

I

try to show

that the conception of epistemic warrant employed here and
the kind of mitigated scepticism that

I

attribute to Hume

has clear and obvious roots in the ancient Greek scepticism
of Carneades and the Academics

(a

form of scepticism with

which Hume was undoubtedly familiar)

.

Finally, there are

some general considerations pertaining to the Modern Era

that make it clear that this is not problematical to discuss

Hume's appraisal of inductive inference in terms of the

concepts of conclusiveness as here delineated.
these considerations that

I

It is to

shall now turn.

The concept of degree of conclusiveness that

employed here is only
one.

Stove and

I

a

I

comparative concept and not

have
a

metrical

only attribute to Hume statements of

comparative equality or comparative inequality.

It probably

would be inappropriate to attribute to Hume more precise

metrical assessments of conclusiveness.

)

.
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More importantly,

l

think that the idea of there being

measure of epistemic warrant that is
less than that of
certainty is not at all foreign to
philosophers of the Modern
a

Era.

For example, Descartes, at the end
of the Sixth Meditation, finds that God does not deceive
him most of the time
about the evidence of his senses and that
he need not, from
an epistemological point of view, continue
to doubt even

though he may be mistaken in

a

given instance.

Locke admits

that, besides intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge, there
is sensitive knowledge

(or the existence of things without

us), which, while not certain,

is highly

(epistemically

probable
Most significant, however, is the fact that Hume himself
at least recognizes that some philosophers think that there
can be varying degrees of epistemic warrant.

A clear state-

ment of this can be found in the opening paragraphs of
Part (iii)

Section 11.

In addition,

he at least recognizes

that some philosophers think that the conclusion of an argu-

ment can be less than certain relative to its premises and
still result in justified belief.

After discussing probable

arguments based on frequent, but not constant, conjunction,
he says.

All these kinds of probability are
received by philosophers, and allowed
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to be reasonable foundations
of
belief and opinion. (T. 143)

Hume may not have thought that this
is true.
clear, however, that he was aware of
this option.

It is
in light

of these considerations it is obvious
that the concept of the

degree of conclusiveness of an argument and
the concept of
justification employed here are not inappropriate

to a dis-

cussion of Hume.
to Hume states,

unobserved)

The radical scepticismi that stove attributes
in effect,

is more

that no opinion (concerning the

(epistemically) probable than it is

prior to or independently of any experience.

To say that

experience is of no epistemic value whatever is to deny that
experience can serve to rationally ground empirical science.
This interpretation accurately characterizes, in large

measure, the epistemological dead end to which Hume is

alleged to have led philosophy of the modern era.
Let us call this version of

Scepticism".

What textual arguments are there for this as

an interpretation of Hume?
two.

I

scepticism "Strong Inductive

I

have been able to find only

should now like to consider these arguments and show

why they are defective.

A.

Hume and Strong Inductive Scepticism:
An Os tensive Argument

This argument which attributes (11a)

(and hence,

ii)
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and

(iii)

to Hume is called

'ostensive' because it consists

of pointing to certain passages in the Treatise
where Hume

clearly asserts something very much like (11a)
even

(ii)

)

(or perhaps

Two such passages are commonly cited.

.

has been previously quoted

(cf.

in Section 12 of Part

.

(iii)

page 123).

One

The other appears

The entire passage is itali-

cized by Hume:
there is nothing in any object
considered in itself, which can afford
us a reason for drawing a conclusion
beyond it; and, That even after the
observation of the frequent or constant
conjunction of objects, we have no reason
to draw any inference concerning any
object beyond those of which we have had
experience; (T. 139)
.

Objections

.

.

Do these passages give conclusive evidence that

:

Hume believed (11a)?

either passage?

I

Does Hume actually assert (11a)

submit that an affirmative answer to

either of these questions is not at all obvious.
I

in

That is,

shall show that Hume's adherence to (11a) cannot be estab-

lished merely by pointing to these passages.
The reason for this is that these passages admit of

another interpretation that is distinct from and does not
imply

(11a)

agree on:

.

There is one thing that my opponents and

can

I

These passages prove some (epistemic) assessment

of predictive-inductive inferences.

They state something

about the degree of conclusiveness of such inferences.

The
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key to the interpretation of the passage quoted
immediately

above is how Hume's expression 'no reason' is understood.
As is obvious to any reader of the T reatise

use the word

reason' univocally.

,

Hume does not

If we read this use of

the expression as "no logically conclusive reason", Hume is
still making an assessment of predictive-inductive inferences.

However, he is not saying that we are no more justified in

believing the conclusion of such an inference after the
appropriate experience than we were prior to or independently
of such experience.
no

(logical)

Rather, what he is saying is that we have

guarantee, even after the appropriate experience,

for the conclusion.

His epistemic assessment of inductive

inferences is that they all have less than the highest

possible degree of conclusiveness.
asserting only (11b)

(or

(i)),

That is, Hume is here

viz. that all predictive-

inductive inferences have less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness.
A close reading of the other passage makes this more

plausible still.

He makes two claims in this passage.

both can be read to support (11b)

They

rather than (11a) as the

correct interpretation of Hume's conclusion.
Thus, not only does our reason fail us
in the discovery of the ultimate
connexion of causes and effects, but
e^v^n ^ft'er experience has informed us
'tis
of their constant conjunction
impossible l^or us to satisfy our,
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selves by our reason, why we
should extend that experience
beyond those particular instances
which have fallen under our observation. (emphases Hume)
(T. 91)
If reason is here understood as the
"faculty" that discovers

relations among ideas (including, presumably,
the relation
of validity)
then Hume is here asserting that past experience
does not provide any absolutely conclusive
grounds
,

for a

conclusion about the future.
We suppose, but are never able to prove, that
there must be a resemblance between those
objects of which we have had experience and
those which lie beyond the reach of our
discovery.
(emphases added)
(T. 92)

Here he says that we as

a

matter of fact believe the

Resemblance Thesis--our belief in RT provides

a

psychological

explanation for our making the transition involved in inductive
inf erence--but it is unavailable from the point of view of

reason, i.e. the Resemblance Thesis cannot be used to give

the highest possible degree of assurance in the conclusion.

This interpretation of Hume's conclusion as (11b)

rather than (11a) has some obvious advantages:
and

I

agree that there is

argument here, viz

.

,

(10);

a

Both Stove

suppressed premise in Hume's
it rests on a principle which

states that the invalidity of an inference is

a

condition for its causing a belief that has

certain epistemic

a

sufficient
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property

either being unjustified or being less than certain

relative to the premises which caused the belief.

We can

also agree that, in the passage under discussion, Hume pro-

vides no argument for this epistemic principle.
However, the Strongly Sceptical Interpretation has the

rather awkward consequence of attributing

a

claim to Hume

that is, on the face of it, wildly implausible, viz., what

Stove calls "Deductivism"--the thesis that all beliefs caused
by invalid arguments are unjustified.

Even if the causal

formulation of the Deductivist Thesis is altered, the problem
remains.

From an interpretive point of view, it is bad

business to attribute to

a

major figure such as Hume an

apparently implausible statement, which (as Stove rightly
admits)

Hume never states or argues for

Hume asserts

(11a)

.

Stove's claim that

and is thus committed to (10a)

and hence

Principle P is of no avail here because it is Hume's alleged
sucscription to (11a) which is at stake.
Furthermore, if one can assume (as seems reasonable) that

other philosophers believed that inferences from frequent, but
not constant, conjunction are invalid, then Hume is here

assuming

a

philosophically significant claim that other

philosophers deny (at least implicitly) because these other
philosophers believe that such inferences produce justified
belief (see quotation on pages 146 and 147).

As Stove readily

admits, nowhere in the Treatise does Hume argue for Deductivism.

.
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Surely, however, were he to go
against the received opinion,
ho would somewhere argue for
the key principle.
He has,
after all, produced an elaborate
argument for one of the
premises, viz
(9)
.

,

The same kind of difficulty does
not afflict my interpretation for the following reasons: The
principle on which
the suppressed premise rests (that
no invalid argument renders
Its conclusion certain relative to
its premises) is pretty

obviously true.

Since in an invalid argument it is always

logically possible that the premises are true
and the conclusion false, given that one is correct in
believing the premises
It IS always possible
a

(except perhaps when the conclusion is

"psychological report") that one is mistaken in believing

the conclusion.

Moreover, as

I

Hence, there can be no relative certainty.

shall show shortly,

it is fairly clear that

Hume believed Principle Q and indeed argued for it, though
not in the passage under discussion.

Though considerations adduced in the past few pages

probably do not suffice to establish (11b) as the correct
and

(11a)

as an incorrect interpretation of Hume's conclusion,

they clearly do establish that some argument is needed to

pin

(11a)

on Hume.

Merely pointing to certain passages is

not enough.
Is there any genuine interpretive argument to establish
(11a)

rather than (11b) as Hume's conclusion?

Stove (and.

,
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as far as

can tell, only Stove) offers
such an argument.
I should now like to
examine Stove's argument.
i shall
show that it is defective by showing
that the strategy of
this argument actually establishes
(11b) and not (11a) as
Hume's conclusion.
I

and Stro ng Inductive Scepticism:
The Symmetry Argum ent

As Stove rightly points out, the argument
of Hume's

that has been under consideration thus far is
actually part
of a longer argument.
The first part of this argument is an

epistemic evaluation of another kind of inductive
inference.
This inference is the same as the predictive-inductive

inference except for one important feature

— it

occurs

prior to or independently of the past constant conjunction.
To see clearly the contrast between the two kinds of

inference, consider the following examples of each kind.

Following Stove,

I

shall call the kind under discussion the

A Priori Inductive Inference.
A Priori Inductive Inference
(1)

This is

a

flame.

Therefore,
(2)

Predictive-Inductive Infere nce
(!')

This is a flame.

(2')

All flames that have
been observed in the
past have been observed to be hot.

This is hot.

Therefore
(3')

This flame is hot.

)
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What Hume's assessment of the
ference has to do with

a

is this:

(11)

priori inductive inStove argues that there

IS a symmetry between Hume's epistemic
assessment of the con-

clusiveness of the

priori inductive inference and his

a

evaluation of predictive-inductive inferences.

Stove alleges

that Hume claims that the observation that
(e.g.)

something

IS a flame renders the conclusion that it
is hot no more

warranted than such

conclusion is independently of any

a

experience whatever.
For the purposes of the present discussion let us

adopt the following abbreviations:

(1)

'Con(H/E-|

&

.

.

.

&

E

)

=

'The degree of conclusiveness of the argument

whose premises are E]^
... Ej^ and, whose conclusion IS H.
(2)

'Con(H/t), where t is some tautology:

This can be
understood as
the initial rational credibility of H.

Stove attributes the following assessment of the conclusiveness of the a priori inductive inference to Hume:

(*)

Con (This is hot/This is a flame) = Con

(This is

hot/t

Obviously, Hume's conclusion is more general than this par-

ticular statement.

Generalizing from (*), Hume's conclusion

can bo represented as follows:

:

i

:
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(

For any a prior

)

Con(H/Ej^)

inductive inference from

= Con(H/t)

where

t

Ei

to

II:

is some tautology.

This comparative equality, then, is Hume's
epistemic assessment of the conclusiveness of a priori
inductive inferences.
If this is Hume's epistemic appraisal
of the a priori

inductive inference, and if he makes the same
assessment of
the predictive-inductive inference (i.e. if
Stove is granted
the Symmetry Thesis)
then Hume subscribes to the following
,

assessment of the conclusiveness of predictive-inductive
inferences
(***)

For any predictive-inductive inference from
Con (H/Ei...E^) = Con (H/t)where
Ew to H:
t is some tautology.

This, of course,

is Statement

(iii)

our way of understanding (12a).

(see

Ej_

.

.

.

page 135, which is

Hume is a Strong Inductive

Sceptic after all.
It is unproblematic to grant Stove the following two

claims
1.

Hume does make some epistemic assessment of the

degree of conclusiveness of

a

priori inductive

inferences in the passage under discussion.
2.

The epistemic assessment that he makes of predictive-

inductive inferences is the same as his assessment
of the a pri ori one.

The Symmetry Thesis explains

d

i

:

15G

why Humo

s

conclusions always have the character of

one-two punch.

a

This is vividly illustrated in the

quotation on page 148.
Granting Stove these two points does not suffice for
his
conclusion.

He needs to establish that Hume's epistemic

appraisal of ^ prior

inductive inferences is

(**)

or

something very much like it.
What does Hume actually say:

In the following passage

Hume offers his epistemic assessment of

a

priori inductive

inferences
Tis easy to observe that in tracing this
relation, the inference we draw from cause
to effect, is not deriv'd merely from a
survey of these particular objects, and
from, such a penetration into their
essences as may discover the dependence
of one upon the other.
There is no object,
which implies the existence of any other
if we consider these objects in themselves,
and never look beyond the ideas which we
form of them.
Such an inference wou
amount to knowledge and wou d imply the
absolute contradiction and impossibility
of conceiving anything different.
But
as all distinct ideas are separable, tis
evident that there can be no impossibility
of that kind.
(T. 86-87)
'

'

From the observation that something is a flame, the

mind cannot conclude (from that alone) that it is hot.

Is

Hume saying here that such an observation does not raise
the initial rational credibility of the conclusion one bit?
I

think not.

Suppose, per impossible

,

that the mind could
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make the inference on the basis of just that
observation.
What kind of inference would it be?

From the third to last

sentence of the above quotation, the answer is obvious:

inference would be deductively valid.

The

Thus, Hume is arguing

in the above passage that the a priori inductive inference
is not deductively valid.

The epistemological significance of this is quite clear
from the second to last sentence of this passage--No A Priori

Inductive Inference Y ields Knowledge.

conclusion of no

a

This means that the

priori inductive inference is certain

relative to its premise.

My interpretation relies heavily

on there being such a thing as relative certainty for Hume.

This passage clearly indicates that there is such
It might be thought that knowledge,

a

for Hume, can only be

achieved by intuition or demonstration (that is, by
inference from intuited truths).
intent on establishing that no

thing.

a

valid

However, if Hume were

a p riori

inductive inference

yields knowledge, in this sense, all he would have to point
out is that the conclusion of such an inference, since it is

factual,

is

saying here.

conceivably false.

That is not what he is

He is saying that the mind can imagine that the

premise is true and the conclusion is false in an
inductive inference.

a

priori

Thus, no such inference is valid and

no such inference produces knowledge in the sense of rela-

tive certainty.

i

:
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In this passage Hume seems to recognize clearly
the truth

of Principle Q and the kind of epistemological argument
that

establishes it.

Principle

Q,

then,

is not really suppressed;

it turns up earlier in Hume's argument--bef ore he considers

predictive-inductive inferences.
Returning now to the Symmetry Argument, Hume's epistemic

conclusion about a pr ior

inductive inference can be expressed

as follows

(+)

For any a priori inductive inference from

Con(H/E^)

Statement
siveness of

(+)

is less than the highest possible degree
of conclusiveness.

is an epistemic assessment of the conclu-

priori inductive inferences.

a

to H:

Given the

Symmetry Thesis, Hume makes the same assessment of the con-

clusiveness of predictive-inductive inferences, viz.
(++)

For any predictive-inductive inference from
E

.

to H

E]^

...

:

1

Con(H/E.

Statement (++)

,

...

is less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness.

E-)

of course,

way of understanding (11b)

is
.

(i)

(see p.

134)

which is our

Thus the Symmetry Argument

established not Stove's interpretation, but mine.
well have been inclined to believe that

inferences are unreasonable.

a

Hume may

priori inductive

However, that is not what he

says in the quotation on page 156.

Nonetheless, it is just

.

.
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this that Hume must have said of
Stove's Symmetry Argument
is to work.
The available evidence, then,

intent on establishing

clusion.

Step (11)

(lib)

suggests that Hume was

rather than (11a) as his con-

is an epistemic assessment of the con-

clusiveness of predictive-inductive inferences.

It is not,

however, the highly sceptical conclusion that
most commentators think that Hume drew.
I

do not think that these considerations shov; that
a

highly sceptical interpretation of Hume is completely untenable.

There are three sorts of objections that my opponents

could offer here:
(i)

When Hume states his conclusion, both in the Treatise
and the Enquiries
a

,

he certainly appears to be stating

highly sceptical position.

No systematic explana-

tion for why this is merely an appearance has yet been

offered
(ii)

It can be granted that

(11b)

is an epistemic assess-

ment (and an important one) of predictive-inductive
inferences.

Nonetheless, if (11b)

is all that Hume

was interested in establishing, then his view is

seriously incomplete

On this interpretation Hume

has nothing to say about the sceptic's position.

predictive-inductive arguments produce justified

Do

IGO

belief?

On the interpretation offered
here, Hume is

really silent on this very important
question.
The
failure to address this question is
a gross oversight,
which ought to cause us to reject
this interpretation
on the grounds of the Principle
of Charity.

I

(ii.i)

A related problem is this:

On this view, Hume came

I

very close to but failed to discover
"Hume's Problem".
Hume was astute enough to see this very
serious problem about the justification of induction.
His failure

^

here is like being late for one's own funeral.

It is

preposterous to believe that Hume failed to discover
one of the most important epistemological problems,

'

a

discovery for which he is almost universally credited.

j

Again, the Principle of Charity demands rejection of

this interpretation.

I

I

It seems fair to say that these objections,

if successful,

j

would be quite telling.

In the next chapter

I

shall show

that they can all bo defeated.
I

However, my opponents are also in an uncomfortable posi)

!

tion.

If Hume thought that predictive-inductive inferences

I

;

produce unjustified belief, by what rUjht does he continue to

I

I

develop his psychological theory, since this obviously re-

I

quires that he make inductions?
I

A particularly acute
I

t

I

I

tli

inker on those matters puts the
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problem this way:
Jurists, when speaking of rights and
claims, distinguish in a legal action
the question of right (quid juris) from
the question of fact (quid f^cti)
and
they demand that both be proved.
Proof
of the former, which has to state the
right or the legal claim, they entitle
the deduction
Many empirical concepts
are employed without question from
anyone
;

.

.

.

If Hume was a sceptic,

he would say that we have no right to

make inductions, though as a matter of psychological necessity
we do make them.

But, one might ask, by what right does he

make this latter psychological claim?

If he were a genuine

sceptic, then, after writing this passage, he should have

packed his bags and left the French countryside for Scotland.
In fact,

however, he stayed, and he stayed to develop the

psychological theory in intricate detail.
vict him of believing

a

If we cannot con-

contradiction, we should at least be

able to condemn him for being epistemically immoral.

However,

independent evidence overwhelmingly establishes both Hume's

acuity and his probity.
Matters are not this bleak, say Hume's commentators.
Hume does provide a deduction (in the aforementioned sense)
for inductive inference.

In fact,

herein lies the great

^^Immanuel Kant, Critique of P ure Reason (trans. by Norman
Kemp Smith (New York, 1929), p. 120.
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positive contribution of his sceptical
philosophy.
shall discuss these and other
matters in Chapter IV
The objections sketched above will
be met, and I will show
that my opponents force Hume into
positions that are philI

osophically and interpretively untenable.

CHAPTER
In the last chapter

Part (iii) Section

6

I

I

V

argued that Hume's argument of

establishes and is only intended to

establish that all predictive-inductive
inferences have less
than the highest possible degree of
conclusiveness. This
can be regarded as a form of scepticism
about such inferences
for the following reasons:
On an organic level, our behavior
does not match that of the completely rational
inferrer.

There is no felt difference between the mind's
conviction
that

(e.g.)

the sun will rise tomorrow and the conviction

that arises from a valid argument.

really provide

a

Though Hume does not

psychological account of the conviction

that arises from a valid argument (except to say that the
sees

the necessary connection)

he does provide a

,

psychological explanation for why the mind has such
degree of belief in the conclusion of

a

a

high

predictive-inductive

inference; the past experience of the observed constant con-

junction makes the transition from the present impression

proceed quite smoothly; this is explained as the effect of
custom or habit.

The origin of the force and vivacity of

the subsequent idea

(which is the conclusion of the inference)

is the impression or memory idea which initiates a given

causal inference.

The degree of conviction thereby generated

16

3
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is quite high.

Whatever the defects of this explanation
from the
standpoint of psychological theory, Hume
is surely correct
in maintaining that a predictive-inductive
inference with
suitably impressive credentials does produce
a felt certainty
in the conclusion.
To assert that, from the point of view of
reason, this is not the case can rightly be
viewed
as a form

of scepticism.

The history of scientific thought shows that

this natural attitude occasionally permeates science
as well.

Confidence in Newtonian theory reached this level in the
18th and early 19th century.^

However, from the standpoint of 20th century epistemology,

this is, by itself, a quite modest form of scepticism

(sometimes called Inductive Fallibilism)

.

The more radical

and perhaps more interesting form of scepticism is that

which denies that past experience can provide any grounds
(i.e.

epistemic warrant)

Thus,

from our point of view, the question 'Was Hume a

for beliefs about the unobserved.

sceptic about induction?' is really

adherence to Statements

^For

(ii)

and

a

(iii)

question about Hume's
of the previous chapter

a full discussion of this and a good explanation of the
non-tr iviality of what I take to be Hume's conclusion in
Section 6 see D.C. Stove's P robability and Hume's Inductive
Scepticism (Oxford, 1973), Chapter 7.
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(cf.

p.136).

It is in this sense that

I

shall use the term

'scepticism' and its cognates with
respect to induction.
It IS important to remind the
speaker of a caveat

entered at the beginning of the last
chapter.

I

do not deny

that Hume was a radical sceptic about
all of the mind's

fundamental claims to empirical knowledge by
the end of
Book I of the Treatise
My view is that he did not reach
.

this sceptical conclusion with respect to
arguments from

experience until Part

(iv)

Later in this chapter

.

I

shall

show just how and where Hume did reach a sceptical
conclusion

about causal inference.

The importance of this is that it

shows that Hume did not adopt this view in light of any

arguments advanced in Part (iii)

Section

6

of Part

(and,

in particular,

in

(iii)).

My argument is designed to establish that Part (iii)
of Book

I

and (ii)

)

(together with the support machinery of Parts

(i)

contains a causal theory of the justification of

empirical belief.
In the last chapter

for scepticism in Part

I

argued that Hume was not arguing

(iii)

Section

however, has taken deep root.

troduction to Hume's 'Treatise

6.

The contrary view,

From T.H. Green's General In '

(1874)

through Norman Kemp

Smith's T he Philosophy of David Hume (1940) to D.C. Stove's

Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism (1973), modern
commentators, both sympathetic and otherwise, have agreed

.
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that Hume hold that prior
experience provides no grounds for
beliefs about the future. The
great contribution of Stove's
monograph has been to show just what
this claim means.
Of course,

there have been dissenters from the
Green-

Kemp Smith-Stove line of interpretation;
indeed, as Hume's
reputation has reached unprecedented heights
in the 1960 's

and 70

s

these voices have become more numerous.

What has

^

been lacking in this quarter, however, is
a systematic

appraisal of Hume's philosophy in light of a
non-sceptical

interpretation of his views on induction in Part
(iii)
this chapter

I

.

in

shall show that Hume denies the sceptic's

claim in Part (iii), and

I

shall show that this interpre-

tation can account for some important things that

interpretation cannot.

I

a

sceptical

will have then established that

Hume held at the end of Part (iii) that, among those beliefs

caused by other beliefs, a belief is justified if and only
if it is caused by causal inference.

'^Three examples of this trend are:
(i)

Frank N. Harpley, "Hume's Probabilism" Australasian
Journal of Ph i losophy 1971, pps 146-151
,

(ii)

.

Thomas Beauchamp, and Thomas Mappes "Is Hume Really
a Sceptic About Induction?"
/American Philosophical
Quarterly 1975, pps. 119-129^!
,

(iii)

Donald C. Stove, "Hume, Probability, and Induction"
Phi loso p hical Review 1965, pps. 160-177.
,
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My interpretation of Hume, like
all interpretations, is
something of an empirical hypothesis.
As such, it is conceivably false, no matter how much evidence
is brought to
bear.
The issue between me and my opponents
is not what

Hume

s hould

have said; indeed. Stove argues quite
persuasively

that the form of scepticism under discussion
is false.
Rather,

it concerns what Hume actually said.

An interpretation

is required because what he said is not
unambiguous.
In effect, much of the argument in this chapter
is

directed back to Section

6

of Part

(iii).

i

will show that

much of what Hume goes on to do in the rest of the Treatise

makes

a

good

deal,

of sense if and only if Hume's argument

there is understood in the way that
III.

I

've suggested in Chapter

These benefits do not accrue to my opponents' inter-

pretation of that argument.
I

shall begin by showing that there is an apparent

inconsistency of considerable importance in Part (iii)

.

I

will then argue that only a non-scept ical interpretation of
Hume can adequately resolve this difficulty.
A n Interpretive Problem:

In Sections 11,

Hume's Sympathy with the Wise

12 and 13 of Part

(iii)

Hume greatly

elaborates his psychological theory of inference.

In Sections

11 and 12 he explains what happens when the mind makes infer-

ences from frequent but not constant conjunction.

At the
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beginning of Section 13 he says,
All these kinds of probability are
receiv'd by philosophers and allowed
to be reasonable foundations of
belief and opinion.
But there are
others, that are deriv'd from the
same
principles tho they have not the good
fortune
to obtain the same sanction. (T.
143)
'

It might be thought that Hume took this
to be merely an

empirical claim about the beliefs of certain
philosophers.
Two facts make this highly unlikely:
A common literary
device of the 18th century is to attribute to
practitioners
in one's field a position which you yourself
hold.

uses this device on a number of occasions
his remarks on innate ideas)

.

Hume

(see especially

More importantly, it is

reasonably clear from the general tenor of these sections
that Hume agrees,

in some sense, with these sentiments.

One way of explaining these sentiments is to say that
Hume believed that all
correct, only)

justified.

(and,

if my argument of Chapter

I

is

those beliefs caused by causal inference are

This option is not, of course, open to my oppon-

ents.

Suppose that

a

20th century cosmogonist writes a long

treatise on the origins of the universe.

Early in the book

he offers a series of devastating arguments and impressive

observational evidence to show that the Steady State Theory
of the origin of the universe is mistaken.

It would be quite
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surprising to find that, later in
his book, he explains
various phenomena by an appeal to the
creation of hydrogen
atoms Gx nihil o.
Obviously, the situation is not exactly
analogous in
Hume o Zyeatise
There is, however, one important
similarity:
If Hume was a sceptic about induction
and if he argued for
It in Part (iii) Section 6, then it
is surprising and more
than a little puzzling that throughout
Part (iii) he appears
to approve of causal (and hence inductive)
inferences.
From
.

an epistemological point of view, this
approval seems un-

warranted and in direct conflict with his official
(allegedly)
sceptical position.

There are numerous passages in Sections 11 through 14
where Hume states his approval of such inferences.

One of

the clearest and most impressive expression of these senti-

ments, however,

is found in the Enquiries:

Tho Experience be our only Guide in
reasoning concerning Matters of Fact;
it must be acknowledged, that this
Guide is not altogether infallible,
but in some Cases is apt to lead
us into Errors and Mistakes.
One,
who, in our Climate, should expect
better Weather in any Week of June than
in one of December, would reason
justly and conformable to Experience;
but tis certain, that he may happen,
in the Event to find himself mistaken
A wise Man, therefore, proportions his belief to the Evidence.
In such Conclusions as are founded
upon an infallible Experience he
'

.

.

.

.

:

.
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expects the Event with the last Degree
of Assurance and regards his past
Experience as a full Proof of the
future Existence of that Event.
In
other Cases, he proceeds with more
Caution; He weighs the opposite
Experiments: He considers which Side
is supported by the greatest Number
of
Experiments: To that Side he inclines
with Doubt and Hesitation; and when at
last he fixes his Judgment, the evidence
exceeds not what we properly call
Probabili ty
a hundred uniform
Experiments with only one contradictory
one, does reasonably beget a pretty
strong Degree of Assurance.^

....

This is one of the clearest statements of the position
that I've attributed to Hume.

On the basis of this passage

it is pretty clear that Hume subscribes to the following

claim

3

David Hume, An Enq u iry Co ncerning Human Understanding, ed
by Ernest ^.~Mossner (N.Y., 1963), pps 109-110.
.

Though in general I have eschewed the Enquiries, the use I
make of it here is not really out of character.
The essay
from which this passage is taken is "On Miracles".
This
was originally slated for the Treatise but was dropped at
the last minute to avoid offending Bishop Butler, whose
favor Hume avidly sought.
Furthermore, it is clear that
Hume took this essay quite seriously.
Mossner quotes the
following description of the excision of that essay from a
letter of Hume's to a friend:
"I am at present castrating my Work, that is
cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavoring it shall give as little Offence as
possible; before which I could not pretend to
put it into the Drs hand."
(p. x)

.

^

.
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(a)

Past experience provides (varying
degrees of)
episteiaic warrant for beliefs about:
the future
(or, more generally, about the
unobserved)

How can a sceptical interpretation account
for this and
expressions of similar sentiments by Hume?
However, the defenders of a sceptical
interpretation
can ask how this passage can be squared with
such apparently

sceptical passages as the following:
That there is nothing in any object,
consider'd in itself, which can afford
us a reason for drawing a conclusion
beyond it; and. That even after the
frequent or constant conjunction of
objects we have no reason to drav/ any
inference concerning any object beyond
those of which we have had experience.
(T. 139)
(entire passage italicized
by Hume)
In this passage Hume appears to be committed to the follow-

ing

:

(b)

Past experience provides no epistemic warrant
for beliefs about the future (or, more generally,
the unobserved)

There are three moves that

(1)

4

a

commentator can make here

He can say that Hume believes both
and has thus contradicted himself.

(a)

and

(b)

This general strategy is suggested by F.N. Harpley,
op.

cit.

:

^
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(

2

can say that Hume really believes
only
and can try to reinterpret or
explain away
nis apparent commitment to (a)
IlG

)

He can say that Hume really
believes only
and can try to reinterpret or
explain away
nis apparent commitment to (b)

(3)

—1

Opti^^n

)

^me

•

^

s

position self-co ntradictory.

(b)

(a)

A

number of commentators have adopted the
first alternative.
This would explain why Hume appears
to be highly sceptical
of causal inference at some places
and why he apparently
embraces it at others. Often supporters of
this line point
to other aspects of Hume's philosophy where
he
(appears to)

contradict himself.

Examples of Hume's cavalier attitude

towards consistency that are commonly cited include:
The

(i)

No Impression without a Precedent Impression

Principle" and the idea of the missing shade of blue in
Book
(ii)

I

Part

(i)

Section

1.

The denial of the existence of an impression of the

self in Part

(iv)

of Book

I

and of the affirmation of the

existence of such an impression (to explain the mechanism of
sympathy)
(iii)

in Books II and III.

The obviously non-equivalent definitions of belief

offered in various places in the Treatise.

Commentators who adopt this line usually go on to argue
that these inconsistencies reveal something of great importance

]
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about Hume’s philosophy: for example,
in the case of
they claim that this shows the
inadequacy

of a (the?)

Empiricist Principle.

(i)

basic

Thus, though Hume has contradicted

himself, he makes a great contribution
to philosophy.
In the context of the present
dilemma,

seems to adopt Option (1).

m

Terence Penelhum

his recent book, H_uj^, he

says,

Ev 0 n when inculcating his sceptical
doubts about induction
Hume
frequently confuses us by talking as
though he accepts the very beliefs
that he is questioning.
This is
especially true when he is describing
in detail those psychological mechanisms whereby nature, in spite of the
absence of justifying reasons, persuades us into accepting them: he
seems unable to hold fast to the contention that nature is consolidating
an unjustified belief, and talks as
though it is a justified one.
This
sometimes leads commentators to question
whether he is a sceptic at all.
That there is an inconsistency in Hume's
procedure cannot be dou bted
in
his epochmaking attacks on metaphysics
and religion Hume takes for granted
the very standards of scientific
reasoning that he has cast sceptical
doubts upon in his analysis of induction.
That ther e is an inconsistency in his
procedure cannot be "doubted here
either ^
(emphasis addedl

....

[

!

.'

i

]

.

What is objectionable about Penelhum

's

claims here is

I

I

I

5
,

i

I

1

Terence Penelhum, Hume

(Nev;

York, 1975), pps

.

25-26

.
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his assertion that Mumo

'

s

inconsistency "cannot be doubted."

He offers no argument whatever
for this.

do

Indeed, not only

doubt this (which may not be
particularly important or
relevant)
other commentators have advanced
arguments to
show how Hume escapes this apparent
inconsistency.
Penelhum
does not even consider these arguments,
much less show that
they fail.
I

,

More importantly, however,

I

think there are good

reasons to be reluctant to attribute
Hume here.

a

contradiction to

Such an attribution would entail that Hume
made

an abrupt and immediate volte-face

.

After allegedly arguing

that the conclusions of causal inference have
no epistemic

warrant, he apparently completely ignores this conclusion
and proceeds to agree with those who think they do.
a

defender of

a

Though

"Contradiction Interpretation" might argue

that Hume made this about-face because of his deep faith in
the sciences, this is at best

a

psychological explanation;

it is uncharitable and philosophically unsatisfying.

Abundant

textual evidence, a lack of plausible alternatives, and
(quasi-)

a

good

philosophical explanation for why Hume was led into

such a contradiction may compel acceptance of such an inter-

pretation.

It is,

however, a "counsel of despair."

The

stakes here are enormously high; as the above quotation from

Penelhum indicates, Hume's Science of Man and his attacks on
his rationalist opponents depend on the legitimacy of causal

s
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inference.

A contradiction at this point brings
down the

entire edifice of Hume's theory.

A "Contradiction Inter-

pretation" should be adopted only when
other measures fail.
What,

Option

(3)

then, of Options

shortly.

(2)

and (3)?

l

Those who adopt Option

argue roughly as follows:

Hume was

a

shall argue for
(2)

usually

sceptic about induction,

but he did sympathize with the Wise because he
later dis-

covered that causal inference is necessary for the
purposes
springs from universal and irresistible prin-

ciples of the human mind.”^

While that does not epistemically

warrant inference, it does, nonetheless,

(pragmatically)

vindicate causal inference; hence Hume's sympathy with the
Wise.

My objection to this way of proceeding will be that

all of the considerations that Hume offers in this connection

are designed to handle difficulties about causal inference

that Hume did not discover until Part

(iv)

and that the

allegedly sceptical argument in Part (iii) Section
never the target of these remarks.

6

is

Admittedly, this does not

This view is defended by F.C. Baylie in his monograph. The
C auses and Evidence of Be l iefs:
An Examinat ion of Hume
Procedure (Mt. Hermon, Mass., 193G), Chapter 7.
'

7

This view IS defended by John Lenz in his article, "Hume's
Defence of Causal Inference" Jo urnal of the History of
Ideas, 1958, pps. 559-567.

.

,

.
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p rov e that Hume did not intend these remarks to apply to an

unresolved dilemma in Part (iii).
be explained solely in terms of

a.

But if these remarks can

response to (new) Problems

that he found with causal inference in Part (iv)

a

interpretation of the araument in Part (iii) Section
very unlikely.

sceptical

becomes

6

In matters such as these, this is the most

that can be hoped for.
B

Option

(3)

:

Hume's denial of inductive scepticism

.

My

position is that the propositions that Hume intended to
express by the passage quoted on page 171 are consistent

with an epistemic approval of the sentiments of the Wise.
In Chapter III

(see pps.

148-149)

I

argued that Hume is

claiming in this and the other offending passage (see quotation on p. 159) that the experience which gives rise to

a

predictive-inductive inference cannot bestow upon the conclusion of that inference the highest possible degree of con-

clusiveness

.

This, of course, is consistent with a non-sceptical

position on induction.

However, as

I

have pointed out, on

my interpretation, these passages are also consistent with

scepticism about induction.

Thus, though by interpreting these

passages in the manner suggested,
sistency,

I

I

have removed the incon-

have not accounted for Hume's sympathy with the

Wise by showing that he adhered to Statement

(a)

above (p.l71)

,
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Fortunately, that explanation is
easily discovered.
what seems to me to be one of the
most important (but
largely ignored) passages of the
Treatise Hume explicitly
denies Statements (ii) and (iii)
(p. 135), and thereby puts
himself squarely in the camp of the
non-sceptic about induction.
This passage occurs at the beginning
of Section 11

m

,

It is worth quoting in extenso:

Those philosophers, who have divided
human reason into knowledge and
and probability and have defin'd
the first to be that evidence, which
arises from the comparison oT ideas
are oblig'd to comprehend alT our
arguments from causes or effects under
the general term of probability.
But
tho every one be free to use his terms
in whatever sense he pleases; and
accordingly in the precedent part of
this discourse, I have follow'd this
method of expression; 'tis however
certain, that in common discourse we
readily affirm, that many arguments
from causation exceed probability, and
may be receiv'd as a superior kind of
evidence.
One wou d appear ridiculous,
who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable
the sun will rise to-morrow, or that
all men must dye; tho tis plain we have
no further ass urance~of~flTese fac^,~
tnhah~' what~eSTperience ^f ords
For
tTTi's reason^
twould perhaps be more
convenient, in order at once to
preserve the common signification of words,
and mark the several degrees of evidence,
to distin^ish human reason~inbo~thf ee~^
kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from
proofs aj}d from probabili ties.
By
knowledge, I mean the assurance arising
from the comparison of ideas.
By
proofs, those arguments, which are
,

'

'

.

^

,

.
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deriv d from the relation of cause
and effect, and which are entirely
free from doubt and uncertainty.
Bv
probability, that evidence, which is
^till attended with uncertainty.
Tis
this last species of reasoning,
l proceed
to examine. (T. 124)
(double emphases
added; others are Hume's)
At first glance, this passage appears
to be a mere

terminological reshuffling; he is now going
to conform himself to a more common use of the term
'probable' and its

cognates.

Three considerations make clear that something

more is involved:
1.

One of the clauses that

I

emphasized

the several degrees of evidence"),

(".

.

.

and mark

understood literally,

if

shows that the distinction is drawn for epistemological,
as well as terminological, reasons.

Though it is conceiv-

able that he merely means to mark what philosophers

takenly)

think are "the several degrees of evidence", there

is no evidence

what he meant.

(either explicit or implicit)

I

think it does, Hume is

making an extremely important claim in

2.

I

that this is

Admittedly, if this passage has the vast

epistemological significance that

manner.

(mis-

a

very off-handed

shall later explain why this is so.

After Hume says that it would appear ridiculous to say

that it is only probable that all men must die or that the
sun will rise tomorrow, he says that "we have no further

assurance of these facts than what experience affords."

Note

^
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that ho does not say that we have
no assurance whatever or
that we have no entitlement, even though
we have belief.
That
is,

he does not assert that the distinction
is made on

psychological and not epistemological grounds.
Finally, the distinction between knowledge,
proofs, and
probabilities is drawn along epistemological and not
psycho3.

1

;

logical lines, though the terms 'certainty' and
'doubt' are
not used in their Cartesian senses.
The reason for this is

I

that there is no difference in the felt conviction
arising

,

from a comparison of ideas and that arising from proofs

.

Furthermore, on psychological grounds, the distinction between proofs and probabilities is sometimes hard to make.
The compulsive gambler who places a large bet on

outcome often feels certain that he will win.
.

a

chance

In addition,

the slow-witted or the philosopher whose brain has been

I

I

tortured by sceptical doubts concerning the understanding may
feel a genuine uncertainty about some claim about the future

[

I

'

I

for which he has ample evidence.

If the distinctions Hume

draws here are epistemological, then he here implies that the

I

degree of conclusiveness of

a

proof is higher than that of a

1

I

1

I

I

;

I

I

^Anyone who has tried to explain to students the difference
between logical and physical impossibility can attest to
this.
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probability.

Statements

if he believes this,

(li)

and

(iii)

then he implicitly denies

and affirms Statement (a).

That is, he denies the sceptic's claim
about induction.
This passage adequately explains Hume's
sympathy with
the Wise throughout the middle sections
of Part (iii).
Admittedly, Hume's denial of this kind of
scepticism is
made in a rather off-handed manner and in
the context of

terminological adjustment.

a

Furthermore, he really offers no

argument for his epistemological distinction between
proofs
and probabilities.
This suggests that he never took
this

version of scepticism seriously

— and

rightly so!

version of scepticism expressed by Statements
is truly extravagant,

and (iii)

and no practicing rational being ever

actually believed it (though some claim
consider it?

(ii)

The

There are two reasons:

to)

.

Why,

then,

First, Hume does say

some things that make it appear that he subscribed to this
view.

Secondly, many commentators believe that Hume ex-

plicitly held or was at least committed to holding this
version of scepticism.

A subset of this group even maintains

(though in words only)

that this position and Hume's argument

for it are sound

(see quotations on pp.

143-144).

My interpretation is that Hume assumed that among those

arguments from experience, some are epistcmically better off
than others.

This assumption,

I

think,

is present from the

Introduction through the end of Part (iii) of Book

I.

Hume's
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epistemological aims to that point arc
quite modest;
the
epistemological consequences of his largely
metaphysical
position about necessary connection are
troublesome

only for

rationalists.

His epistemological intentions can be
seen as

an attempt to discover the scope and limits
of certainty.

addition, he is trying to systematize

in

commonly held but

a

unarticulated theory of the justification of empirical
belief,
the bedrock of which is causal inference.
To see why this is the case,

it is necessary to go back

to the Introduction to the Treatise and to see what
Hume

took his task in the Treatise to be.

Earlv in the Intro-

duction he says.
Tis evident that all sciences have a relation,
greater or less, to human nature
Even Mathematics Natural Philoso phy, and
Natural Rel ig ion are in some measure dependent
on the science of MAM;
And as the
science of man is the only solid
foundation for the other sciences so the
only solid foundation we can give to
this science itself must be laid on
experience and observation (T xv,xvi)
,

.

.

.

.

.

The tone of this passage is, in one significant respect,

Cartesian.

Hume supposes that all the sciences have

foundation and that

a

a

satisfactory account of that founda-

tion will set aright the other sciences.

However,

just as

Descartes did not try to doubt everything, at the beginning
of the Meditation s

,

Hume did not take experience and observa-

tions as the only solid foundations for the science of man.
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Another thing that was (provisionally)
taken for granted was
the legitimacy of scientific inference.

Whatever philosophical aims Hume had in
the Treatise, it
is clear that he constructed an
elaborate psychological theory
of the operations of the human mind.

His philosophical aims

led him to examine the epistemological
foundations of

scientific reasoning; however, it is not surprising
to find
Hume taking for granted for some time the legitimacy
of the

canons of empirical science.

For an early example of this,

witness his discussion of the causal connection between
impressions and ideas in Part

(i)

His early distinction

.

between knowledge and probability is based on epistemological

considerations dictated by his categorization of the seven
philosophical relations;

the motivating concern is to dis-

cover the extent to which the mind can achieve (epistemic)
certainty.

failure

As

I

have argued previously (pps. 143-145),

to find certainty with respect to causal inference

does not, for us or for Hume, entail the epistemological

rejection of that process.
What,

then of the argument of Part (iii) Section 6?

rather narrow, technical grounds

I

have rejected

interpretation of this argument, but
it fits in with the rest of Part
I

sceptical

have not shown how

I

(iii)

a

On

.

Early in Chapter III

made fun of T.E. Jessop's claim that Hume was merely doing

psychology here.

While

I

think it is clear that Hume was not

,

.
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merely doing psychology here, there is an
important psychological aspect of this argument that must
be taken into
account
The case of this crucial argument is thoroughly
psy-

chological; in fact, some of the important distinctions
Hume

makes are those of

a

faculty psychology.

After showing that

the mind cannot make the transition from an impression
(of
the cause or effect)
a

to an idea

(of the effect or cause)

by

"penetration into the essence" of the former, he realizes

that the transition is based on past experience.

He then

says

The next question is. Whether experience produces the idea by means of the
understanding or by means of the
imagination; whether we are determin'd
by reason to make the transition, or
by a certain association and relation
of perceptions.
(T. 88-89)

His use of the word 'reason' here is more than a little

puzzling; if reason is taken in its broadest sense as (in-

differently) the faculty which grasps necessary connections
(including those involved in valid arguments) or as that which

generates "arguments from experience," then the answer to
the above question is obvious and trivial-- that reason de-

termines the transition is true by definition.

If

'reason'

is understood in a narrower sense as the faculty which

generates and recognizes v:\lid arguments, the argument that

.
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follows the above quoted passage makes
much more sense.
His
discovery that reason does not determine
the transition, but
that an association or relation of
perceptions is responsible, has obvious epistemological
significance.^ However,
It also has significance from a
psychological point of view.

Causal inference is

a

causally determined transition that

is explained without reference to any
deliberative mental

process.

It is instinctual and non-ref lective in a way
in

which other cognitive processes are not.

Hume is anxious

to show that the most important mental process that is
used
to generate a system of empirical beliefs is fundamentally

different from the mind's more "rational" faculties.

The

epistemological consequences of this argument insure that
causal inference cannot be reconstructed by such "rational"

faculties
Some commentators have claimed that this has vast

philosophical significance.

By proceeding in this way, Hume

calls into question the warrant for or the utility of justifying causal inference.

The fact that the mind cannot

refrain from making such instinctual transitions provides
the legitimating grounds for causal inference, even though,

fuller discussion of this can be found in Harpley,
cit
p. 218

op.

.

,

.

1

.
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as the principal argument
of Section

6

(allegedly)

shows,

there is no e pistemic warrant
for such transitions.
The problem with this
interpretation is that there is
no evidence for it in Section
6 or,
indeed, in any of Part
(111);
All of the evidence for this
).ind of interpretation
IS found in Part (iv)
and of itself, this might not
prove too damaging, what is
problematic is that Hume advances these considerations to deal
with difficulties that
he found with causal inference in
Part (iv) --difficulties
that are independent of anything that
he says in Part (iii)
I shall shortly establish
beyond reasonable doubt that this
is the case.
.

First, however,

I

m

shoul(i like to point out a serious

difficulty that arises in connection with

a

interpretation of Hume’s argument of Section

highly sceptical
6.

If he

really intended to establish that no opinion is
more (epistemically)

probable after the appropriate experience than

It IS prior to any experience,

it is breathtaking that in

the second paragraph following his conclusion he makes

number of emp i r i c a
among ideas.

a

claims about the causes of the union

He gives a causal explanation of how the rela-

tion of causation operates.

Had he believed that he just

destroyed the epistemological foundations of causal inference,
it is not unreasonable to expect him to have done some "back-

f.illing"

to cover himself.

Without any epistemic warrant for

,
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him to proceed, one would expect
him to provide some sort
of justification for his
deployment of the rest of the psychological theory; if that did not fit
in with the plan of this
part of the Trea tise one would expect
him at least to have
'taken out a loan" with the reader.
There is no evidence at
all for this sort of thinking on
Hume's part
,

here.

In summary,

then,

there are some significant psychological

aspects to Hume's argument in Section

6:

The non-ref lective

instinctual operation of the process of causal
inference is
insisted on by Hume; this allows him to explain
how peasants,
children and animals construct a system of
realities by

which they can regulate their lives.

At this stage of his

presentation, the epistemological significance of this is

exhausted by the fact that, since causal inference does not
operate in and through the "faculty of reason"
construed)

,

(narrowly

no causal inference can have the highest possible

degree of conclusiveness.
C.

Option (2):

Hume's response to scepticism

.

Those who

adopt a sceptical interpretation of Part (iii) Section

6

and yet want to avoid attributing a contradiction to Hume deny

that Hume had any epistemic sympathy with the Wise.
they maintain, Hume finds

a

However,

way to vindicate causal inference

and can thereby pragmatically approve of the sentiments of
the Wise.

This has the double advantage of removing the

.
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apparent contradiction and explaining
why there appears to
be a contradiction.
There is, however, some disagreement
on just what Hume believes
provides the vindication.
1
shall discuss a number of possible
candidates in this
connection
My objection to this procedure,
and hence to Option
IS that all of the considerations
that Hume advances to

(2),

vindicate causal inference are designed
to handle problems
with causal inference that do not arise
until Part (iv)--

problems that are independent of anything in
Part (iii).
Let
me emphasize that I recognize that this
does not prove
that Hume was not a sceptic in Part (iii).
After all, he
could have intended the considerations about
to be discussed
to apply to the problems raised in Part

(iii).

However, if

my argument is correct, there is no evidence that
this is
the case.

Hume discovers that the mind cannot avoid making causal
inferences.
i

the

si

Causal inference springs from certain universal

st ib le principles of the human mind.

He adopts

'Ought Implies Can' Principle and concludes that, since

the mind cannot refrain from making causal inferences, it

ought not to refrain from that practice.

Given that there

is a distinction between being epistemologically justified
in believing something

(conclusions of causal inferences)

and being pragmatically vindicated in engaejing in a practice

188

(the practice of making causal
inferences), Hume can con-

sistently hold that beliefs produced
by causal inferences
are unjustified, but from a pragmatic
point

of view, it is

permissible to engage in the practice of making
such inferences.
This explains his sympathy with
the Wise.

Undoubtedly, Hume does argue in this fashion in
of places.

number

The primary evidence for this interpretation
can

be found in two places:

at the end of Part

and at the beginning of Part (iv)

Part (iv)

a

Section

2

Section

4.

(iv)

Section

2

At the end of

he says.

'Tis impossible upon any system to
defend either our understanding or our
senses; and we but expose them farther
when we endeavor to justify them in
that manner.
As the sceptical doubt
arises naturally from a profound and
intense reflection on those subjects,
it always encreases, the farther we
carry our reflections, whether in
opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and inattention alone can
afford us any remedy.
For this reason
I rely entirely on them.
(T. 218)

The "carelessness and inattention" that Hume recommends

here concern sceptical doubts and not matters of everyday
life, nor perhaps, of science.

inference but not for very long.

The mind can question causal

Nature reasserts Herself

and it is hopeless--and thus point less-- to resist.

This passage can be found in the last paraoraph of
Part (iv) Section

2.

Hume is drawing his final conclusions
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from the arguments of Sections

1

and

2.

The first section

IS entitled "Of Scepticism with
Regard to Reason".

in this

section he presents some sceptical
arguments concerning the
operation of the understanding, and in
Section 2 he presents
some sceptical arguments concerning the
operation
of the

senses.

The argument in the former section is
designed to

show that a reiterated examination of our
reasoning faculties
results in the successive diminution of the
probability of
any conclusion, whether the original argument
is demonstrative or probable.

The details of this argument, as well as

its serious difficulties, are of no immediate
concern.

The

important point is that the difficulty that Hume finds with
causal reasoning in this section is independent of any epis-

temological argument of Part (iii)

.

Hume's move towards

vindication of causal inference at the end of Part
Section
1.

(iv)

2

a

(iv)

is designed to meet the problems raised in Section

Fortunately, for us and for Hume, nothing else in Part

depends on this argument of Section

1.

He never refers

to it again.

The other significant evidence for a vindicationist

interpretation of Hume can be found at the beginning of Part
(iv)

Section

4,

"Of Modern Philosophy".

He says.

In order to justify myself, I must
distinguish betwixt the principles
v;hich ^lre permanent, irresistable
and universal; such as the customary
transition from causes to effects and

.
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effects to causes:

And the principles,
and irregular;
The former are the
foundations of all our thoughts and
actions, so that upon their removal
human nature must immediately perish
and go to ruin.
For this reason
the former are received by philosophy
^

'^hich arc changeable, weak,
.

.

.

.

(T.

.

.

225)

The inevitability and apparent utility of causal
inference

recommends it to us; for parallel reasons, the changeable,
weak, and irregular principles that afflict the ancient
phil

osophers (whom he has just discussed) are not praiseworthy.
Again, however, the problems that force Hume to draw
this distinction are peculiar to Part (iv)
this:

In Section

3

.

The problem is

Hume has criticized the ancient phil-

osophers' distrines of substances, substantial forms, faculties, and occult qualities.

In addition, he has offered a

psychological explanation of what led them into these errors
The problem is that the explanatory principle involved in
this account is roughly the same as those used to explain

causal inference (cf. Treatise

,

p.

222).

Causal inference

appears to be guilty by association, and for this reason
Hume draws the distinction indicated in the passage quoted
above.

Nowhere is there any mention of the failure of

"reason" to determine the transition involved in causal

inference
It is true that Hume appears to take the universality

and irresistibility of causal inference as a legitimating

.
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consideration.

If he was in fact arguing for a sceptical

position in Part (iii) Section
out.

6,

this would give him a way

However, this passage admits of another, incompatible

interpretation.

He might well have assumed all along^*^ that

causal inference was epistemically warranted; only at this

point is he making explicit what he takes to be the epistemic

grounds for this process.
Admittedly, the evidence here is equivocal and not

overwhelming for my reading of this passage.
hand,

On the other

it is not conclusive as an attempted vindication, pre-

dicated on an earlier epistemic rejection, either.

The main

problem here, as well as elsewhere in Parts (iii) and (iv),
is that nowhere does Hum.e seem haunted by the sceptical

doubts allegedly raised in Part (iii).
read the last Section of Book

I

capable of being haunted--indeed

As anyone who has

can attest, Hume
,

v;as

quite

tormented--by sceptical

doubts

Another candidate for a legitimating consideration that

vindicates causal inference can be found in the last section
of Part

(iv)

.

throughout Part

The sceptical doubts that have nagged Hume
(iv)

heat up in this final section.

As

I

shall show shortly, the proposed justification or vindica-

tion offered at the beginning of Section

4

is rejected.

^^Hxcept for the argument of Part (iv) Section
seems to have subsequently ignored.

1,

At

which he

.
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the end of this final section
Hume is faced with a serious
problem:
He wants to continue to develop
his psychological
theory to account for the passions
and morals.
Important

foundational difficulties, however,
appear unresolved.
He
wants to find some sort of warrant--or
at least an excuse-for moving on to Books II and III.
Towards the very end of
this section he makes the following
observation:
Since,

therefore, 'tis almost
impossible for the mind of man
to rest, like those of beasts,
in that narrow circle of objects
which are the subject of daily
conversation and action, we ought
only to deliberate concerning the
choice of our guide, and ought to
prefer that which is safest and most
agreeable And in this respect I make
bold to recommend [natural]
philosophy and shall not scruple
to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination.
(T.

271)

Inclination and sentiment, in the final analysis, are what
allow Hume to move on.
The reason that Hume was pushed into this rather feeble

justification or vindication lies in Part

Section

(iv)

(approximately five pages before this passage)

.

7

He draws

some obvious conclusions from some arguments advanced earlier
in Part

(iv),

and it is these conclusions that raise the

difficulty which
handle

tlie

above quoted passage is supposed to
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The problem is that

has continued to trace the

llumo

causes of some of the more important
processes of the mind
(i.e. causal reasoning and the
belief in the confined and
distinct existence of matter)
He finds that they both
spring from the imagination.
This is problematic because
.

tho these two operations
be equally natural and necessary
in the hurnan mind yet in some
circumstances they are directly
contrary, nor is it possible for
us to reason justly and regularly
from causes and effects, and at
the same time believe the continued existence of matter. (T. 266)
•

.

.

'

,

A footnote in this passage refers back to Part

Section

(iv)

where Hume advances Berkelian arguments to show that
both
primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent. Thus,
4

the conflict of what Norman Kemp Smith calls the "Natural

Beliefs

is Hume's

final argument for scepticism.

Arising

from the same faculty, these natural and unavoidable beliefs

ultimately conflict.

Because of this conflict, the imagina-

tion is not entitled to be the final arbiter on matters of

truth and falsehood.

Here again, however, there is no refer-

ence to any arguments of Part (iii)

.

This is a new and

independent development that has arisen in Part

(iv)

.

It is clear that Hume believed that this conflict

seriously undermines the legitimacy of causal inference.

In
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striking passage which occurs shortly
after he discovers
this difficulty, he briefly falls into
the scepticism that
Stove and others attributed to him in Part
(iii) Section 6.
The following statement is so clear and
unequivocal, it is
a

a

wonder that Hume does not use similar language
if he was

in fact arguing for a radical form of
scepticism there.

The inten se view of these manifold
contradictions and imperfections in
human reason has so wrought upon me,
and heated my brain, that I am
ready to reject all belief and reasoning and can look upon no opinion even
as more prob able or likely than
another
VJhere am I or what?
From
what causes do I derive my existence?
Whose favor shall I court and whose
anger must I dread? (T. 268-269)
(second emphasis added)
,

.

It is this deep scepticism,

brought on by what Hume

takes to be the conflict of the Natural Beliefs, that he
tries to escape by following the course which is "safest
and most agreeable."
In conclusion,

it is clear that every move that Hume

makes to avoid scepticism about causal inference is motivated by problems that he finds in Part (iv)

the argument of Part

(iii)

Section

6

.

No specters of

follow Hume into the

depths of scepticism that he reaches at the close of Book
This,

I.

coupled with Hume's explicit epistemological dis-

tinctions between proofs and probabilities, strongly supports
the view that,

through the end of Part (iii), Hume believed
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that causal inferences lead to
epistemically warranted
belief.
If justification is understood
as 'having a sufficiently high measure of epistemic
warrant', it is clear from
the arguments that I have advanced
in Chapters I, III, and
this chapter that Hume held that,
among those beliefs that
are caused by other beliefs, such
beliefs are justified if
and only if they are caused by causal
inference.

Thusfar in this chapter
interpretive.

ray

concerns have been primarily

However, there are large philosophical issues

at stake here.

Hume has undoubtedly made

large contribu-

a

tion to epistemological debates about the mind's
knowledge
of what is unobserved.

tions in this regard:

There are

a

number of relevant ques-

What challenges does Hume raise,

either explicitly or implicitly, about the mind's claims
to

knowledge about the future?

Does he offer

resolution of these challenges?

a

satisfactory

In particular,

how does all

this relate to the so-called Problem of Induction?

Thusfar

I

have said little about this problem.

There

are three relevant questions in this connection:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

What is the Problem of Induction?
How does or can Hume respond to this problem?
How satisfactory is this response?

In the next chapter

I

shall discuss these and other matters.

CHAPTER

V

What IS the Problem of Induction?

As

a

first approxima-

tion, we can say that the Problem of
Induction is

a

sceptical

challenge about the mind's claims to knowledge
about the
future (or, more generally, about the
unobserved)
in the
.

context of Hume's philosophy, this challenge
can be seen as
a question:
"From an epistemological point of view, why
approve of causal inference?"

Before discussing answers to this question, it would
be
helpful to understand what kinds of considerations motivate
it.

There are in fact

can arise.
of Book

a

variety of reasons why this challenae

From Hume's point of view at the end of Part
the answer is clear:

I,

causal

(iv)

(and hence inductive)

inference cannot be trusted because it conflicts with the
basic and unshakeable (natural) belief in the continued and

distinct existence of bodies.
is prepared

Because of this conflict, Hume

(at least temporarily)

to question the ability of

causal inference to deliver even merely probable opinion,

quotation

p.

(cf.

194).

Nonetheless, this is not the motivation that has been

historically important for generating the Problem of Induction
Ihe relevant arguments of Part
to Hume's philosophy.

(iv)

are parochial and peculiar

Besides, these arguments may not be as
196

,
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Huino

thinks they arc.

What is commonly cited as the source
of the Problem of
Induction is the argument of Part (iii)
Section 6.
Now, I
have argued in great detail that Hume
did not conclude in
that argument that past experience
provides no epistemic
warrant for beliefs about the future. All
that he was trying
to establish there is that this warrant
cannot be the highest
possible.
The Incurable invalidity of such inferences
guarantees that.
Pre-analytically, this creates no problems.

Not only

is the mind convinced by invalid "arguments
from experience"

ever so little reflection convinces it of the rationality
of
such arguments.

Deeper philosophical reflection, however,

appears to reveal that there is

a

significant epistemological

gap between valid and invalid arguments.

Because of the

intimate relationship between certainty and validity, valid

arguments are epistemologically less problematical than invalid ones.

The warrant for the conclusions of valid argu-

ments is the certainty (relative to the premises) that the

validity of the argument bestows--at least in cases where
person knows that the argument is valid.

a

Since the conclusion

of no invalid argument can be certain relative to its premises^.

I ignore here arguments whose promises and conclusions are
all "psychological reports".

?
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IS there,

nonetheless

a

significant epistemological relation

between the promises and conclusion?

Put another way, what

is the epistemic warrant for the
conclusions of the incurably

invalid arguments from experience that
Hume calls "causal inf erence "

Though Hume did not see it as such in Part
(iii)
is the Problem of Induction.

It is a question,

a

this

,

sceptical

challenge to show that the conclusions of such
inferences have
some measure of epistemic warrant.
It is not the substantive

philosophical position that there is no such warrant.
positive position, scepticism has little to recommend
the extent that it depends on a

Hume

s

S tovean

argument of Part (iii) Section

dubious Premise (10b)

it,:

to

interpretation of

6,

(and Principle P)

As a

,

it requires the

or something similar.

The legacy of Hume's argument in that section is an

implicit challenge to produce

a

philosophical theory that

epistemically legitimates causal or inductive inference.
Failure here can result in

a

triumph for scepticism only if

scepticism is construed as

a

suspension of belief (and not

disbelief) about the legitimacy of such inferences.

It is

important in this connection to distinguish between belief
in the conclusions of an inductive inference and belief in

the legitimacy of those conclusions.

A sceptical attitude

about the latter may not require a sceptical attitude about
the former.

Indeed, Hume argues that the mind cannot refrain
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from believing the conclusions
of causal inferences.
Whatever the truth of that claim, it
does not preclude a sceptical
attitude about the legitimacy of such
inferences.

How can this challenge be met?

it is beyond the scope

of this dissertation to discuss
all of the soJutions, resolutions, and dissolutions of the Problem
of Induction; instead,
I shall focus on those
responses that can be legitimately

called "Humean."

in various places in Book

Hume hints at or clearly states

a

I

of the Treatise

number of positions that

can be viewed as responses to the sceptic's
challenge.

Some

commentators with philosophical axes to grind have
claimed
to find implicit in Hume's work a way to meet
this challenge.

A critical evaluation of these proposals seems in
order here.

Aside from its intrinsic philosophical interest, such a

discussion is of some value for those interested in the
^^tional recons ti uct ion " of the philosophy of
ical figure.
a

a

major histor-

The aim of rational reconstruction is to render

philosopher's views consistent and coherent.

This in turn

allows for a more exact appreciation of that figure's con-

tribution to outstanding philosophical debates.
Humean Responses to the Problem of Induction
Let me emphasize at the outset that this discussion is
not strictly historical and interpretive.

The Problem of

.
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Induction is only implicit in
Hume's argument of Part (iii)
Section 6.
There, and in the rest of
Part (iii), he merely
assumes that invalid arguments
from experience can provide
some measure of epistemic
warrant.
The responses
that he

offers in Part

are designed to meet scepticism
as a
substantive position, the arguments
for which occur in Part
(IV).
My statement and evaluation of
Humean responses to
the implicit challenge of Part
(iii) Section 6 do not represent a recanting of the interpretation
offered in Chapters
III and IV.
The discussion here is undertaken
for philosophical, and not strictly historical or
interpretive, reasons.
(iv)

Faced with the sceptic's challenge about
induction,
there are two kinds of responses that can
be made:
(i)

It can be met head on by constructing and
justifying a philosophical theory that shows the
epistemological legitimacy of inductive inference.

or
(ii)

It can be met indirectly by showing that inductive
inference can be approved of on other, nonepistemic grounds
In this way legitimate
philosophical aims that motivate this challenge
can be met, even though the question of the
epistemic legitimacy of such inferences remains
unanswered
.

The second kind of move is not the one adopted by those who

claim to "dissolve" the Problem of Induction.
form,

In its crudest

the dissolution of the problem is effected by asserting

that it is part of the meaning of the relevant epistemic terms
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that certain kinds of non-doductive
inference provides a
measure of epistemic warrant. 2 it
asserts that some kinds
of non-deductive inference were
epistemically legitimate.
The second option outlined above adopts
a quite

different strategy:

It avoids the question of the epistemic

legitimacy of certain kinds of non-deductive
inference (whose
conclusions are empirical claims) by showing that
such

inferences can be approved of on other, non-epistemic
(e.g.
pragmatic) grounds.
The concept of "vindication" employed
by those who adopt this second option is analogous
to the

concept of justification in the following sense:
a

To say that

kind of inference is justified is to say that it is worthy

of epistemic approval.

On this construal

,

to say that a

kind of inference is vindicated is to say that it is worthy
of some other kind of approval.

If it can be shown that

certain kinds of non-deductive inference can be approved of
on non-epistemic grounds, then legitimate philosophical aims

that motivate a "head-on" approach would be met.

What are these aims?

It is reasonably clear that

certain kinds of non-deductive inference form the backbone
of the empirical sciences.

2

It is a legitimate pliilosophical

See Chapter 2 of Bryan Skyrms Ch oic e and Chance
1966) for a good discussion of this p^Tnt.
'

Ca,

(Belmont,
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task to give a satisfactory account
of the foundations of
empirical science.
Also, among characteristically inductive
arguments, some appear to be "better off" than
others, and
some merit no approval at all.
A good theory should account
for this.

Finally, perhaps the most important aim is this:

Pre-analytically

,

most philosophers (and certainly Hume)

believe that science and the scientific method alone
merit
an approval that,

e.g.

enthusiasm and superstition do not.

An adequate philosophical theory will show that this
broadly

based sentiment is well-grounded.

Failure to meet these

aims need not result in the triumph of scepticism as a sub-

stantive position.

It would,

however, leave the legitimacy

of these pre-systematic beliefs--to say nothing of inductive

inference itself--in serious doubt.

And surely that would

be a serious failure of philosophy.

The second option outlined above seeks to satisfy

these aims but on non-epistemic grounds.

If this sort of

move is successful, the epistemological questions remain
unanswered; however, this is not too serious or troublesome

because the philosophical aims that motivate the questions
are met.

It is in this sense that the sceptic's

challenge can be successfully avoided.

(epistemic)

It is important to

note that someone who adopts this position need not eschew
a].l

epistemic aims.

cally)

His only concern is to avoid (epistemi-

justifying empirical claims by means of non-deductive
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inferences.
cally)

3

There is nothing to prevent him from (epistemi-

justifying non-empirical claims by means of deductively

valid arguments.
The actual motivations for adopting this second option
can be quite varied:

A theorist might think that a substan-

i

tive sceptical position is correct and that all beliefs

arrived at via non-deductive inference are epistemically
worthless; he may think that all positive attempts to meet
the challenge head on have failed;

for this latter reason

especially, he may think that this sort of move is desirable

because he can avoid

a

rather thorny challenge and still

I

satisfy legitimate and important philosophical desiderata.

;

j

In the remainder of this chapter

I

should like to discuss

seven responses to the sceptic's challenge that are "Humean"
in character;
j

they are either clearly stated by him or in-

spired by things that he says in Book

I

of the Treatise.

j

i

I

Since Hume adopts

a

number of positions at different places,

!

'

j

I

it is not surprising to find such a variety of responses

suggested in the Treatise

.

These responses are naturally

subsumable under the two broad options outlined above.

I

shall first discuss three attempts to avoid the sceptic's

^That there are no acceptable deductive inferences whose
conclusion is an empirical claim is shown by Hume's argument of Part (iii) Section 6 (see Chapter III).
I

s
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chnllengo.

The first two have been discussed
in the secondary
literature, and they were brcifly
outlined in Chapter IV
as interpretations of Hume.
The third position is apparently
the final one adopted by Hume in
Book I (see quotation p.l92).
In light of Its obvious weakness,
a brief discussion of it
IS warranted only because this
is Hume's final position and

this dissertation concerns Hume's
epistemology.

These posi-

tions may aptly be termed "pragmatic
vindications"— as
opposed to validations— of inductive
inference.
It IS important to distinguish this
kind of vindication

from that advocated by such writers as
Reichenbach and Salmon.
They attempt to show that inductive inference is
epistemically

legitimate by showing that if any method of inference
is
successful, the one that is in fact employed (i.e. the

straight rule', which tells us to project observed frequencies to the unobserved)

is and will be successful.

The kind

of vindicationism under consideration is silent on the

question of the epistemic legitimacy of these inferences.
A Pragmati c V i ndication of Induction:

Legit ima~Fing Consideratio n

I

This view is proposed and argued for as an interpretation of Mume by F.C. Baylie in his monograph. The Causes and

Evidence of Beliefs:

An Examination of H ume's Me thod

.

Baylie

view is that Hume originally attempted to distinguish the

'
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worthy from the unworthy boliots
on the basis of their causal
antecedents. Although he does not
consider causal intoronoe
as a candidate, ho does consider
and (rightly) reject a number of other candidates (e.g.
whether a belief was caused by
an impression of sensation or one
of reflection)
Finally,
towards the end of his monograph he
offers what ho takes to
.

be Hume's ultimate position:

The change in Hume's emphasis
is from the causes of a belief
to the consequences of a belief.
Hume appears to point towards a
functional test for the validity of
a belief and away from a test in
terms of its origins.
Hume's procedure indicates that his ultimate
distinction between beliefs is in
terms of their necessity for
rational science and living,
The beliefs which are justified
are those which are necessary,
necessary for the purpose of drawing
inferences from our experience and
for the purpose of a biological
existence.
Hume seems to be suggesting a biological justification
for some of our beliefs.^
.

I

take it that what Baylie means by

justification" is what
tion.

I

.

a

.

"biological

have called a pragmatic vindica-

In the case of causal inference,

he is saying that

such inferences are necessary for the purposes of living

^Frank C. Baylie, The_ Causes and Evidence of Belief: An
Examination of Hume's Method
(Mount Hermon T936),
,

p.

79.

.

20G

and doing science, and this
vindicates the practice of
making them.
Baylie does not clearly distinguish
the concept of an epistemological
justification from that of a

pragmatic vindication.

Consequently, it would be worthwhile

to consider what he offers here
as a sufficient condition for
the (epistemic) justification of
a belief as well.
Later in
this chapter I shall do this.

By realizing that causal inference
is necessary for
the purposes of living and doing
science, the problem of

epistemically jus t i fying such beliefs can be
effectively bypassed.
What evolves is something like a doctrine
of "as
if

.

If one acts as if

(e.g.)

it is virtually certain that

winter will come next year, then, by acting accordingly,
it
can be survived.
The necessity of such inferences
for the

purposes of living vindicates our organic and instinctual

confidence in conclusions reached by these inferences.

Thus

there are non-epistemic reasons for approving of causal in-

ferences and disapproving of empirical beliefs arrived at

through other means (e.g.

superstition)

Let us consider the argument here

a

little more closely.

It is not clear whether or not Baylie believes that these

purposes are singly sufficient or singly necessary but
jointly sufficient.

I

shall first consider them separately.

The following seems to be
strual of Baylie

's

a

fair rc})resentat ion of one con-

reasoning:

.

,
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.

(

1

)

(

2

)

(3)

If causal inference is necessary
for the purposes of
living, then it is vindicated.

Causal inference is necessary for
the purposes of living.
Causal inference is vindicated.

It IS unproblematic to grant Baylie
Premise

(1)

.

in this

context, our desire to go on living needs
no justification
or vindication.
Consequently, it seems true to say that if
a process is necessary for that
purpose, it is worthy of

approval
In order to evaluate Premise

(2)

however, it is

necessary to get clear about the meaning of this claim.
Certainly not every belief arrived at via causal inference
is necessary for the purposes of living.

it must be the

general practice of making such inferences or the tendency
to make such inferences that is necessary for living.

Indi-

causal judgments are vindicated because they are in-

stances of that general practice or manifestations of that

general tendency.

Thus,

it is the

"institution" of causal

inference which is necessary for the purposes of living.
It is probably correct to say that causal inferences are

necessary for the purposes of living.

If one did not make

such inferences, one might walk off the edge of cliffs, be

suspicious of the ability of bread to nourish the body, etc.
In short,

were one to stop making causal inferences, one

would shortly pe.rish.

Hume is fond of pointing out just

.
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how much we depend on causal inference.

Problems arise when the defender of this
position tries
to show that this claim is true.
it is a high-level empirical assertion about the effects of making
or not making
causal inferences.
its truth is by no means self-evident.
The defender of this view would have to offer
an argument
for this premise that merits epistemic
approval.
Put more
simply, he would have to justify an empirical
claim by a

non-deductive argument to show that the argument on page
207 is sound.
to avoid.

This task, however, is just what he has sought

Thus,

it appears that this vindication fails in

its attempt to avoid the

j

ustificat ion

of empirical belief.

Baylie might respond by saying that the empirical argu^snt for Premise

(2)

is designed to and results in a vindi-

cation of that premise.

Its vindication legitimates the

premise and thus recommends it to us.

The problem with this

response is that it begs the question at issue.

That is,

it assumes the truth of the conclusion in order to establish

one of the premises.

With respect to the other condition,

a

similar argument

emerges

1

(1)

If causal inference is necessary for the purposes of
doing science, then it is vindicated.

(2)

Causal inference is necessary for the purposes of
doing science.
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.

(3)

Causal inference is vindicated.
It may be that Premise

(2)

is not an empirical claim

and can be established in some
non-circular way by an a
priori argument.
Premise (1), however, is problematic.
it
says that satisfying a certain aim or
purpose legitimates
causal inference.
This seems to require that the purpose
(engaging in the practice of doing science)
is itself a

legitimate one.

The legitimacy of that purpose may be self-

evident, or it may be established by showing
that the ful-

filling of that purpose serves some other
purpose (s).
These ends may be "ultimate", and, as Mill has
argued in

Utilitarianism

,

incapable of justification, or their legi-

timacy may be self-evident.
The legitimacy of doing science is not self-evident.

Whether or not we should do science is an "open question"
in that it is possible to understand the question without

knowing the answer.

Engaging in the practice of doing science

is not "ultimate" because reasons can be given for doing it.

What are these reasons or purposes?

Commonly cited purpo-

ses for doing science are explanation, prediction, and the

practical

(e.g.

technological) benefits that are derived

from engaging in the practice.
of argument,

Let us grant,

for the sake

that the legitimacy of these purposes is self-

evident or that these ends are ultimate.

The following ar-

:
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gument then emerges for Premise
(la)

(1)

If science j'-L'-j.ut)
vieJds exnl
-.nn4explanations,
practical benefits, then it is predict irmc:
vindicated
.

-,r-.a

•

'

(lb)

If science is vindicated,
then if any practice is
necessary for the purposes of
doi ng science, then it
IS vindicated.

(Ic)

Science yields explanations,
predict ions and practical
benefits.

Premises (la),
imply Premise
a

(lb),
(1)

.

and (Ic), together with Premise
(2),
The argument seems to be a good

one, but

close examination of Premise

Tacit in Premises (la) and (Ic)

(Ic)

reveals a fatal flaw.

is the qualification that

the explanations and predictions are
reasonable to believe.
Otnerwise, there is no way to distinguish
science from superstition;
the latter can also offer explanations
and prediction.
However, since this theorist has sought
to avoid

recommending the conclusions of scientific reasoning
(i.e.
explanations and predictions) on epistemic grounds,
it is

difficult to see how he could appeal to explanation
or prediction unless that appeal is parasitic on the
practical
benefits of doing science.

Beliefs about those facts, if

indeed they are facts, require some (epistemic)

justification

in order that Premise

It will not

do to say that (Ic)
at issue.

(Ic)

can be established.

can be vindicated -- that begs the question

This vindication of causal inference fails to

avoid the epistemic justification of empirical belief and can.
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therefore, be rejected.

j^r agmatic

Vindica tion of Induction:
Legit ima ting Con s Td^ration II

This account can be found in a
number of commentaries
on Hume.
l suspect that this is
the final view of Norman
Kemp Smith in Th^_Pj^osophy of David
Hum e, though this is
not completely clear.
The clearest statement of it can be
found in John Lenz article, "Hume's
Defence of Causal
'

Inference".

5

Lenz claims that Hume discovers that the
mind

cannot help making causal inferences; such
inferences
spring from universal and irresistible principles
of human
nature.

Since the mind cannot refrain from engaging in

the practice of making causal inferences, it is
not the

case that it ought to so refrain.

This vindicates the

practice of making causal inferences.

Lenz puts the m.atter

this way:

This defense is based on a crucial
characteristic of causal beliefs.
All men, because of their common
human nature, are compelled to
have them.
Hume holds, that is,
that it is impossible for men not
to make causal inferences.
His
.

r

.

John Lenz,

"Hume's Defence of Causal Inference" in Hume:
A Collection oF Critical Es says, od by Ver^^.
Chappell (1966, Notre Dame, Indiana), pps.
169-186.
.

.

.
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essential point is that the epistemic c]uestion, "Ought wo to
make causal inferences?" is "blocked"
by the unavoidability of our having
to make them.
Apparently presupposing
the principle (which he explicitly
adopts in his moral philosophy) that
ought not d.mplies able not to, he
simply argues that inasmuch as we cannot
help but make causal inferences, there
is no point in anyone's saying that
we
ought not to.^
The principle that Lenz attributes to Hume
is somewhat

ambiguous.

It seems to be a form of the "Ought
Implies

Can" formula.

If so,

this principle can be less misleading-

ly expressed as follows:

(1)

If the mind ought to refrain from engaging in
practice P, then it is able to refrain from
engaging in practice P.

Instantiating in the appropriate way, the following argument emerges:
(la)

If the mind ought to refrain from making causal inferences, then it is able to refrain from making such

inferences
(2)

’.(3)

The mind cannot refrain from making causal inferences.
It is not the case that the mind ought to refrain
from making causal inferences (i.e. it is permissible
to make causal inferences)

In order to evaluate this argument,

^Ibid., pps.

183,184.

it is important to

.

:
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get clear about the sense of the
two key terms:
and 'permissible'.

It is doubtful that Lenz intends
that

these are terms of episte_mj^ appraisal.
tion for this argument is to avoid

block

'ought'

The whole motiva-

(in his words,

"to

the question of the epistemic warrant
of these

)

inferences.

Principle

Besides, it seems that, on this construal.

(1)

may indeed be false.

It certainly seems

possible that the mind could be compelled to believe
pro-

positions which are unjustified (perhaps by the
machinations
of a Cartesian demon or even the blind forces
of Nature)

Rather, the parenthetical remark in the above quota-

tion suggests that the intended sense of these terms is
a
^*^^al one.

Ihus the conclusion asserts that it is morally

permissible to make causal inferences.
Hume

s

If the bulk of

psychological theory is granted, it seems to me,

anyway, that this claim is indeed true.

Nevertheless, this conclusion does not, by itself,
satisfy the aim of this approach.

It needs to be shown that

the moral permissibility of making such inferences vindi-

cates the mind's making them.

This suggests the following

argument

•
.

(4)

If it is morally permissible to make causal iiiferences,
then the practice of making causa] inferences is
vindicated

(5)

The practice of making causal inferences is vindicated.
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statement

(5)

IS valid.

is implied by

(4)

and

Let us consider Promise

means self-evidently true.

(3),
(4)

and the arqumont

first.

It is by no

In order to evaluate it,

how-

ever, one must recall what a
vindication is and how this

concept can be used here.

As noted previously (cf. p.200),

in connection with the philosophical
aims of this kind

of project,

a

vindication of causal inference will have
to

provide some grounds for approving of the
practice.
IS,

That

causal inference will have to be shown to be
worthy

of approval.
Now,

on the face of it,

it seems very unlikely that the

fact that causal inference is morally permissible
makes it

worthy of approval.
of moral approval

Certainly it does not make it worthy

(i.e. morally praiseworthy).

It is highly

doubtful that its moral permissib.ility makes it worthy of

aesthetic approval

permissibility is
approval.

.

a

It also does not seem that the moral

sufficient condition

fo.r

pragmatic

There are many things that are morally permis-

sible yet quite unwise from a practical point of view.

There may be other kinds of approval, but it does not seem
that the moral permissibility of causal inference is a

sufficient condition for any kind of appro val
therefore,

.

Premise (4),

is probably false.

It may happen that there are many non-cpistemi c grounds

for approving of causal inference.

For example, causal

.

.

215

inforenco does servo some worthy
prudential or pragmatic
aims.
However, that this is the case is
a contingent tact
that needs to be justified.
A vindication of that claim
begs the very question at issue.
This leads to a parallel problem with
Premise

(2)

This premise states that the mind cannot
refrain from
making causal inferences. This is a high-level
statement
of psychological theory.

Any argument for it must be de-

signed to justify this empirical proposition.

Of course,

this is just what the vindicationist wants to
avoid.

was the case with Premise

(2)

As

of Baylie’s argument, an

attempt to vindicate this premise would beg the question.
Lenz

Although

position, therefore, is ultimately untenable.
I

cannot demonstrate it, it seems to me that any

attempt to avoid the question of the epistemic justification
causal inference will fail because it will require an em-

claim that needs to be justified at some point in
the argument.

Thus, prospects for a non-epistemic vindica-

tion of causal inference appear bleak.

premise could be
I

a

Maybe the key

synthetic proposition, knowable

a

prio ri

am sceptical of this, but it is reasonably clear that

there is no suggestion of that sort of move anyv;hcre in

Hume
A Pragm atic Vi ndicat ion of Induction:
Legitimating Consideration ill

.

i
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This proposal is the one that
the end of Section

7

Ilume

(the last section)

fina]]y

.

k)f)ts at

of Pari

After discovering that the two Natural
Beliefs
in the continued and distinct
existence of bod

(i '''•

it.

belief in causal reasoning) ultimately
conflict,

belief

rind
”'irne

the
is

moved to make the following observation:
Since, therefore, 'tis almost
impossible for the mind of man
to rest, like those of beasts,
in that narrow circle of objects, wiii^.i
are the subject of daily conversation and action, we ought only to
deliberate concerning the choice of
our guide, and ought to prefer that
which is safest and most agreeable.
And in this respect I make bold to
recommend [natural] philosophy and
shall not scruple to give it the
preference to superstition of every
kind or denomination. (T. 271)

Shorn of all its trappings, Hume's claim

i

'

method of natural philosophy (causal inference)
of approval because it is safest and most

Thus, this

the same defect that plagued Baylie's and Lenz
In addition,
is

i'

worthy

=

agree...

it is safest and most agreeable is an empirical

needs an epi stemic justification.

tat the

c-

That
'aim that

.

vu
'

what is most agreeable to Hume may

.

suffers
'

'

I

erion
be what

.

most agreeable to an enthusiast.
The weakness of this view is quite obvious;

M

an expression of despair than a serious propo.s,,i

discussion of it is warranted, however, becaus.:

is more
A brief

i

t

does appear
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to be Hume's final position.

*****
This completes my discussion of Humean
attempts to

avoid the sceptic's challenge to show that
beliefs arrived
at via causal

(inductive)

epistemic warrant.

I

inference have some measure of

have not been able to discover any

other proposals in the secondary literature that are
designed
to avoid the sceptic's challenge.

Some theorists, however,

have claimed to find some suggestion in the Treatise of
to meet this challenge head on.

I

have been able to

four proposals in this connection.
of this chapter,

1.

I

a

In the remainder

should like to discuss these proposals.

Since Professor Baylie does not sharply distinguish
the concept of a pragmatic vindication from that of
an epistemic justification,

sider his criterion as

a

it would be useful to con-

sufficient condition for the

justification of an empirical belief.
2.

Lenz suggests that his criterion was first employed by

Hume as a sufficient condition for the epistemic justi-

fication of

a

belief; Hume's realization that causal

inference ultimately conflicts with the belief in the

continued and distinct

existence of bodies forced him

to the vindication ist position that Lenz attributes to
him.

Putting to one side the ali.eged conflict of the
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Natural Beliefs, Lenz

criterion deserves careful consideration as a sufficient condition
for the justification of empirical belief.
'

In a brief but penetrating
discussion of Hume and the

Problem of Induction in F act, Fiction,
and Forecast
Nelson Goodman argues that this
problem has been largely

misconceived and that Hume's description
of the process
of inductive inference is highly
relevant
to the justi-

fication of that process.

By drawing attention to how

deductive inferences are justified, Goodman
claims that
there is no special problem with respect
to induction.

It is not clear to what extent Goodman
thinks that this

accurately characterizes Hume's intentions, but
there
can be little doubt that some suggestion of this
view
can be found in the Treatise

finally,

I

outline what

of the matter.

.

take to be the correct view

I

My evaluation of Goodman's proposal

will show that he is m.istaken about the justification
of deductive inference.

However, the correct account

of the justification of deductive inference will suggest
the way that inductive inference is to be justified.

I

shall argue that both ultimately depend on intuition.

That some inductive arguments can be intuited to be
"better than" others (in
is

a

yet to be specified sense)

suggested by Hume's distinction, made

v>^ithout

argument.
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between proofs and probabilities.
An Epistemic Justific ation of Induction:

Legitimating Consideratl^^T

Baylie claims that Hume's discovery of the necessity
of causal inference for the purposes of living
and doing

science legitimates beliefs arrived at in that manner.

Let

us construe this legitimacy as epistemic justification.

Thus one might construe Baylie as asserting that

being necessary for the purposes of living is

condition for its being justified.

a

a

belief's

sufficient

Some obvious counter-

examples show that this cannot be true and that perhaps
Baylie'

s

criterion ought to be more charitably construed.

Comrade Ivan Ivanov has been sentenced to the most

wretched labor camp in Stalinist Russia for an indefinite
period of time.

In order for him to survive,

he must be

firmly convinced that he will eventually be released.

He

may not even be aware that his survival depends on this
belief.

However, he has no evidence to support this belief.

In fact,

he has evidence to the contrary:

a

He was branded

Trotskyite; he was sentenced "without right of correspon-

dence"

(a

common and widely known device used when the

Soviets wanted to shoot the prisoner eventually)
a

.

Only by

curious but not uncommon practice of self-deception can

Comrade Ivanov stay alive.

In short,

ho may have an un-
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system of belief that is necessary
for the purposes of
living IS justified.
Nonetheless, it would bo easy to
defeat this proposal by reconstruing
Comrade Kirov's system
of belief in such a way that causal
inference is restricted
to apply to just those areas that do
not impinge
on the

economic dogma.
(e.g.

Attempts to further amend the criterion

by requiring that the system of beliefs
be the simplest

among competing systems) are problematic
because the rationale
for such conditions will either beg the
question (by assuming
that systems that meet these conditions are the
m.ost reasonable)

or be as difficult to produce as an independent

argument for the conclusion that causal inference alone

merits epistemic approval.
What of the other part of Baylie's criterion?
view,

On this

the epistemic legitimacy of causal inference is

guaranteed by its necessity for doing science.
justify causal inference?

Does that

Part of the difficulty involved

in evaluating this criterion is that it is not at all clear

what it means.

If it just means that were one not to hold

the belief or kind of belief in question one would not be

able to engage in the practice of doing science, it would
be easy to find counterexamples.

In a given Marxist-

Leninist society, one might have to believe some absurd

:

.
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political or even scientific
doctrine^ in order to practice
science.
Such counterexamples,
however,

seem like -cheap

shots".

Besides, they require that the
relevant sense of
necessity is causal necessity. Any
contingent relation between causal inference and doing
science will be subject
to this kind of difficulty.
what if the relation between
causal beliefs and science was a
logical one? if the connection IS of this sort, however, it
is a little misleading
to speak of causal inference standing
in a means/end relation to science.
The argument then seems to be that, since
beliefs arrived at via causal inference are
"scientific"
(i.e.

since science consists of such beliefs), they
are

justified.

This argument can be expressed more formally

as follows

(1)

If causal beliefs are scientific (in the aforementioned
sense), then they are justified.

(2)

Causal beliefs are scientific.

.'.(3)

Causal beliefs are justified.

Problems with this argument arise when the defender
of this view is pressed to provide an argument for Premise

7

I

Something like this actually happened in the USSR in the
30 's.
For some time, Trofim Lysenko's absurd theory of
genetics was de ri geur for Soviet scientists.

(1)

.

I

.
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The question rnised by
Promise
trant)

(1,

is on old

(and recalci-

one.

Why is science cpistoniically
preferable to any
competing system?’' The obvious
answer-that scientific
beliefs are roasonable-begs
the question at issue.
it
seems that a non-question
bogging argument for Premise
(1)
(or even, for that matter.
Premise (2)) would be at least
as difficult as an independent
argument for (3). Anyway,
it is reasonably clear that
there is no suggestion of any
independent argument for Premise
(1) in Hume; Baylie certainly offers none, and I am aware
of no other commentator
who has tried this tacit. However,
the principal problem
with this argument is that it does not
offer any insight
into the reason why causal inference
is worthy of epistemic
approval

This also indicates the futility of
construing Baylie
entire proposal as a pair of singly necessary
but jointly

sufficient conditions for the justification of
empirical
beliefs.

Since the epistemological significance of the

scientific method is as unclear as the epistemological

significance of causal inference,

a

proposal such as this

does not really advance our understanding of the relevant
issues

An Ep istem ic Justification of Induction:
LegTFimating Con si dor atio n I

Another proposal

tliat

has obvious roots in Hume is

's

224

considered by John Lenz (on. c^.

)

.

Lenz

'

interpretive

argument is that Hume discovered that
causal inference
springs from universal and irresistible
principles of
huirtan

nature.

Originally,

ikime

believed that this justified

causal inference, but he later realized
that beliefs
arrived at via causal inference conflict
with the belief in
the continued and distinct existence
of bodies.
This
leads him to give up this criterion as a
justification of
causal inference; according to Lenz, he does
hang on to it
as a sufficient condition for the vindication
of causal

beliefs.

Qua vindication, this condition has already

been discussed.

However, by putting aside the alleged

conflict of the Natural Beliefs and its epistemological

significance (if any)
terion as

a

,

it is possible to discuss this cri-

sufficient condition for the justification of

beliefs arrived at via causal inference.

Roughly, the argu-

ment states that, since this form of inference is so fun-

damental and basic to human nature, beliefs arrived at by
this means merit epistemic approval.

More formally, this

argument can be expressed as follows:
(1)

If causal inference springs from universal and irresistible principles of human nature, then causal beliefs
are justified.

(2)

Causal inference springs from universal and irresistible
principles of human nature.

.(3)

Causal beliefs are justified.

?

.

.

.

225

At first glance, this argument appears
to be open to
an objection that parallels objections
raised against the

first two Vindicationist arguments:

Premise

(2)

is a high-

level theoretical assertion of empirical
psychology.
such,

It needs an empirical argument,

As

the efficacy of which

presupposes the truth of (3); hence the argument is
quest ion- begging
A defender of this view, however, may want to argue

that

is not an empirical claim;

(2)

truth, knowable a priori

ment for Premise

(2)

rather, it is a necessary

Perhaps there is

.

From

a

a

Kantian argu-

Humean point of view, however,

the above argument clearly begs the question.

Hume's argu-

ment for

He appeals

(2)

is a complex empirical argument.

to the association of ideas,

the effects of repeated con-

comitant variation, and the effects of resemblance in constructing this argument.

Thus, to the extent that this

argument is "found in" or "inspired by" Hume, it begs the
question.
there is
Premi se

Nonetheless, for the moment, let us assume that

Kantian argument for Premise

a
(

1

What about

(2)

)

Premise

(1)

seems suspicious.

There is no obvious

relation between the epistemic warrant of causal inference
and the fact that it arises from universal and irresistible

principles of human nature.
that,

Following Lenz

,

one might argue

since the mind cannot refrain from making such in-

,
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forences, it is not the case that
it ought to so refrain.
Even if one interprets the 'ought'
and 'can' here as
epistemic terms (and the sanction for
that is by no means
clear)
one can only conclude that such
inferences are
,

epistemically permissible

,

what is needed, however, are

grounds to show that causal inference is
worthy of epistemic
ap_prov^.
Pushing the analogy a little
further, it seems

that a belief may be epistemically
permissible (not

unjustified) without being epistemically
praiseworthy
(justified)
On an intuitive, pre-analytic level, this
objection

makes a good deal of sense.

Someone such as Hume might

argue that belief in the existence of God is just this
kind
of belief--not justified but unavoidable.

Even if this

particular example is not correct, there is nothing selfcontradictory about the notion of

a

belief that is unavoid-

able but not justified.

None of the criteria discussed thusfar has been intended
to be a "legitimating consideration"

for deductive inference.

Perhaps a closer examination of the epistemic legitimacy
of deductive inference will shed some light on the problem
of the epistemic legitimacy of inductive inference.

The

last two proposals to be discussed take just this tack.

i
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Of Induction
Logl timatjji^^^onsiderat ion III
In Chapter

3

of

F^a.c t,

Fiction and Forecast Nelson

Goodman argues that the old Problem of
Induction can be
dissolved and that this problem was something
of a pseudoproblem all along. He credits Hume with the
basic insight
in this connection; Goodman's position
is an elaboration of
this basic insight that he claims is implicit
in Hume's

discussion of these issues.
Goodman points out that when Hume is faced with the

problem of the justification of inductive inference, the
latter proceeds to describe how the mind makes such inferences.

Others criticize this by pointing out that

a

psychological description of the process is irrelevant to
the justification of that process.

Goodman believes that

this is seriously mistaken; the description of the process
is relevant to the question of the justification of that

process.

To illustrate this, Goodman asks us to consider

how deductive inferences are (to be) justified.
How do we justify a deduction?
Plainly, by showing that it
conforms to the general rules
of deductive inference ....
Moreover, when a deductive
argument has been shown to
conform to the rules of
logical inference, we usually
consider it justified without

.

^

.
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going on to ask what
justifies the rules.
As a description of actual practice,
this is basically
correct.
Obviously, however, this only postpones
the
important question of the justification
of the rules themselves

Yet, of course, the rules themselves
must eventually be justified.
The
validity of a deduction depends
not upon conformity to any purely
arbitrary rules we may contrive,
but upon conformity to valid rules.
But how is the validity of the
rules to be determined?
Principles of deductive inferences are
justified by their conformity with
accepted deductive practice.
If a rule yields inacceptable inferences, we drop it as invalid.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Now, obviously,

this procedure appears to be circular,

but Goodman claims that this circle is virtuous and not

vicious.

He says.

The point is that rules and
particular inferences alike are
justified by being brought into
agreement with each other. A rule
i s amended if it yie^s an inference
we are unwill ing to accept an inference
is r e j ected ^f it violates a rule we
are unwi 1 1 ing to amend.
The process
;

p

^Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast,
N.Y.,
9

Ibid

.

,

pps

.

1965y7'~pr~63'^

63-64

(2nd

edition;
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of Dustification is the
delicate
one of making mutual adjustments
between rules and accepted
inferences.
(emphases are
Goodman s)
'

Goodman says that the same kind of
process applies
to inductive inference.
Of course, the process of the
justification of inductive inference
is much more complex
and formidable because the
principles of inductive inference
are in a much sorrier state than
their deductive counterparts.
However, for the purposes of this discussion,
we

can assume that these principles will
have been worked out
in the Carnapian millenium.

This approach is interestingly different from
all

those previously discussed in this chapter in
at least one

important respect:

The justification of inductive inference

is in principle no different from the
justification of de-

ductive inference.
induction per se

.

In this sense there is no "problem" of

Put another way, there is a Problem of

Deduction in the same sense that there is
Induction.

In principle,

between the two.

Problem of

a

there is no significant difference

The systematic unity that this approach

would bestow on epistemological tlieory is significant and
impressive.

10 Ibid.,

p

.

Before accepting it, however,

64

a

closer scrutiny

A

:
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of it seems called for.
In particular,

there

seeni to be

two relevant questions

that can be asked of Goodman
a)

Is the above a correct
description of the justification
of deductive inference?

b)

If so, does
inference?

a

parallel account hold

t rue of

inductive

The motivation for Goodman's way of
proceeding is clear and
reasonable enough— the logical and
epistemological issues

surrounding deductive inference are much
better understood
and less in dispute than correlative
issues surrounding in-

ductive inference.

If the two problems are essentially

the same, a close examination of the relevant
aspects of

deductive inference will suggest an answer to our
queries
about inductive inference.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Goodman
has accurately characterized the process involved in the

justification of deductive inference.

It is reasonably

clear that the process being described here is what Carnap
has called expl ication

brief review of the nature of

.

Explication has been and is widely employed by philosophers.
I have chosen to state and evaluate Goodman's argument in
terms of this concept as specified by Carnap (see Logical
Fo undations of P ro bability Chapter 1) because he has
developed the notion in greater detail and with more precision than other theorists. Goodman's esoteric and technical
variant--constructional def inition--i s apparently not
applicable here, since he luis made no attempt to apply it to
,

.

231

that process would

1

)g

in order here.

An explication involves the
replacement of a commonly
employed, but vague or obscure
concept (the explicandum) by
a clear and precise one
(the explicatum)
The two concepts
are distinct because they are
not co-extensional
Preliminary to the actual explication,
one must provide an informal
clarification and explanation of the
nature and functions
of the explicandum.
This includes a specification of
certain
.

.

contexts in which the use of the
explicandum is clear and
unproblematic; it also includes a description
of the purposes
for which the concept is used.
Finally, in this preliminary
stage, one gives rough synonyms for the
term that customarily
expresses the explicandum (or perhaps rough
characterizations
of meaning)
which while often as vague as the explicandum,
,

serve to indicate what concept is under discussion.
If the explicandum cannot be clarified in
this pre-

liminary way, then it is not really

a

candidate for

explication after all because it is too obscure to be of
any value (for Carnap's Scientific Philosophy, anyway.').

Assuming that this task is successfully completed, the next
step is the actual explication wherein the explicatum is

proposed

the issue at hand.
As will become apparent, the features
of explication upon which my objections depend are common
to the less precise and exacting concepts of explication
that others, including Goodman, employ.

.
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The justification of an explication
is a complex affair;
we need not consider all the details
of this task here.
The

important thing for present purposes is
that there must be
a considerable overlap in the
explicandum and the explicatum.
A systematic deviation of the extensions
of the concepts is
permissible only if it is theoretically fruitful.
In

particular, the explicatum must apply to all,
or nearly all,
of the things to which the explicandum clearly
and unam-

biguously applies; that is, one must be able to
substitute,

verita^, the explicatum for the explicandum
favored (extensional) contexts.

in certain

These will include, but may

not be limited to, the contexts specified in the
preliminary

clarification
How does all of this relate to inductive inference?
Presumably, the explicandum is the concept of

ductive inference or argument.

a

strong in-

Since the rules for the appli-

cation of the explicandum are not clear and well-specified,
an explication seems appropriate.

One of the interesting

features of Goodman's proposal is that it tells us, in
general way, how to arrive at the explicatum, viz

.

a

by a

mutual adjustment between the rules (such as they are) and
the favored contexts of the explicandum.

There are rules

for the correct use of explicandum though they may be few and

ill-specified.

They can be discovered by tentative abstrac-

tion from a number of clear and obviously related cases.
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These instructions for producing
the explicutum should not
be confused with its
justification.
Goodman has not justified a yet-to-be-produced
explicatum; he has, however, told
us something about how to
construct one.
If the explicatum
IS justified, then it will
preserve truth value in favored
contexts (with perhaps some systematic
deviation)
Though
this is a necessary condition for
a successful explication,
it is not a sufficiont ono.
.

Aside from preserving truth value in
favored contexts,
a

(justified)

explicatum can serve most of the important

purposes for which the explicandum was used;
it is also
theoretically fruitful in that it makes possible

the con-

struction of

a

simple yet systematic theory (in this case an

epistemological theory) that can account for
of phenomena.

wide range

a

Admittedly, this description of what consti-

tutes a successful explication is somewhat vague, but it is

serviceable enough for present purposes.

The important point

IS that Goodman's description of the v;ay the explicatum
is

to be produced is

not open to a charge of circularity.

The

actual justification of the explicatum can only be completed

when the explicatum is produced
yet to be found

I)

(Embarrassingly, it has

.

Unfortunately, this procedure is open to

a

more fundamental charge of begging the question.
the position of our l^enighted sceptic.

Ilis

deeper and

Consider

question, which
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will arise at the preliminary
clarification stage, is, 'Are
there any strong inductive argument s? ^2
He wants to know
If the explicandum has a non-empty
extension.
it is not
'

helpful or reassuring

to answer this by merely assert-

ing that there are such arguments

contexts)

.

(i.e. by reciting favored

He will need an argument^^ to show that
there

are some strong inductive arguments.

By the very nature of

his task, one who is in the process of
constructing an

explication (which, after all, is what Goodman is up
not meeting this demand.

to)

is

Explications are of value only to

those duplicitous souls who believe that the explicandum
has a non-empty extension.

Put another way, explications

are useful and indeed necessary, but

(in the face of sceptical

doubts) only when it has been established that the explican-

dum has

a

non-empty extension.

What might Goodman say about this objection?

Goodman

suggests!'^ that a quick appeal to the usage of the explican-

dum would show that this objection is completely spurious.

12 The relation
of this form of inductive scepticism to the
inductive scepticism considered in Chapter III is by no

means obvious.
13

14

I

shall discuss this relation below.

I use 'argument' here in a somewhat loose sense to mean
roughly 'some (rational) considerations'.
Indeed, I shall
later argue that one must just "see" that there are some
strong inductive arguments.
However, that this is true
needs some discussion and argument.

Nelson Goodman, op.

c^.

,

p.

66.
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Let us consider a parallel case
to see how this would work.
Suppose someone proposes to explicate
the concept Tree.
it
has many clear and uncontroversial
applications and yet is
fuzzy enough so that an explication
could be carried out.
Suppose an explicator is confronted by
an "arboreal sceptic"

who IS in doubt about whether or not
the concept has a nonempty extension.
I suppose the former would
suspect that
this alleged sceptic does not really
understand the meaning
of the word 'tree'.

Perhaps he believes that the term 'tree'

means the same thing as 'tree within which
elves live'.
This is where the preliminary clarification
becomes very
important.

The explicator gives a rough and perhaps impre-

cise characterization of the mean ing of the term 'tree';

suppose the aboreal sceptic clearly indicates (perhaps by

giving rough synonyms himself) that he is "onto the concept".
Is it still meaningful for him to guestion the non— nullity

of the extension of the concept?

This question is of considerable importance, but

think there can be no doubt about the answer.

meaningful for him to ask the question.

I

It is

The reason for this

is that it is possible and indeed quite easy to give him a

satisfactory reply.

VJhat

as Goodman suggests,

be an appeal to the common usage of the

term.

T)ie

would this reply be?

It would not,

truth of the statements containing the favored

contexts is just what is at issue.

Ratlier,

the reply would

—
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be an empirical argument
to show that there are
trees.
One
would show him a tree and
demonstrate that what he sees
is
not artificial; that he is
not hallucinating, etc.
(we can
assume that he subscribes to
the canons of scientific inference, etc.; otherwise, he
would not be an arboreal sceptic.)
Why he would ask such a question
is somewhat

mysterious

perhaps he has lived all his life
on the moon, or he is
almost incredibly stupid or
suspicious.
However, that is of
no moment here.
The important point is that an
appeal to
common usage is not to the point
here (unless one loudly
proclaims and proceeds to demonstrate
that the favored
context statements are true
what is necessary is an appeal
to the (non-linguistic) facts.
)

;

With regard to the explication of the concept
of a
strong inductive argument, a similar situation
obtains.

It

IS of no value to tell the inductive
sceptic how people use

the term 'strong inductive argument'.

In addition, merely

producing for him (what one believes to be)
argument is, by itself, unhelpful.
manner)

a

strong inductive

One must show (in some

that there are such things.

Of course,

there are some disanalogies here, too.

No

straightforward empirical argument can establish that there
are strong inductive arguments.

Aside from the fact that

such arguments are "on the block" in this discussion, it is
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doubtful that this kind of argument
would be appropriate
here anyway.
The fatal flaw in Goodman's argument
is that ho pays
too much attention to how people
in fact behave.
Since the
class of accepted inferences and the
class of accepted rules
are fixed by a mutual adjustment
process fueled by our preanalytic belief, it is ruled out from
the start that we could
be seriously mistaken about both.
Since the concept of
jus-

tification is an objective one, it seems to be
an open
question as to whether or not we are seriously
mistaken
about what (if any) arguments are inductively
strong.

is where the sceptic offers his challenge;
if there are any such arguments.

This

he wants to know

Goodman's failure to answer

this challenge can be correctly characterized as begging

the question against the sceptic.

Even if this objection could be avoided, there is

another problem with this approach.

Over

a

period of time,

the actual criteria for what constitutes a strong inductive

argument could drasticall.y change.
inductive argument may later be

a

What was once

a

strong

weak one (Note that this

is not merely a claim about what people believe to be a strong

or weak inductive argument.)
a

All that would be required is

change in word usage and perhaps certain beliefs.

Now

suspect that Goodman would not be too troubled by this.
he oug)it to bo.

I

But

"
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Pragmatists such as Goodman, Quine
and White have argued
against the distinction between contingent
and necessary
truths.
The concepts of necessary truth and
contingent
truths presuppose a clear and sharp
distinction which does
not in fact obtain.
However, matters are not
this simple,

say the Pragmatists.

The relevant concept is "give-upability

Some beliefs are (and ought to be) more
easily given up
than others, though any belief can, in principle,
be abandoned
The rules of evidence are not inalterable fixtures
of the

world that cannot be revised.

The course of nature might

change dramatically; not only would we have to give ud

previously well-founded empirical beliefs, but we may have
up some previously useful

(but no longer so)

rules

of evidence as well.

While it may be that

a

dramatic change in the course of

nature would lead to a change in the rules of evidence (this
is not at all obvious)

,

one could imagine the relinquishment

of these rules for other than the kind of epistemological

reasons envisioned by Goodman and his colleagues.

Consider

the case of the People's Revolutionary Epistemology Brigade.

This is a very powerful group who wants to change the way

that science is done to conform to the goals of the Gang
of Four.

By making certain key changes in textbooks and by

encouraging scientists to undergo appropriate "selfcriticism", they are able to alter perceptibly word usage

and scientists' beliefs so
that what counts as a strong
inductive argument includes some
obviously weak arguments.
The change need not be so fundamental
that the fact of
scientific thought is unrecognizably
altered; nonetheless,
when senior members of the P.R.E.B.
explicate the concept
of a strong inductive argument, many
obviously worthless

arguments become sanctioned.

Any reason for not adopting

this course (e.g. the subsequent lack of
theoretical
simplicity) can be seen as just another
belief that ought
to be given, up.

These considerations show that any attempt to
explicate
the concept of a strong inductive argument requires,
at the

earliest stage, an argument that shows that there are
some
strong inductive arguments.

This argument will require

something more than or different from mere appeals to people'

beliefs and their usage of the appropriate words.
These objections suggest that perhaps Goodman's

characterization of the justification of deductive inference
is also incorrect.

made.

Indeed,

I

think

a

case for that can be

Goodman says that an argument is judged to be de-

ductively valid if it conforms to

a

rule that more or less

accurately codifies accepted deductive practice.

Again, the

process involved here is clearly one of explication. Indeed,
it could be plausibly argued that Aristotle made the first

attempt to carry out this explication and that Frege (in the
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M£2£iff^c2-ir^) brought it to final
fruition.

Now it might be objected that
no sceptic can seriously
doubt that there are deductively
valid arguments.
Thus there
are no steps that need to be
taken for the sceptic's benefit
prior to the preliminary clarification
of the explicandum.
This in turn would cast doubt on
whether or not such doubts
can be seriously maintained about
the existence of strong
inductive arguments.
This appears to be a significant objection.

If this objection can be successfully
met,

however,

Goodman's characterization of the justification
of deductive
inference can be rejected, and the cloud of
suspicion hanging
over the foregoing objection to his account of the
justification of inductive inference can also be removed.

These

tasks are the burden of the fourth view on the epistemic

legitimacy of inductive inference that

I

shall discuss.

The primary task will be to show that there are independent

arguments that can establish the fact that there are deductively valid arguments and the fact that there are inductively
strong arguments.
A n Epistemic Just i ficati on of Induction;
Legitimating Consideration IV

I

!

i

I

I

have argued that, during the prelimiiiary clarification

j

i

of a given explicandum, one needs

(in the face of sceptical

I

doubts)
j

I

an independent argument to establisli the fact that

241

there are things to which the
oxplicandum applies. As a
matter of historical fact, fewer
sceptical doubts have been
entertained about deductive inference
than have been entertained about inductive inference.
It would be helpful,
however, to see just how such doubts
could be mot.
Let us employ a common tactic used
by Quine:

look at how deductive logic is
learned.

let us

What appears to go

on in this process can be seen as
a explication; one is con-

fronted with an adolescent or adult of
normal intelligence
and reasoning capabilities.
The goal is to teach him or her
a system of formal logic that is
roughly based on Frege's
Beg^riffschrift

.

One starts with an informal explanation

of the concept of a conclusion "following
from" some

premises.

In addition to giving some examples, one points

out that, when a conclusion follows from the premises,
the

truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.

That is, necessarily, if the premises are assumed to be true,
then the conclusion is also true.

Suppose that the student

accepts this informal clarification but demurs about the
examples.

This is not so far-fetched as it might seem; this

individual may have just completed many years of study in

progressive school of Education and as

a

a

result of some

study of cultural anthropology, he or she may be in some

doubt about whether there are any valid arguments.

However,

the student can understand the meaning of the term 'deductively

:
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valid argument

;

he or she is just in doubt
about whether

or not there is anything answering
to the concept.
(The
student need not maintain that there
are no such things.)
How does the teacher proceed? Obviously,
with great
patience and with every effort to
suppress contempt.
The
best strategy would seem to be this:
The teacher concentrates on one example of a valid argument
that is as trans-

parent as possible.
of

mo^ Pon^

Many instructors start with instances

or modus tollens

,

but with the deductively

dim-witted, an even simpler example would probably
be

better
A-

,

e g
.

.

(1)

This is

a ball.

(2)

That is

a

.*.(3)

hat.

This is a ball and that is a hat.

The instructor points to this example and asserts, in as

many ways as possible (using terms invoked in the preliminary
clarification)

that this is a valid argument.

The instructor

will ask the student the following kind of question:

"Do

you see that if the premises are true the conclusion must
be true?"

One might regard a negative answer here as a good

reason to believe (barring the intrusion of emotional factors
or evidence of drug intoxication,

etc.)

that the person did

not really understand the concept of validity after all.

Most likely, however, the answer will be 'Yes'.

happened here?

V7hat has

2A4

situation in doductivo logic is
exactly
(emphasis is Carnap's)

the same.

The fundamental insight here is
that our knowledge of
deductive and inductive relations is
on the same footing.
However, what Carnap means by the
word 'intuition' is sig-

nificantly different from the sense that

I

attach to it.

I

should now like to clarify these two
senses and show that,
on Carnap's construal, this appeal to
intuition does not
defeat the sceptic but that my construal shows
that scep-

ticism is untenable.
The term

intuition' as it is commonly employed in

contemporary philosophy, means roughly the same thing as
'firmly held pre-analytic belief or 'firmly held pre-

systematic belief '.15

on this construal, an important

philosophical task is to sharpen and systematize some

theoretically significant group of intuitions.

Explication

Rudolf Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition" in
The Problem of Induc ti ve Logic
Proceedings of the International Colloquim In the Philosophy of Science,
ed. by I. Lakatos (North Holland Publishing Co.,
Amsterdam, Holland), p. 265.
:

^^It may be thought that these synonyms are too weak in that
intuitions are k nown and not merely believed.
However,
while many intuitions may be known, not all of them are.
The reason for this is that the development of a powerful
and systematic philosophical theory, either by means of
analysis or explication, may show us that some intuitions
are just mistaken.
We are (and ought to be) willing to
relinquish these intuitions for tlie same reasons that
established scientific theories are given up, viz., a
better theory can take its place.
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and perhaps analysis are
the most important tools
for accomplishing this task. Now, an
important feature of explication is that it allows us
to deviate from at least
some of
our intuitions in the following
sense:
An explicatum may
not be (truly) attributable
to a thing which, intuitively
(and clearly) the explicandura
is (and vice-versa)
Thus the
.

explicandum designated by the term
'Pish' is intuitively attributable to whales and dolphins,
but the explicatum designated by the term 'Pish' (member
of the class Pisces)
is not so attributable.
Systematic deviations of this sort
are justified on grounds of theoretical
fruitfulness and
simplicitly that the explicatum (and the
conceptual network
into which it fits) provides.
The point is that the theory
can force us to give up some of our
intuitive beliefs as
mistaken.
It is for this reason that one can correctly
say
that whales really are not fish.

If it is objected that

questions of truth and falsehood are not really at
stake
here,

it is easy to point to other kinds of situations
v/hich

we are willing to maintain that some intuitive beliefs
are

false (e.g. the Axiom of Specification in Set Theory).
It may happeii that we have intuitive beliefs that lead to

contradiction or imply the denial of beliefs that we are
unwilling to reject (the latter may not be intuitive)

.

The

pojnt is that, on the basis of custom^u^y ph.ilosophical usage,
an intuitive belief can be mistaken or false.

I;
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On the other eonetrual

,

this is logically impossible.

If a given individual intuits
a proposition at a given
time,

then that proposition is

a

necessary truth; intuitions are,

in this sense,

something akin to Cartesian clear
and distinct
Ideas.
Such beliefs are the result of
an immediate intellectual apprehension of their objects.
This appears to be
and IS in fact flaming rationalism.'
And, as Carnap might
say, my empiricist friends might
here demur.
This view does
not require that there is a "faculty"
of intuition, any more
than the existence of memories requires
a "faculty"
of

memory.

in fact,

as

I

shall later argue, it is only a

contingent fact that the mind intuits certain
truths.

The

main arguments against- the existence of intuitions
concern
their alleged variability and their irreducibly
subjective
character.
First,

I

I

shall consider some of these arguments shortly.

should like to show that, on Carnap's construal of

the sense of

'intuition', the sceptic's challenge cannot be

successfully met;

I

shall later argue that on my construal,

this challenge can be met.
lo avoid confusion,

hereafter

I

shall use the term 'pre-

systematic belief to designate Carnap's construal of the

meaning of the term 'intuition'; the term 'intuition' will
be retained for my sense of the term.

Carnap is really in exactly the same position as Goodman.
The sceptic can claim that he is uncertain and has suspended

8
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belief about the propositions that
the cxplicatior has claimed
are obviously true from a pro-systematic
point of view.
Carnap's response to this kind of
challenge goes one step
further than Goodman’s: Carnap asserts
that he must conclude
that the sceptic is inductively blind. 17
(who is supposing
the existence of faculties here?)

The sceptic is excused

from the room, and Carnap continues his lecture
for the

benefit of his sighted colleagues.

The problem is that

Carnap has not really met the sceptic's challenge.
Actually, there are two forms of scepticism about induction:
The "substantive sceptic" says that there are no strong

inductive arguments.

The other kind of sceptic suspends belief

about both this proposition and its denial.

The problem with

Carnap's position is that nowhere has he asserted that substantive scepticism is fals e

1

7

Rudolf Carnap, "Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition",
op. cit
p. 265.
.

1

A simple appeal to pre-

.

,

Professor Heidelberger has suggested to me that Carnap's
appeal to intuition may not be designed to justify inductive beliefs but, rather, to explain how we know. This,
of course, assumes that we
know.
By reading Carnap in
this manne.r, it is possible to absolve him of the charge of
f ailing to meet the sceptic's challenge but only because, in
the present article, he was not trying to meet that
challenge.
Whether or not he should be read that way here
is not too important.
A check of his relevant writings
reveals no other place where he comes as close to addressing
the question of justification as he does here.

^

9

.
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systematic beliefs and word usage
fails to show that th i s
is the case because our
pre-systema tic beliefs could bo
false, and the sceptic wants
to know whether or not they
are, or he believes that they
are in fact false.
If it

could be shown that substantive
scepticism is false, then not
only would that position be untenable,
but the sceptic who
suspends belief would have to retract
his sceptical challenge.
As a guiding thread, let us return
to the case of the
deductive sceptic.
He has a fairly clear idea of what
a
deductively valid argument is but is unsure
whether or not
there are any valid arguments. After
much patient explanation, however,
is valid.

(e.g.)

Argument A

(p.

242)

That is, he intuits the proposition that argument

A is valid.
a

he comes to see that

By this act of intuition, then, he comes
to know

certain proposition.

Since he knov;s that a certain argu-

ment is deductively valid, he can no longer suspend
belief
about the proposition that there are some deductively valid

arguments

1

There are five objections to this refutation of this
form of deductive scepticism.

One objection is that it has

not been shown that wliat is here called an

19

.intuit.i.on

is a

In general, if S knows p and p entails q, one cannot conclude that S knows q.
However, in this case p= Argument A
is valid and q= There are some deductively valid arguments.
The entailment is so obvious and transparent (an instance of
Existential Generalization) that it seems acceptable to say
that S knov;s q hero.

.

2A9

form of knowledge. 20

Another objection is that it
begs the

very question at issue.

A related objection is tliis:

That
the sceptic goes along here
seems to be an empirical claim.
How can one be certain that he
will assent to this? The
fourth objection is that it has
not been shown that the
sceptic, upon "conversion", has
had a genuine intuition and
not merely a psychologically
necessitated belief. Finally,
the irreducibly subjective and
private nature of what one
claims to be an intuition seems to be a
suspicious foundation
for the systematic construction of an
objective system of

deductive logic.

More specifically, how can one be certain

that what one claims to be an intuition is
in fact intuition?
I

shall consid.Gir ©ach of thos© in turn.
It has b©©n point©d out to m© that, ©v©n if
th© sc©ptic

go©s along her©, it has not been shown that he has come
to

kr^

that Argument A is valid.

shown that what

knowledge.

I

That is, it has not been

have called 'intuition' is

a

form of

A satisfactory response to this objection would

require an elaboration and defense of

a

theory of (logical)

intuition as an adequate account of our knowledge of logical
truths.

Even though the solution to the Problem of Induction

proposed herein requires it, it would go far beyond the scope
of what can be accomplished in this dissertation to give an

2 0 ,,

This objection was pointed out to me by Professors Feldman
and lleidelberger

;
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adequate account of this theory and
its defence.
it is
important to note, however, that
this objection does not
d^^t this proposal; it only shows that more is
needed to
establish it than is provided here.
Indeed, there is another
such "gap" in my proposal (see pps.
251 ff)
at
the end of

this chapter

I

shall offer some considerations to
show that

these "gaps" are actually healthy signs.
Let us return to the other objections
outlined above.
Suppose a sceptic fails to go along here
and claims that we
are asking him to assume what is to be proved,
viz. that

there are deductively valid arguments.

I

do not think that

this objection can be sustained for the following
reason:

That some argument or other is deductively valid is
not open
to proof in one important sense:
say,

A proof of the validity of,

argument A would be a demonstration that the conditional

whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose

consequent is the conclusion is

a

theorem of some axiomatic

system which includes axioms and rules of transformation,
however, an axiomatic system of this sort that comprises the

propositional calculus is really the support machinery that
is offered in the course of giving an explication of the con-

cept of validity.

At this stage, the explicatum is not yet

available because we are only at the preliminary clarification
(which,

in this case,

includes the assuaging of sceptical

doubts) of the explicandum.

The sceptic who argues that we
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are begging the question is
asking for proof where proof is,
at this stage, in principle
unattainable.

With regard to the third objection,
if the sceptic under
stands the pre-systematic (i.e.
unexplicated) sense of the
term 'deductively valid argument'
and understands, with
respect to one or another of a small
group of obviously valid
arguments
the proposition that such an argument
is valid,
then it is impossible for him not to
be di sposed to believers

(occurrently)

that proposition.

This is not an empirical

claim.

Obviously, however, this presupposes a certain
theory
about the nature of belief.
A full elaboration and defense
of that theory would clinch this argument.

21

Unfortunately,

i

Argumen'Ls that have the following logical form would
be
included in this list:
(1)
(2)
•

*

(

.

(1)
(2)
(3)

D.
.

3

.

•

)

A

B.

B

.

•
.

(1)
(2)

A
A

&

B

C.
.

(1)
•
.

(

2

A and B
A or B

E.

Not-A
B

.

•

.

(1)
(2)
(3)

If A then B

A
B

F.

)

A
A or B

(1)
(2)
(3)

If A then B

Not-B
Not-A

This list may not be exhaustive.
Also, my claim is not that
any argument of one of these forms would be recognized as
valid; rather, it is that some instance of one of these
argument-forms would be recognized as valid. The reason for
this is the fact that validity is a matter of logical form
is not immediately obvious.
It seems that someone could
"grasp" the concept of validity without being explicitly
and clearly aware of this fact.

Hereafter, I shall, following Hume, use the term 'believe'
in its occurrent rather than its dis[)ositi oncal sense.
When
it is necessary to speak of belief dispos it ional ].y
I shall
use expressions such as 'disposition to believe'.
,

r
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do not have such a theory.

Nonetheless, this assertion need

not stand completely naked and
undefended

(or at least it

need not stand naked and undefended
alone !) because there
are some analogous cases that seem
a little clearer.
Now
it seems clear that the relation
between two dispositions
to believe need not always be
contingent.
That Jones is
disposed to believe that Smith is a
brother entails that he
IS disposed to believe that Smith
is male.
That this is
true does not follow from the mere fact
that one proposition
entails the other; it is something about the
obviousness of
the entailment that makes it true.

At this time,

I

do not

know how to make this relation clearer and more
precise.
However, the relation under discussion is not between
two dispositions to believe

understanding

a

;

rather what is related is

proposition (the proposition that

a

certain

argument is valid) and being disposed to believe somethina
(the same proposition)

.

Are there any cases of this that

are clearer than the one under discussion?

Suppose that

Jones understands the proposition that Smith is

a

brother.

It seems clear that Smith is disposed to believe that,

Jones is
a

a

brother, then he is male.

if

Thus, his understanding

proposition entails his being disposed to believe

a

propo-

sition.

However, they are not the same proposition.
any clear cases of this?

Well,

T

Are there

suppose some obvious
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Identities or tautologies would
qualify here.
if jonos
understands the proposition that
this table is identical to
this table, then ho is disposed
to believe it.
Perhaps
instances of the Law of Non-Contradiction
or the Law of
Excluded Middle would also be of this
sort.
Obviously, these examples don't
constitute much of an
argument for the assertion made on
page 251.
However, the
last of these examples does suggest
the outlines of an

appropriate

argument.

Consider some simple and obviously

tautology such as 'The moon is identical
to the moon'.
if
I am correct, then it is
impossible that someone understands
tills

proposition and yet is not disposed to assent to it.

Serious

scepticism about such propositions, then, is in

principle impossible.

But,

human beings dis believe

a

if it is not even possible that

proposition, it is not at all clear

how sense can be made out of saying that this statement

—

b^ false.

For there to

a

difference between what we

believe to be the case and what is true, it must somehow make
a

difference.

Although this line of defense is surely contentious, it
does, nonetheless, have a certain measure of "initial rational

credibility".

Of course, even if this is correct, it only

shows that such beliefs are true and not that they are known
to bo true.

That such intuitions constitute knowledge needs

further argument (see

p.

250).
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The fourth objection is that
it has not been shown that
the belief that the sceptic comes
to have is a genuine intuition and not merely a psychologically
necessitated belief.
A key logical feature of intuitions
(their phenomenological
features are unclear to me, anyway,
perhaps because they last
for such a brief period of time!) is
the immediacy with which
their objects are apprehended and believed.
Now, it may be
that there are a number of things that
humans as a matter of
fact are disposed to believe immediately
and without argument.

However,

it is at least logically possible that some-

one understand one of these propositions
tree)

(e.g.

This is

and yet is not d isposed to assent to it.

a

It may be,

as

Hume has argued, that humans cannot in fact fail to be
dis-

posed to believe certain empirical propositions.

But scepti-

cism about those propositions is "theoretically" if not in
fact

(natural law)

possible.

Scepticism about the validity

of certain simple arguments is not even

".in

theory" possible

for someone who understands the meaning of certain terms.
Yet,

this seems to render impossible

a

view (deductive

scepticism)

that has just been given serious and careful

attention.'

How is this so?

This paradox is resolved by

distinguishing occurrent from dispositional belief.

It is

impossible for someone who understands the meaning of the

appropriate logical terms not to believe

tlie

proposition

that Argument A (or one of the other simple valid arguments)
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IS a valid argument,

in the dispositional s ense
of

'believe',
But the disposition, through
the "irruption of other causes"
(e.g. emotional factors, a
pig-headed penchant for scepticism,
etc.) may not be activated.
In this sense it can be said
that deductive scepticism can be
maintained (to paraphrase
Hume) in words only.
It might be objected that this
distinction is problema-

tical because there is no real difference
between the resolution of (specious) sceptical doubts
about deduction and
certain )cinds of empirical doubts (e.g.
arboreal scepticism).
In both cases the sceptic refuses to
assent to certain asser-

tions and in both oases his sceptical doubts
can be easily

overcome almost ostensively (This is an empirical
claim.).
Can the difference be specified in

a

non-question begging way?

Let us return to the case of the arboreal sceptic.
may, when shown a tree,

immediately and without argument

assent to the assertion that there are trees

particular thing is

He

a tree)

.

(or that that

However, if he does not go

along here, one need not conclude that he does not understand
the meaning of the term 'Tree'.

The reason for this is that

it is possible to produce an argument to show him that there

are trees.

(If it is

to assent then

,

impossible for him not to be disposed

this may show that inductive scepticism is

also untenable; but that is another story.)
The situation is quite different with respect to someone
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who claims to be in doubt about deductively
valid arguments.
After showing him certain simple examples,
if he does not go
along, there is no (rationally persuasive)
argument to

convince him.

One ought to conclude that one (or more) of

three things are true:

(a)

that he did not understand the

meaning of the terms after all;

(b)

not simple or obvious enough; or,

(c)

that the examples were

other factors (e.g.

emotional ones) have prevented the disposition from being
activated.

Therefore, it is possible to distinguish intui-

tion from psychologically necessitated belief.
It is also possible to distinguish intuitable proposi-

tions from necessary truths that are not intuitable.
sider Goldbach's Conjecture.

It is possible

it is as a m.atter of fact true that)

Con-

(and indeed

one can understand both

Goldbach's Conjecture and its denial without being disposed
to assent to either.

The fifth objection is that the irreducibly private and

subjective nature of what one claims to be an intuition
seems to make it publicly unavailable for the systematic
and objective construction of an explication of deductive

validity.

Furthermore, how can one be certain that what one

claims to be an intuition is in fact an intuition?

23

...

The

Unless, of course, one includes in the specification of
the "initial conditions" necessary for the activation of
the belief, a clear and detailed specification of the
proof of Goldbach's Conjecture or its denial.

I

2S7

theory espoused here provides answers
to both of these queries.
If this view IS correct, then each
and every person
(who

understands the language) is capable of "seeing"
the truth
of one or another intuitable propositions.
Let me extend
an invitation to the reader to see for himself
or herself

that Argument A on page 242 is valid.

The truth of such pro-

positions is open to immediate public inspection.
to the correct answer to the second question.

This points

It is impor-

tant to distinguish the following propositions:
(1)

Argument A is valid.

(2)

S

Statement

intuits that argument A is valid.

(1)

is a necessary truth that can be known immed-

iately and with certainty.

Statement (2), on the other hand,

is an empirical proposition and is conceivably false.

though

(1)

may be knowable intuitively,

have had an intuition.

systematic belief.

S

Even

may not actually

He may just have a firmly held pre-

Such beliefs are often insidiously im-

planted in the course of one's philosophical education.

I

suspect (but am not sure) that intuitions are phenomenologically
similar to pre-systematic beliefs.
the way,

This might explain, by

that the distinction between pre-systematic beliefs

and genuine intuitions is often blurred.
A proper argument for

would be an empirical argument

(2)

which cippeals to (among other things) certain phenomenological
features of S's experience at

a

given time.

Tlie

point is
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that, while one can be sure
of the truth of what is
in tact
intuited, one cannot be certain
that one is having or has
had an intuition.
It would be unreasonable
to demand that,
in order to know that
argument A is valid, one must know
that one is having an intuition
because it is unreasonable
to demand that one must know

that one knows.

The distinction between

(.1)

and

(2)

allows us to retain

valuable insight of the Quine-Goodman
approach to these
matters.
They maintain that any belief is
subject to revision
or retraction.
In one sense this is true and in
another
sense this is false.
No proposition that is actually intuited ought to be given up.
However, from our point of view,
a

we cannot be certain about what is actually
intuited and what
is not.

Thus,

from a practical point of view, any belief is

subject to v/ithdrawal or revision.
On what grounds should one be willing to give
ud a

proposition such as (2)?

Consider the original set theoretic

axiom of class abstraction.

One might think that it can be

intuited that, for any property
{x/x is P}.
^

this axiom.

P,

there exists

a

set

The Russell Paradox shows through a series of
t

steps that a contradiction can be derived from

The reason that one in fact gives up the axiom

and not one of the self-evident steps that leads to the con-

tradiction is that all of the latter are such that one is
more certain that they are intuited

tlian

one is about the
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original claim that the Axiom of
Specification is intuited.
The reason that one ought to
give up this axiom is that the
derivation of the contradiction is
valid.
And in fact the
Axiom of Specification is not intuited
becau.se it is possible
(and indeed it actually happens
after one sees the derivation of the contradiction) that one
understands the axiom
without being dispose)^ to assent to it.
These considerations render harmless

a

number of objections

raised against intuitions on grounds of
their alleged variability.
Where one man claims to have an intuition,
another
may demur.
There are two possible explanations
for this.

Either the first person did not really have an
intuition at
all

(it

may be merely a firmly-held presystematic belief)

or the one who demurs really is disposed to intuit
the propo-

sition, but the disposition has not been activated (perhaps

because of

a

general penchant for scepticism)

that, under the appropriate conditions
are, by the way,

.

The fact is

(what those conditions

is an empirical matter)

everyone who

understands the appropriate terms immediately and without
need of argument assents to an intuitable proposition.

What

people believ e be be an intuitable proposition varies, as

might be expected.

As noted previously, one explanation for

this might be that the phenomenological features of intuition

may be quite similar to those of

a

firmly held pre-systematic

belief.

This completes the refutation of this form of deductive

:
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scepticism.

.here may to other forms
of deductive scepticism,
but 1 hove argued that when
one claims to understand
what a
deductively valid argument is,
one cannot fail to be disposed
to believe occurrently that
there are such arguments.
Thus
It can be said that this
form of deductive scepticism
is

literally untenable.
Let us now turn to
cism.

of

a

a

consideration of inductive scepti-

Suppose that one is going to
explicate the concept
strong inductive argument. What
happens in the prelim-

inary clarification stage and how
can a sceptical challenge
be met here?
As a rough characterization of the
meaning of the term
'strong inductive argument', consider
the following (equivalent)
Statements

a)

An argument is inductively strong just in
case the
truth of the premises renders highly probable
or
likely the truth of conclusion.

b)

An argument is inductively strong just in case it
is highly improbable that the conclusion is
false,
given that the premises are true.

What is the sense of the term 'probable' here?

I

think that the most appropriate way to understand this relation is to view it as a degree of entailment.
It is a logical relation between the premises and

conclusion of certain arguments.
Carnap's view.

This is essentially

Just exactly what this means and why it is

2G1

true is unclear to mo at this
time.^^

difficulty

involved here is that, at this
stage of the exposition,
what is at stake is only a
preliminary clarification of the
explicandum.
How mud, clarification and argument
can be
required here is by no means obvious.
It
seems to me, any-

way,

that the basic concept is "there"
and is not so hopelessly obscure that it cannot be
explicated.
It is, of
course, another question whether or
not anything answers
to that concept.
There are, however, two features of
the

concept of inductive strength (as

I

understand the term)

that suggest that it is a logical relation
(like validity)
that actually does obtain between the
premises and conclusion
of some invali(3 arguments.
One thing that suggests that in(ductive strength,
like

deductive validity, is

a

logical relation is the fact that

inductive strength, like deductive validity is independent
of the actual truth value of the premises.

In both cases

one assum es that the premises are true and then asks whether
it is possible

(probable)

that the conclusion is false.

Another reason for this is that there is no way to
a rgue

for the claim that a given argument is inductively

The apparent obscurities involved in the exact nature of
the explicandum were pointed out to me by Professors
Aune and Feldman.

.
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strong without

well-dofinod conceptual network
that arises
with the completion of the
explicatum.
of course one ma_y be
able to argue on a pre-explicative
level that a given argument is inductively strong by
showing that it is analogous
in certain ways to some
other argument which is known
independently to be inductively strong.
This only postpones the
need for an intuitive judgment.
any event,
a

m

(just as in

the case of deductively valid
arguments) one must, at some
point, intuit that a given example
of an inductively strong

argument is in fact inductively strong.
demurs about

If an alleged sceptic

number of simple and obvious examples
but
claims to understand the concept, one
must conclude
a

that the

examples were not simple or obvious enough
or that the alleged
sceptic does not really understand the meaning
of the term

inductively strong argument', or he is very upset
and confused
Thus inductive scepticism is as untenable as
deductive

scepticism.

However,

it is not at all clear that this shows

that the form of inductive scepticism considered in
Chapter III
is false.

Recall that this form of scepticism involved a

statement about the rational credibility or conclusiveness
of arguments, viz.
(iii)

The degree of conclusiveness of all predictiveinductive inferences with the Scime conclusion
(caJ.l it'c') is the same as the degree of conclusivencss of that argument (whose conclusion
is c) which has only a tautoloqical premise.

1

2G3

In order for the foregoing
discussion to be of any
value here, there must be a
theoretically

fruitful relation

between the logical concept of inductive
strength and the
epistemic concept of degree of
conclusiveness.
It must be
shown that there is a comparative
inequality with respect
to the inductive strength of two
predictive-inductive
in-

ferences and that this comparative inequality
entails a
corresponding comparative inequality with respect
to the

respective degrees of conclusiveness of the
arguments.
Recall that the degree of conclusiveness of an
argument
IS a measure of the degree of belief that
a completely

rational inferrer would have in the conclusion of an
argu-

ment given that he has

a

full and entire belief in the premises

and that his belief in the conclusion is influenced only
by his belief in the premises.

Stove believes that the

degree of conclusiveness of an argument is identical to the
relation that

^^9 ^

I

have called inductive strength and

that Carnap has called logical probability.

I

have

pointed out that this identity is by no means obvious and
that Carnap has abandoned it.

I

now believe that there are

some good reasons to think that this identity does not obtain
but that there is an obvious and important relation between
the two.

One problem with identifying the logical relation of

inductive strength and rational credibility arises in connec-

.

.
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tion with the following two arguments.
I.

(1)

Many reputable textbooks in set theory
assert in
the pref^^ce that they contain a proof of
the
logical independence of the Axiom of Choice
of
the other axioms of set theory.

(2)

Prof. Michael Jubien, a respected and acute
logician, has told me that the Axiom of Choice
is
logically independent of the other axioms of set

theory

(3)

Prof. Terry Parsons, another respected and acute
logician, has told me that the Axiom of Choice
is logically independent of the other axioms
of
set theory.

(4)

Both Professors Jubien and Parsons have told me
that they have worked through the proof, and they
assure me that they are not joking or lying.

Therefore
The Axiom of Choice is logically independent of
the other axioms of set theory.

(5)

II.

(!':

)

Madame Blavatsky asserts that her crystal ball
tells her that the Axiom of Choice is logically
independent of the other axioms of set theory.

There fore
The Axiom of Choice is logically independent of
the other axioms of set theory.

(5)

To be perfectly frank, Argument

I

virtually exhausts my

relevant information about the independence of the Axiom of

Argument II might be offered by

Choice

gypsy logician.

a

One interesting feature of these arguments is that they
are both valid!

entails

a

Any proposition or set of propositions

necessary truth; since the conclusion of these

arguments is

a

necessary truth,

(1)

&

(2)

&

(3)

&

(4)

entail

.

;
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(5)

,

as does

(1

'

)

What of the completely rational
inferrer?

Since he

never makes any mistakes in reasoning,
he would never believe
that either of these arguments is
anything but valid.
However, this concept of an idealized
inferrer becomes
epistemologically unhelpful and perhaps useless
because one
cannot express what appears to be an
important epistemological
distinction in terms of it.
In fact, it seems that an

Idealized rational being would make

distinction here;

a

from an epistemic point of view. Argument

Argument II is weak.

It seems that,

I

is a strong one

for the completely

rational inferrer, his degree of belief in the conclusion

based on Argument

I

would be greater than his degree of belief

in the conclusion based on Argument II and that
in both cases

his degree of belief in the conclusion would be less than
his degree of belief in the premises.

The point of all this is that it does not appear that
the logical relation beyween the premises and the conclusion
is identical to the rational credibility of the conclusion,

based on the premises and that there is more to the measure
of epistemic warrant than strictly logical relations

(or

perhaps the logical relations with wliich we are familiar)
On the other hand,

it seems that,

.

if someone intuits

that a certain logical relation obtains between the premises
and conclusion of an argument, then his measure of epistemic

.
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warrant is measured by this
logical relation.
Under these
circumstances (assuming that his
belief in the conclusion
is influenced only by his
belief in the premises and this
intuition (or perhaps his disposition
to have this intui-

tion)

the person is being completely
rational and his
measure of epistemic warrant is i
dentical
the degree
of conclusiveness of the argument.
Though as the above
)

,

example about the Axiom of Choice
suggests, the degree of
conclusiveness of the argument is not always
measured by
the logical relation that obtains
between the premises and
the conclusion, it sometimes is— at
least in those cases

where it can be intuited that the relation
obtains.
My only argument for this involves an appeal
to the

reader's pre-systematic beliefs about the convergence
and

divergence of logical and epistemic relations.

Consider the

case of a number of simple and obviously valid
arguments which
are such that one can intuit that they are valid.

It does

not seem that the degree of conclusiveness of any of these

arguments can be anything but the higliest possible--unlike
the two arguments concerning the Axiom of Choice.

The com-

pletely rational in f errer--and the rest of us insofar as
we are rational and capable of having the intuitions
in each case,

be certain of the conclusion,

— can,

relative to the

premises
The relation of all of this to the version of scepticism

.
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considered in Chapter III is this:

If it can be shown that

one can intuit, with respect to
two predictive-inductive
inferences with the same conclusion,
that one is inductively
stronger than the other, than the
degree of conclusivenoss
of the two arguments will be unequal,
i.e. (iii) on page 138
will be false.
The obvious move to make here is to
give an example of

predictive-inductive inferences with the same
conclusion
which are such that one can intuit that one
is stronger
tV70

than the other.

Consider the followincr situation:

two giant urns, each containing 10,000

some of which are black.

There are

balls at least

Now consider the following two

arguments that might arise after 1000 drawings with
replacem.ent

from each urn^^:

Urn A

Urn B

Argument III:
(1)

Urn A is thoroughly shaken
after each of the 1000 drawings

Argument IV:
(1)

Urn B is thoroughly
shaken after each of
the 1000 drawings.

(2)

The drawings are carried
out by an independent
testing agency of known
integrity

.

(2)

The drawings are carried out
by an independent testing
agency of known integrity.

(3)

Ball^ is black

(3)

Ballj^

is white.

(4)

Ball2 is black

(4)

Ball

is white.

2

5.

2

It might be thought that j.t would be better to consider a
non-random situation (e.g. sunrises). However, since unspoken theoretical prosup[5ositions miglit here interfere,
the chiances (!) for a non-intuit.i ve judgment are increased.

,

,
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Ball^ is black.

(5)

(1002)

Ball

1000

(5)

is black.

is wliitc.

Ball^^^^ is white.

(1002)

Therefore

Therefore

Ball

(1003)

Bal.l^

1001

is black.

(1003)

^^li2.001

black

.

Now consider the following statement:
Argument III is inductively stronger than
Argument IV.
Statement (iv) is an assertion of a
comparative inequal

(iv)

with respect to the logical relation that
obtains between
the premises and conclusion of the two
arguments.
Since

Statement

(iv)

can be intuited (the reader is hereby in-

vited to have an intuition)

the following is true:

The degree of conclusiveness of Argument III is greater
than the degree of conclusiveness of Argument IV.

(v)

Statement
(p.

,

138)

If

.

(v)

(ii)

entails the denial of Statement
is false,

then

the reasons cited on page 138.

form of scepticism is false.

about

(

iv)

,

(iii)

Since

(ii)

is untenable for

(iii)

is false,

this

If a potential sceptic demurs

the example can be changed

— increase

the number

of premises of the relevant kind to 10,000.

Someone might object that this judgment of comparative
inequality presupposes that all of the balls in the first
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urn are black.

Now

have argued in Chapter III
(cf. pps.
97ff) that if that which
in presupposed is to be
of any
value, it must, together with
the other premises, render
the argument deductively
valid.
That, however, begs the
question because it assumes that
the only differential in
degrees of conclusiveness is that
which obtains between
valid and invalid arguments.
I

It IS important to note just
how little this example

assumes.

There are

in cases like this.

a

variety of judgments that one can
make
Carnap distinguishes three kinds of

concepts employed in logical and empirical
inquiry— qualitative, comparative, and quantitative.
There are three corresponding kinds of judgments that can be
made here.

Comparative judgments of inequality are very
cautions.

They

do not presuppose that judgments of inductive
strength can
be quantitized.

Thus it is not necessary that one be able

to intuit the exact inductive strength of
either argument.

All that must be intuited is that the inductive
strength of

the two arguments is different.

Such judgments do not even

tell us very much about the actual strength of each argument.

Nonetheless,

some comparative judgments of inequality

do entail that one form of scepticism is false.

What of

a

charge of begging the question?

Well, of

course one cannot prove that what has occurred is an intuition.

That claim is not open to proof.

Moreover, it is
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very hard to see how this charge
could be sustained.
The
(alleged) intuited statement is
not the denial of (iii);
are a number of clear and
self-evident steps from the
inductive intuition to the denial of
Scepticism.
One might feel a bit uneasy about
this refutation of
scepticism because the two most important
concepts--inductive strength and degree of
conclusiveness--are not very
clear or well-specified.
However, this is just what one
should expect because, at this stage, we
are only giving a

preliminary clarification of the explicandum
(and assuaaing
(specious)

sceptical doubts)

.

A more detailed and precise

refutation of scepticism that employs
concept of logical probability?)

the explicatum (the

is unavailable because,

prior to offering an explicatum, one must show (in the
fact
of the relevant challenge)

that there are things to which

the explicandum applies.
It should be noted that this refutation explains why

there have been few, if any, sceptics about both induction
and deduction in the sense specified.

It is hard to see

how anyone who thinks calmly and seriously about these

matters can maintain what really are specious sceptical
doubts about either deduction or induction.

Inductive and

deductive scepticism, even though they are specious, are

worthy of serious consideration because why they are specious
is by no moans obvious.

Something like arboreal scepticism

.

.
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is much more reasonable.

Empirical scopticism^^

is a hallmark

of scientific judiciousness.

There may be other forms of scepticism
about inductive
inference not refuted by this example.
As Prof. Aune has
pointed out (see p. 140), these differing
degrees of epistemic
warrant may be viewed as degrees of
worthlessness
On

.

such a view, no inductive inference has
a high enough degree
of conclusiveness to warrant rational
acceptance.

This

form of scepticism is not as important as the
form that has
just been considered because, if the latter is
false, it is

possible to show that beliefs arrived at by means of the
scientific method (in the form of inductive inference) have
an epistemic ground in past experience

(unlike, e.g.

super-

stition and enthusiasm)
It is tempting to think that a qualitative intuitive

judgment of inductive strength (e.g.

'This is a strong in-

ductive argument') would suffice to show that this other form
of scepticism about induction is false.
to devise,

This would allow us

via explication, a rule of (rational) acceptance.
or

Indeed, Carnap thinks^
of (rational)

that the issues surrounding a rule

acceptance are superseded by the substantive

26 Rudolf Carnap,
"Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition",
op cit
265
p
.

.

,

.
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problems ot quantitative
confirmation theory. „is reason
for holding this is that
he believes acceptance to
be a
qualitative concept, which, with
the development of the
science of confirmation theory
is superseded by a comparative
concept (greater or lesser degree
of conclusiveness)
;

this

concept is in turn superseded by
the quantitative concept
of degree of confirmation.
others have argued,

however, that

there is more at stake here than
Carnap thinks.

resolution of this debate is not

present context because, as

I

a

The correct

pressing concern in the

have argued previously, it

IS consistent with this form of
scepticism that science has

an epistemic ground in past experience.

Thusfar in this dissertation the main thrust
has been
towards predictive- inductive arguments and
scepticism concerning such inferences.

I

do not wish to suggest that all

inductive arguments are reducible to (in some sense)
such
arguments.

Predictive-inductive arguments have been con-

sidered largely because of their important historical position
in the philosophy of David Hume.
I

do not have an argument for it)

However,

I

suspect (though

that the important logical

relation of inductive strength is common to all invalid argu-

ments from experience.

If the sceptic maintains a broader

position by claiming that no inductive argument is any more
conclusive than any other (with the same conclusion)
is easier to produce a refutation.

,

it

Consider the following
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two arguments:
V.

(!')

(

2 ')

Lee Harvey Oswald was in the
Texas
Depository at the time that Kennedy School Book
was she??

Oswald had Communist sympathies.

(3*)

revealed that Kennedy was shot from
Iht
the direction of the Texas
School Book Depository.
Therefore

VI.

(4')

Lee Harvey Oswald shot Kennedy

(1)

Walter Cronkite testified under oath
that he saw
a man he ]^ew to be Lee Harvey
Oswald shoot in the
direction of the Kennedy motorcade at 12-32
P M
on November 23, 1963.
*

(

2

)

*

The Pope testified to the same thing.

(3)

Many reliable witnesses independently testified
that they saw a man who closely resembled
Oswald
shoot at the motorcade.

(4)

Oswald owned the murder weapon.

(5)

Oswald had recently received one million dollars.

(6)

Oswald confessed to shooting at Kennedy.
Lis confession was taken while he was on a Doly—
graph, and the polygraph indicated that he was not
lying.

Therefore

(8)

Oswald shot Kennedy.

Both arguments are invalid but that one of them is inductively

stronger than the other is intuitively obvious.

Argument VI

does not presuppose that there was no fantastic conspiracy

which included Walter Cronkitc
and the Pope.
if a premise
or premises were added to
that effect, it would either
render
the argument deductively valid
or inductively stronger.
A

requirement that the argument be
deductively valid begs the
question, that it be inductively
stronger is either unnecessary (Argument VI is already
stronger than Argument V)
or it establishes the falsity of
inductive scepticism. of
course not all of the premises are
true, much less known to
be true.

However, that is irrelevant.

Just as in the case

of deductively valid arguments, one
assumes that the premises
are true.
Then one asks the question, "Is it more likely

or probable that the conclusion of Argument
VI is true based
on premises (1) through (7) than that the
conclusion of

Argument V is true based on premises

(!')

through (3')?"

That the answer is 'Yes' is open to immediate inspection
(inThis in turn entails that the conclusiveness of
the arguments differs.
strued,

Thus,

scepticism, more broadly con-

is false.

What is the relevance of all of this to Hume?
not much.

Admittedly,

However, at one point (see quotation p. 177)

Hume assumes that the conclusiveness of proofs is greater
than that of probabilities.

Proofs are predictive-inductive

inferences from observed uniform concomitance; probabilities
are just like proofs except that one or more of the observa-

tional premises state that,

in a particular case,

the concomi-
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tanco did not obtain.

Now it is doubtful that Hume
thought

that any proof is more conclusive
than any probability.
But
If we consider two arguments
with a large number of premises
and the same conclusion, and
the promises of one state that
there has been an observed constant
conjunction but the
premises of the other state that there
has been a frequent
but not constant concomitance, it
that the conclusiveness of the one argument is greater
than that of the
other, I am not sure if this is intuitively
obvious.
The
point is that, at one point Hume assumed
that some invalid

^

arguments are epistemically better than others.

If the

argument of the past twenty-five pages is correct,
that might
not have been a bad assumption to make.
Once the nature and
function of logical intuition is understood, that
assumption
does not need much of an argument.

**********
Obviously the outline to the solution of the Problem of
Induction proposed herein presupposes
logical doctrines that
defend.
a

I

a

number of epistemo-

have made little or no effort to

Among other things,

I

have presupposed throughout

Platonistic theory of meaning and certain doctrines about

the nature of belief and of our knowledge of logical truths.
At tills time it is unclear to me whether or not my proposal

can be formulated in terms agreeable to those with leaner

.

ontologies.

Perhaps more importantly,

i

have adopted an

essentially Carnapian view of
the nature of probability.
Without much argument I have
claimed that the relation
of
inductive strength is a
loaiccU one.
A fuller defence of
this claim would involve,
among other things, a critical
evaluation of alternative
interpretations of probability.
Nonetheless, all of these
presuppositions can be seen
in one light as a strength
rather than a weakness. The
amazing recalcitrance of the Problem
of Induction would seem
to indicate that the problem
goes pretty deep.
it is prima
fa_cie implausible that an
undiscovered solution lies close
to the surface and is largely
independent of a wider and more
systematic epistemological theory. Thus
a final evaluation
of this proposal awaits the deployment
and defense of a more
elaborate theory of knowledge; but this is
as we should
expect
There are, however, some additional benefits
to be
derived from this proposal that I have not yet
brought to
the reader's attentions.

These can be best appreciated by

recalling the problem faced by those who adopt what

I

have

called the Carneadean standpoint (see Appendix, Chapter IV).
Recall that Carneades had successfully argued that there
IS no mark by which the mind can distinguish

of)

(at least some

those impressions wliich accurately represent their

o^i^cts.

That is, contrary to the Stoics' claim, there are

a

)
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no cataleptic impressions that
both compel and

(unconditional

authorize our assent; certainty is
unattainable. Nonetheless, Carneades did not conclude that
all impressions wore
equally dubious. Some are more worthy of
our assent than
others.
Now Carneades believed that the criterion
(or
ly)

criteria) of truth (i.e. rational acceptance)
us

;

his task

v/as

to make this more explicit.

one might well ask,

"lies within

However, some-

"is it not possible, Carneades,

that we

are radically mistaken about what impressions are
acceptable?
It is not at all clear if Carneades can,

on his principles,

answer this question.
Let us now consider how matters stand with regard to in-

ductive inference.

Hume has successfully argued that there

is no mark or not

in past experience that can guarantee our

claims about the future.

No such claim is certain relative

to our knowledge of the past.

However, Hume did not con-

clude that all beliefs about the future are equally dubious,

regardless of past experience.
of belief than others.

Some of them are more worthy

Just as Carneades believed that the

criteria for acceptable impressions "lie within us", so too
Hume thought

(at least until Part
.

ctcceptable beliefs

o7

(

iv)

that the criteria for

about the future lie within us.

27

'For the sake of simplicity and ease of exposition, I here
gloss over the problem of a rule of acceptance
It would
bo more cumbersome, but nonetheless feasible, to employ
here a comparative concept of epistemic worth.
.
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However,

it is at this point that
one can raise a

question that parallels that asked of
Carneades
"is it
not possible that we are radically
mistaken about what
arguments from experience are acceptable?"
:

Actually, this question that the challenger
asks is
ambiguous.
There really are two questions that he
might have
in mind:

a)

Is it possible for us to hold mistaken
beliefs
about what rules are correct?

b)

Is it possible that the beliefs that

v;e actually
hold (implicitly) about what rules are correct
or
mistaken?

It is difficult to see how someone could give a
negative

answer to the first question.

It would suppose an infalli--

appropriate only to the Author of our being.
a
b)

positive answer to
.

a)

does not entail a positive answer to

On my proposal the rules of evidence are intimately

connected with logical relations.
depends ultimately on (logical)
a bit

However,

Our knowledge of these

intuition.

Actually, it is

grandiose to speak of rules of evidence here.

have yet to be explicated.

However, if my argument is

correct, they are "there" to be explicated.
that the answer to question
my proposal.

They

(b)

The point is

above is a negative one on

This provides us with an answer to the scep-

tical challenge that is directed at the Carneadean standpoint.

.
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One might well wonder v^y it is
that we happen to
operate (implicitly) on the basis of
more or less correct
rules of inference.
It would be appropriate to
let Hume
have the last word liere
:

Here is a kind of pre-established Harmony
betwixt tiu' Course of Nature and the
Succession of our Ideas; and though the
Powers and I’orces, by which the former is
govern'd, bt' wholly unknown to us, yet
our Thoiuilits and Conceptions have still, we
find, goru' on in the same Train with the
other Works, of Nature.
Custom is that
admirable' Principle, by which this Correspondence has bi'on effected; so necessary to the
Subsistence' of our Species, and the ReguIstion of e)ur Conduct, in every Circumstance
and Occurrence of human Life.
.Those who
delight in the Discovery and Contemplation
of final Causes have here ample Subject to
employ tlu'ir VJonder and Admiration
.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
Though the focus of this dissertation is on
Hume's
Treatise, it would be appropriate to take

a

brief look at

the Enquiries with regard to a matter of such
signal impor-

tance as Hume's argument concerning inductive inference.
An examination of this argument as it appears in the
Enquiries

further strengthens the interpretive hypothesis advanced in
this chapter viz

.

that Hume only intended to establish that

inductive argum.ents have less than the highest possible
degree of conclusiveness and that such arguments are not, on
that account, epistemically worthless.

This argument takes up most of Essay IV "Sceptical Doubts

Concerning the Operation of the Understanding".

Though it

is stated in a more forceful and lively fashion here,

inferior,

in a number of respects,

it is

to the Treatise version.

The main problem is that the psychological theory has not

been fully' enough developed for Hume to establish the priority
of and thereby focus his attention on predictive-inductive

inferences.

He speaks more generally about arguments from

the observed to the unobserved.

Another problem is that his

argument concerning the A Priori inductive inference, which
is compactly expressed in one paragraph in the Treatise

here spread over several pages.
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It is more difficult to

is

.

.

28G

determine what his epistemic assessment
is of such inferences.
If we take Stove's Symmetry Thesis
seriously, this makes it
more difficult to determine what Hume's
epistemic assessment
of other inductive inferences is.
Nevertheless, there are some direct and indirect
clues
about the nature of Hume's final conclusion that
make it

fairly clear that he is concerned to show that the
mind cannot achieve (epistemic) certainty with respect to
arguments

from experience.

Of course,

then it becomes important to

show that Hume did not believe that a lack of certainty in

this connection is equivalent to epistemic worthlessness.

Fortunately, there is some direct and indirect evidence here
to suggest that Hume did not think that this

the case.

v/as

One of the features of Hume's argument of the Enquiries

that makes it appear to be much more strongly sceptical than
it in fact is,

is his use of the terms reason and

'reasoning'.

Consider the following two statements of this final conclusion

:

I say, then, that even after we
have Experience of the Operations of
Cause and Effect, our Conclusions from
tliat Experience are not founded on
Reasoning or any Process of the under-

staiiding

1

An Enquiry Co ncerning Human Understanding ed
42-43.
by Ernest C. Mossner (N.Y., 1963), pps

D£ivid Hume,

,

.
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It is not Reasoning, which engages us to
suppose the past resembles the future
and to expect similar Effects from
Causes, which are, to Appearance, similar.
This is the Proposition, which
I intended to enforce by the present
Essay
.

My purpose in the remainder of this Appendix is two- fold;

First

I

shall argue that what Hume means by 'reasoning' in

this Essay is what

v/e

mean by the expression 'deductively

valid reasoning from acceptable premises' and that the

epistemic content of Hume's conclusion is that the conclusion
of no instance of causal inference is or can be rendered

certain relative to its premises.
that Hume did not believe that

a

Secondly,

I

shall argue

lack of certainty in this

connection means that the argument is epistemically worthless.
Turning now to Hume's argument of Essay IV Part

2,

it

is easy to see that he offers essentially the same argument

The first version occupies roughly the first three

twice.

paragraphs of Part

2.

He concludes by saying that the in-

ference from the observed to the unobserved is not made by
any chain of reasoning, of which he is aware.

implicit challenge to anyone to produce such
reasoning.

He issues an
a

chain of

Such "negative tactics" are often employed by

However, he feels that he can carry the war into his

Hume.

opponents' camp.

He gives an exhaustive enumeration of the

kinds of arguments that there are and shows, with respect to

^

Ibid

.

,

p

.

49.

.
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each one, that it cannot be used to
bridge the logical gap
between statements about the observed and
statements made
about the unobserved. This constitutes his
second statement
of the argument.
After dealing with the likliest moves that
an opponent might make, he brings the essay
to a close.

Let us take a closer look at the first version
of the

argument.

Hume proceeds by way of an examp]. e
If a Body of like Colour and
Consistence with that Bread,
which we hav formerly eat, be
presented to us, we make no Scruple
of repeating the Experiment, and expect,
th Certainty
like Nourishment and
Support.
Now this is a Process of Mind
or Thought, of which I wou.ld willingly
know the Foundation (emphasis added)

;

j

I

!

^

,

j

I

j

He then points out that there is nothing in the sensible

I

qualities of the object that justifies that certainty.

This

I

.

point was argued more thoroughly in Part

1

of Essay IV,

j

which concerns the A Priori Inductive Inference.
I

j

other alternative is past experience.
i

i

"As to past Experience
it can be
allowed to give direct and certain
Information only of those precise
Objects, and that precise Period Of
Time, which fell under its Cognizance.
But why this Experience should
be extended to future Times and to
,

j

ii

^Ibid

i

.

,

p

.

43.

The only

4
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other Objects, which, for auqht
we know, may be only in Appearance similar;
The standpoint here is naturalistic in that Hume is

discussing inductive inferences as they occur in the mind
and how the premises are related to the conclusion.

Later,

he will examine in more detail just how such inferences

might be augmented.

Notice, however, the (logical)

limits

of the epistemic certainty that past experience can grant.
It is clear that he is not talking about psychological cer-

tainty here (contrast the above quotation with the preceding
quotation)

.

Shortly thereafter he restates this same point more

clearly and forcefully and draws his final conclusion
But does it follow, that other
Bread must also nourish me at
another time
?
The Consequence seems no way Necessary
There is a certain Step taken
Inference which wants to be
Explained ... if you insist, that
the Inference is made by a Chain of
Reasoning, I desire you may produce
that Reasoning.^
.

.

.

.

From this conclusion, offered as

a

.

.

.

.

.

,

challenge, much

confusion can arise; for what does Hume mean by
of reasoning"?

^Ibid

.

,

'^Ibid.,

pps.
p.

a

"chain

Heretofore he has spoken of causal reason -

43-44

44.

.

an

i_nq

and reaso ning from the ouserved to the
unobserved.

M'hc,’

implication that the inference is not an instance
of rear.oning is, on one construal,

self-contradictory.

Obviously

lie

has a very special sense of the term in mind.

To see just what he means here let us look at
the second

version of the argument.
kinds of

Here he enumerates the various

reasoning" and argues, with respect to each one,

that it cannot be used to generate the conclusion of an

inductive argument.
Here the argument parallels almost exactly the Treatise
version.

There are no demonstrative arguments here because

it is always logically possible that the course of nature

may change.

A demonstrative argument is

of whose premises are necessary truths.

a

valid argument all

He then says that

all arguments from experience proceed on the supposition that
the future resembles the past.

Thus any such argument for

this proposition must be circular.

However, as

I

have

pointed out, since the principle of the uniformity of nature
can be formulated in many non-equivalent ways, an argument

from experience for this proposition need not be circular
in that the conclusion appears as one of the premises.

theless,
is

for reasons cited previously

(see pps

.

None-

116-1.19),

fair to say that any such argument for this proposition

would be circular, question-begging or involve an infinite

it

.

.
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regress and hence is unacceptable.
Or would it?

The claim that any argument from experience

for the Resemblance Thesis has one of these defects
is true

only if we restrict ourselves to deductively valid arguments
from experience.

If we allow invalid arguments to be used

to substantiate the Resemblance Thesis,

it would be clearly

false to say that all arguments from experience for RT have

one of these defects.
a

This suggests that what Hume means by

'chain of reasoning" is an acceptable valid argument.

Only

on this construal is Hume correct in saying that there is
no chain of reasoning from experience for the Resemblance

Thesis

Now what is the epistemological significance of this?
Defenders of Stove's interpretation of this argument would

conclude that Hume believes that only valid arguments have

epistemic merit.
forced upon us.

However, this conclusion is in no way
The reason for this is that, in the context

of the present argument,

be pointless.

an appeal to invalid arguments would

Inductive inferences, as they occur in the

mind are invalid.

Any attempt to establish the premise that

turns them into valid arguments would have to arise from

another valid argument.

Otherwise, there is no point in

trying to see whether or not the Resemblance Thesis can be

established
Hume might have believed that only valid arguments have
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epistcmic merit.

However, the fact that he allows only valid

arguments from experience cannot be construed as
evidence for
this claim because,

in the context of this argument of

Hume's, only valid arguments can be of any help.
A defender of Stove's interpretation might well ask
at this point why Hume wants to see if the Resemblance Thesis

can be established.

If some invalid arguments are epistemically

acceptable, why even bother discussing the Resemblance Thesis?

There are two reasons for Hume's concern with the

Resemblance Thesis:
psychological.

one is epistemological and the other is

Let us consider the latter first.

Recall

that belief, for Hume, is occurrent and not dispositional.
In the course of making a particular transition from beliefs

about the observed to beliefs about the unobserved, the mind
may not actually have before it some version of the Resemblance Thesis.

Hume maintains, nonetheless, that as

a

matter

of fact the mind is always disposed to believe (some version
of)

the Resemblance Thesis.

This psychological hypothesis

is necessary to explain why the mind makes the transition

that it does.
If there be any Suspicion that
the Course of Nature may change
and that the past may be no Rule
for the future, all Experience
becomes useless and can give rise
to no Inferences or Conclusions.^

^Ibid., p.

47
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Thus all arguments from experience are "covertly valid"
in
that there is an unstated
to assent to.

premise which the mind is disposed

Having made this psychological discovery, Hume

is interested both in tracing its origin

be custom or habit)

(which turns out to

and determining its logical and epistemo-

logical significance.
As to the epistemological significance of the Resemblance

Thesis, one might speculate what would be the case if, per

impossible
argument.

,

RT could be established by an acceptable valid

The conclusion of (what was) an inductive inference

would be certain relative to its premises.

Whatever one

thinks of the epistemic efficacy of invalid arguments, it is
clear that valid arguments are, all else equal, epistemically

preferable to their invalid counterparts.

Thus,

from an

epistemological point of view, Hume's attempt to see whether
or not inductive arguments can be "improved upon" so as to

render their conclusions certain relative to their premises.
Is there,

however, any evidence to suggest that Hume's only

concern here is to see if

the conclusion of such inferences

can be rendered certain relative to their premises?

There are two passages that support this contention
directly.

One has been previously quoted (cf. p.

).

There

Hume says that the mind expects with certainty that bread will

nourish after it has experienced that fact in the past.

However,
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past exporicncG can only provide certainty with
respect to
what has been previously experienced. This suggests
that

arguments from past experience cannot render certain
conclusions about what is not observed.

From

psychological

a

point of view Hume can explain why the mind believes with

certainty that the future resembles the past.

The epis-

temological point is that there really cannot be any epistemic

certainty here because it is possible that the course of
nature may change.
The other piece of direct evidence occurs a few pages
later.

Hume says,

Their secret Nature, and consequently, all their Effects and
Influence may change, without
any Change in their sensible
Qualities.
This happens sometimes and with regard to some
Objects; Why may it not happen
always, and with Regard to all
Objects? What Logic, what Process
of Argument secures you against
this Supposition?”^
Again, the point here seems to be that since the course of

nature could change, one cannot be sure, in any given case,
that it will not change.

If,

per impossible

,

there was some

"logic or process of argument" here, then we could be guaranteed

!

^Ibd

d

.
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that the sensible qualities v;ould not change.

However much

we are naturally inclined to believe with certainty
that
the course of nature will remain the same, there
is always

room for some doubt.

Hume does not say here, or elsewhere

in Essay IV that this doubt must,

from an epistemological

point of view, be total.
Indirect evidence for the claim that Hume only attempted
to establish that the mind cannot achieve

(epistemic)

cer-

tainty about the unobserved (relative to the observed) is

scattered throughout Essays IV and V.

In a number of places

Hume states or clearly implies that arguments from experience
are not lacking in epistemic merit.

If this is so,

the only

plausible interpretation of the conclusion of Hume's primary
argument of Essay IV is the interpretation that
gested.

I

have sug-

This also shows that Hume did not identify a lack

of certainty with a lack of epistemic value.

There are pri-

marily two passages v;here Hume voices epistemic approval of
arguments from experience.

Let us consider each of these

in turn.
In Part

1

of Essay IV Hume argues that the mind cannot

discover the cause (effect) merely by examining the effect
(cause).

He then makes the following observation:

Hence we may discover the Reason
why no Philosopher, that has been
rational and modest has ever
pretended to assign the ultimate
Cause of any of the Operations of

^
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....

Nature
Tis confess'd, that the
utmost Effort of human Reason is, to
reduce the Principles, productive of
natural Phenomena, to a greater
Simplicity and to resolve the many
Particular Effects into a few general
Causes by Means of Reasonings from
Analogy, Experience, and Observation.
But as to the Causes of these general
Causes we should in vain attempt their
Discovery
These ultimate Springs
and Principles are totally shut up from
Human Curiosity and Enquiry.^

....

What Hume is saying here is that Reason, in what might
be called its synthetic employment seeks to unify and sys-

tematize its knowledge of natural phenomena.

However, it can

never reach universal and necessary first principles.

If

this be reason's goal, it must inevitably fail to achieve it.

However,

if the mind is more modest in its demands,

it may

achieve its goals.
Elasticity, Gravity, Cohesion of
Parts, Communication of Motion by
Impulse; these are probably the
ultimate Causes and Principles we
shall ever discover in Nature; and
we may esteem ourselves sufficiently
happy, if by accurate Enquiry and

^
^

Ib^.

,

pps.

40-41.

There is an astonishing parallel between Hume's reasoning
here and Kant's discussion (in the Cri tique of Pure Reason
of the difference between reason in Its hypothetical or
regulative employment, and reason in its apodeictic or
(cf. Critique of Pure Reason
constructive employment.
A644-649)

)

.
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Rccisoning, wg can tracG up

tlic particular Phenomena to. or near to, these
general Principles

In light of these passages it is difficult to
see how

someone like Stove can maintain that Hume believed that
no

argument from experience is epistemically better off than
any other.

The general rules by which the mind effects this

systematization are conclusions of arguments from experience.
Though their universality cannot be proved, they are not,
upon that account to be scorned as

a

sham or mere psycholo-

gically necessitated illusion.
The only way that Stove could accommodate these pro-

nouncements of Hume's would be to argue that, since these

passages occur prior to Hume's discussion of inferences from
past experience, his subsequent argument commits him to

rmouncing even these more modest aims.
is true,

Quite the contrary

however.

In Essay V Hume discovers that it is custom or habit

that is responsible for the mind's transition from beliefs

about the observed to beliefs about the unobserved.
ing this discovery he says.

Perhaps we can push our Enquiries no
farther, or pretend to give the Cause

^^David Hume, Enquiries

,

op.

cit

.

,

p.

41.

Regard-

.
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of this Cause; but must rest contented
with it as the ultimate Principle, which
we can assign of all our Conclusions from
Experience.
'Tis sufficient Satisfaction,
that we can go so far; without repining
at the Narrowness of Faculties, because
they will carry us no farther.il

These two passages, as endpieces of Hume's famous argument
of Essay IV,

suggest that Hume never doubted the epistemic

efficacy of arguments from experience.
of that argument is only,

The important question

"How much?"

Indeed, there is even a passage within the argument of

Essay IV Part

2

that indicates that Hume never doubted that

arguments from experience are, in some measure, epistemolo-

gically acceptable.
These two propositions are far from
being the same, ^ have found that such
an O bj ect has always been attended with
such an Effect and ^ f orsee that other
Objects which are
Appearance
simi lar will be attended with similar
E ffects
I shall allow,
you please
t hat one Proposition may justly be
ihTer'^b~f tom the~ ~btTTer l
I know
But
fact that it always is infer'd.
if you insist that, the Inference is made
by a chain of Reasoning, I desire you may
produce that reasoning. 12
(double emphasis added)
,

,

,

,

.

.

Ifbid

.

,

p

52.

l^iy^id

.

,

p.

44

^

.

,

,
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Now if it is only "chains of reasoning" that produce
justified belief, then Hume in

contradicted himself!

a

very short space has flatly

Of course Stove might say that what

Hume means in the offending sentence is what others

believe to be

a

just inference.

(falsely)

The problem with this move

is that there is just no evidence to suggest that Hume thought

this way.
In sum,

then,

the argument of the Enquirie s is best

explained by the interpretive hypothesis of Chapter III,
vi z

.

that Hum.e only intended to establish that no argument

from experience can have the highest possible measure of

conclusiveness and that Hume did not believe that, in light
of this fact,

such arguments are epistemically worthless.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV
In a discussion of the nature and extent of Hume's

scepticism about induction, it would be helpful to take

a

brief look at Hume's relation to some of the Ancient
Sceptics.

He was undoubtedly acquainted with the various

schools of ancient scepticism, and his occasional remarks,

both critical and otherwise, should shed some light on his

epistemological position about inductive inference.

It is

not my purpose here to give a fina l assessment of Hume's

scepticism.

The evidence adduced in Chapter IV suggests

(and most commentators agree,

reasons)

though perhaps for different

that Hume's views on scepticism changed over the

course of Book

I.

Consequently, it may not be possible to

give a consistent and coherent account of Hume's scepticism.
In addition,

an adequate discussion of Hume's scepticism

would go far beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Instead,

my purpose here will be to show that my interpretation of

Hume's scepticism in Part (iii) has

a

clear historical pre-

cedent in the scepticism of Carneades and the Academic

Sceptics and that Hume's discussion of Pyrrhonian scepticism
is best understood against the background of an earlier,

more mitigated (Carneadean)

scepticism.
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The two main schools of Creek scepticism
were the Pyrrhonian and the Academic.
Let us first consider the major

tenets of the latter, as expounded by Carneades.

The Stoics

maintained that true impressions were exact copies
of the
objects which caused them.

This copy relation specifies the

truth conditions for impressions.

This part of the Stoic

doctrine was accepted by Carneades.
logical question that arises is,

The obvious epistemo-

'How are we to distinguish

the true impressions from the false impressions?

'

The Stoic

answer was that, among the true impressions, there were some
that both compel and authorize our assent.

down by the hair."

They "drag us

Carneades, however, objected to the

Stoics' claim that there are such perceptions

phantas ia

)

.

As Charlotte Stough says in

(kateleptike

Creek Scepticism:

That is, a cateleptic impression
"generates" a proposition that
is immediately evident and certain
requiring no supporting evidence
beyond the unquestionable experience
of the subject himself.
The role of
the cateleptic impression is
therefore apparent.
In addition to
defining the conditions of truth, it
authorizes claim to knowledge.'^
Briefly, Carneades objection was that there is no nota

or mark by which the (alleged) cateleptic impression can be

distinguished from the non-catelept ic impression, which, by

^Charlotte Stough, Creek Scepticism:
(Berkeley, 19G9), p. 5T7
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definition,

may^

be false.

it a guarantee that its

above quotation)

Thus, no impression carries with

"correspondent' proposition (see

is true.

Since, then, there really is no

cataleptic impression, there is no way for

to distinguish

\is

the true from the false because it is the cataleptic

impression that gives us access to an independently existing
reality.

Without the cataleptic impression, the Stoic is

left with no criterion of truth.

merely psychological) certainty is

If epistemic
a

(and not

necessary condition for

knowledge, then it is a consequence of Carneades

'

argument

that there can be no knowledge of external things.

Although Carneades has shown that the Stoics' criterion
of truth was unacceptable, he did not conclude that all per-

ceptual statements were equally dubious.

To discover the

criterion of truth, he turned to an examination of the relation between a perception and its perceiver.

tions are equally compelling or convincing.

Not all percepSometimes, as

Alcmaeon has said, "But my mind agrees in no way with the
vision of my eyes."

On the other hand, some perceptions

are apparently true or credible.

It is among the credible

perceptions that Carneades searched for the criterion of
It is unnecessary for present purposes to follow

truth.

2

Ibid

.

,

p

.

48

^
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Carneades any further.

It is important to notice,

however,

that an important shift has been made in the conception
of
the criterion of truth.
(or actually,

Strictly speaking, the criterion

as Carneades developed it, the criteria)

not tell us what is true

;

does

rather it is a criterion of accept-

ance or of what is apparently true.

As Stough says.

The criterion of truth coincides
with the apparently true.
It follows,
therefore, that to ask, "What is the
criterion of truth?" is not to inquire
when a statement ... is true, but to
inquire, "When are we justified in
making an assertion
.?" And
Carneades' response would be, '’When
the assertion is supported by our most
credible experience." Nevertheless, it
is also clear that though the criterion
tells us what counts as an acceptable
ground for an assertion, it cannot
guarantee that the assertion is true.
That is, it allows the uncomfortable
possibility that a statement may be
justifiably made even though it is in
.

fact false

.

.

By making apparently true the criterion of truth,

Carneades could be asked,

'Why ought we to accept the

apparently true?' Carneades' reply would be that his criterion more or less accurately codifies and systematizes

accepted practice.

If part of the goal of the epistemological

enterprise is to bring us into harmony with the practices and

3

Ibid., p

.

58.
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conventions of ordinary life, then Carneadcs has mot with
some measure of success.

However, if we allow that it is at

least possible that our common sense beliefs about what we
ought to accept are radically mistaken, Carneades would have
to show that the apparently true has something else to

recommend it.

For example,

if he could show that the

apparently true is often (though not always) true, his criterion would be acceptable on the grounds that it leads us
to truth more often than not.

On the basis of his epis-

temological principles it is difficult to see how he could
do this.

What does all of this have to do with Hume's argument
about induction?

It is quite natural to see Hume as carrying

on the tradition of Carneades'

scepticism.

Recall that

Carneades argued that there is no nota or mark by which the
(alleged)

cataleptic impression, v/hich compels and authorizes

assent, can be recognized.

Hume argues, in effect, that

though we may be com pelled to believe things about the unobserved, past experience only unconditionally authorizes

belief about the observed.

That is, there is no nota or

mark in past experience that guarantees the mind's projections
about the future.

He further argues that any attempt to gain

that authorization by supposing

a

resemblance between the

observed and the unobserved is doomed to failure.

Thus, no

beliefs about the unobserved are or can be rendered certain

30

relative to the mind's beliets about the observed.
this conclusion is sc eptical

!

That

is shown by the fact that the

mind does believe with certainty that the unobserved resembles
the observed.

Hume even has a psychological explanation for

why this is the case.
It by no means follows,

;

nor did Hume conclude that,

that all beliefs about the unobserved are equally dubious.
j

If the argument of this chapter and the last is correct,

Hume followed Carneades in that he located the criterion of

rational acceptance in that which is accepted.

That is,

past experience provides some measure of warrant (though
not the highest possible)

'

for beliefs about the unobserved,

We are justified in accepting some of these beliefs, even
j

though they may in fact be false.

Of course, Hume did not

believe that all accepted beliefs were acceptable.

'

As

I

the quotation on pages 189 and 190 indicates, the acceptable
I

beliefs are those that spring from universal and irresistible
J

principles of human nature.

The unacceptable beliefs are

those that spring from weak and irregular principles.

This

j

^

recalls Carneades' distinction between the credible perceptions

]

'

'

and those which do not compel our assent.

However,

just as was the case with Carneades' proposal,

1

I

!

one might well ask,

'Why ough t we to make past experience the

criterion for (rational) acceptance?'

Hume might reply that
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his criterion
(iii)

(which is worked out in some detail in Part

Section 15:

Effects

)

"Rules by which to Judge Causes and

more or less accurately codifies and systematizes

accepted practice.

If part of the goal of the epistemo-

logical enterprise is to bring us into harmony with accepted
(everyday and scientific) practice, then Hume's positive

i

i

proposals of Section 15 have something to recommend them.
However, if we allow that it is at least possible that we

I

are radically mistaken about what beliefs

served) we ought to accept,

(about the unob-

then one might ask Hume why

accepted practice is, in effect, acceptable practice.
this is a deep question.

It is not at all obvious that

Hume had a satisfactory answer to this question.
I

Clearly,

In Chapter V

shall discuss some Humean approaches to this problem.

the present,

For

it is sufficient to note the striking similarities

between Carneades' and Hume's approach to closely related

'

epistemological problems.

I

Not only is this similarity evi-

I

dent on the basis of general philosophical considerations,
1

but in addition, Hume explicitly endorses the Carneadean
I

I

,

approach in the last Essay of the E nquiries

:

i

1

\

I

i

j

i

!

I

There is, indeed, a more miti gated
Scepticism or academical Philosophy
which may be both durable and useful,
and which may, in Part, be the Result
of this Pyrrhonism or exces siv e
scepticism, when its undistinguished
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Doubts are, in some measure, corrected
by common Sense and Reflection."^
Those who have a Propensity to Philosophy, will still continue their
Researches; because they reflect, that,
besides the immediate Pleasure, attending to such an Occupation, Philosophical
Decisions are nothing but the Reflections
of common Life methodiz'd and corrected.^

Hume

discussions of

s

a

more extreme form of scepticism

constitute further evidence that throughout most of Book

I

of the Treatise Hume adopted primarily a Carneadean stand-

point.

This more extreme form of scepticism is often called

"Pyrrhonian "

.

Let us turn to Sextus Empiricus, the chronicler

of Ancient Scepticism, for a definition of this version of

scepticism:
[Pyrrhonian] Scepticism is an ability
or mental attitude, which opposes
appearances to judgments in any way
whatsoever, with the result that, owing
to the equipollence of the objects
and reasons thus opposed are brought
firstly to a state of mental suspense
and next to a state of "unperturbedness
or quietude.^ (ataraxia)

David Hume, Enquiries
^^bid.

,

op.

cit

.

,

154.

p.

155.

p.

^Sextus Empiricus, Outlines o f Pyrrhonis m in Greek and Ro man
ed by Jason L. Saunders
Philosophy Following Aristotle
,

(n7y.

,

1966)

,

p.

153.

.
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Sextus proceeds to define all of the key expressions
in
this definition.

For present purposes, one of these is

v;orth quoting.

Equipollence v/e use of equality in
respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the
conflicting judgments takes precedence
of any other as being more probable.”^
'

'

There can be little doubt that Pyrrhonian Scepticism, as

defined by Sextus, is very similar to the version of

scepticism that Stove has (falsely) attributed to Hume's
argument of Part (iii) Section

6.

Now Hume argues in various places in Part
in the latter essays of the Enquiries

ataraxia is unattainable.

(and

that the Pyrrhonians'

He has primarily two arguments

Briefly, they are:

for this.

)

(iv)

(i)

He claims that the mind

is unable to suspend judgment as the Pyrrhonians recommend.

This is just

matter of psychological fact.

a

(ii)

Secondly,

if someone could adopt this suspensive attitude, Nature

would shortly put an end to that individual's miserable
existence.

Hume's characterization of the nature and extent

of the Pyrrhonian 's suspensive attitude is probably inaccurate.

~^

Ibid

.

,

p

.

154

.

His Pyrrhonism and His
^Sce Richard Popkin, "David Hume:
A Collection of
in Hume:
reprinted
Pyrrhonism"
Critique of
(Notre Dame,
editor
Chappell,
Critical Essays. Vere C.
54-57
jriidiana, 1968) pages
.

.

8

In addition,

Hume's objections are clearly based on
empirical

arguments; those arguments may well beg the
question against
the Pyrrhonian.
However, both of these issues are not im-

portant for present purposes.

What

I

should like to call

attention to is the placement of Hume's Objections
to Pyrrhonism.

Hume feels obliged to disassociate himself from

Pyrrhonism by means of these objections only when he sees
that his own principles appear to draw him towards that

position.

The two places where this occurs in the Treatise

are at the end of Part (iv) Section

2

Section

I.

7,

the last section of Book

and in Part

As

I

(iv)

have argued

previously in this chapter, the arguments that lead Hume
towards the Pyrrhonic suspension of judgment are distinct
from and independent of the argum.ents of Part (iii)
the argument of Part (iii) Section

6.

,

notably

Thus the location of

Hume's objections to Pyrrhonism suggests that he did not

believe that, prior to these new arguments, there was any
reason to suspend judgment regarding matters of fact.

This

is difficult to understand on Stove's interpretation of the

argument of Part (iii) Section

6;

it makes sense,

however,

if Hume had adopted a Carneadean standpoint up until Part

Let us consider the argument of Part (iii)

Section

light of these distinctions between the various forms of

6

(iv)

in

.

scepticism.
"a

Does Hume remain,

in the words of John Laird^

complete Pyrrhonian regarding all

u ltimate

principles"?^

The Pyrrhonian Sceptic offers (what he takes
to be) equally

good conflicting arguments.

They are supposed to result in

the suspension of judgment.

Obviously, that is not what Hume

is doing here.

He asserts unequivocally that the ultimate

reason for beliefs about the future cannot be known.

The

Academics were sceptics in that they abjured from dogmatic
assertions about the world.

They were not, however,

sceptics about the mind's claims of (certain and incontrovertible)

knowledge about the world.

My purpose in this brief Appendix has not been to offer
a

systematic appraisal of Hume's scepticism in the Tr eatise

Rather

I

.

have only tried to show that, once we distinguish

between Carneadean and Pyrrhonian scepticism, Hume's position
through the end of Book
a kind of

I

Part (iii)

Carneadean scepticism.

is best interpreted as

This entails that beliefs

about the future (or, more generally, about the unobserved)
can have differing measures of epistemic warrant, even if

none of them can have the highest possible such measure.
Since Hume was undoubtedly aware of the v/ritings of Sextus
and Cicero, this Appendix further shows that the conception
of epistemic v^;arrant employed in these chapters was not foreign
to Hume

^John Laird, Hume
p.

leT.'

's P hiloso ph y

of Human Nature

(l.ondon,

1

932)

,

